Safety Measures to Reduce Medication Administration Errors in Paediatric Intensive Care Unit by Ameer, Ahmed
  
 
Safety Measures to Reduce 
Medication Administration 
Errors in Paediatric Intensive 
Care Unit  
 
 
Ahmed Ameer 
 
Submitted to the University of Hertfordshire in partial fulfilment of 
the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
February 2015 
  i 
Acknowledgement 
I would like to express my deepest appreciation to all those who have 
provided me with the support to take advantage of this life-changing 
opportunity. A very special thanks to Dr Maisoon Ghaleb and Professor Soraya 
Dhillon who have supervised this project and mentored my development. I 
am extremely grateful for all the unforgettable and stimulating discussions 
that helped to shape this research. I am sincerely much obliged to you for 
giving me the freedom to lead and take on this research.  
This research would not have been possible without the support I received 
from staff and patients at Great Ormond Street Hospital. I witnessed the 
excellent world-class level of care provided by everyone at the PICU in 
particular. I thank Professor Mark Peters, Alison Taberner-Stokes, Rachelle 
Booth, Venetia Simchowitz and Ghislaine Stephenson for facilitating and 
welcoming this research. I cannot thank enough the unsung heroes that 
allowed me to observe them and exchanged thoughts on all circles of life and 
healthcare practice.  
I highly appreciate the research committees of UK Paediatric Intensive Care 
Unit as well as the Neonatal and Paediatric Pharmacist Group for sending out 
questionnaires to their members. Their input in this study is of key 
importance. Also, all those doctors, nurses and pharmacists across the UK 
who took part in this study. I thank you all very much.  
Furthermore, I am grateful for all the support I received from my colleagues 
at NHS England; Patient Safety Domain. Especially the Safer Medicines and 
Devices Team: Dr David Gerrett, Dr David Cousins, Steve Williams, Isobel 
O’Grady and Dagmar Luettel. The insightful and inspirational discussions I 
received on medication safety have been tremendous. I am thankful for all 
the learning opportunities you have given me. Also, I thank Windwood 
Chemist for their immense support: Mahendra Amin, Kirtida Mehta, Sarah 
Talia, Sandrine Hamzoie and Safoora Khatibzada.  
I am also so thankful for the financial support by the University of 
Hertfordshire in funding this PhD Programme. It would have been extremely 
  ii 
difficult to undertake this programme without this help. Moreover, the support 
by Department of Pharmacy staff and clinical pharmacy practice research 
students was absolutely priceless. I have shared with them all the hardship of 
PhD and research. I thank them for their patience with me and I thank them 
for their infinite thought provoking questions. I have made many friends who, 
I am sure will be around in the coming years. I will always come back for 
advice and support from everyone in UH Pharmacy.   
I have been blessed with friends that have made this journey less difficult. 
They have always motivated me by asking “when is this finishing?”. I will not 
attempt to name any one of them individually. I sincerely thank you all for the 
support and knowing how to cheer me up in difficult times.   
Lastly but by no means least, I cannot express how thankful I am for the 
endless encouragement and motivation I receive from my family. Words 
cannot express the amount of gratitude I have for my biggest role models; 
my parents. They have been the fuel that powered my development in 
everything. I will always be indebted to them for their unconditional advice, 
love and guidance. I would also like to thank my siblings Hayder, Zina and 
Khalid for their limitless supply of motivation and dealing with PhD induced 
mood swings. A big thank you to Baby Ali for not failing to put a big smile on 
my face every time.    
  iii 
Abstract 
Objective: Medicine administration is the last process of the medication 
cycle. However, errors can happen during this process. Children are at an 
increased risk from these errors. This has been extensively investigated but 
evidence is lacking on effective interventions. Therefore, the aim of this 
research is to propose safety measures to reduce medication administration 
errors (MAE) in the Paediatric Intensive Care Unit (PICU). 
Method: The research was carried out over five studies; 1) systematic 
literature review, 2) national survey of PICU medication error interventions, 3) 
retrospective analysis of medication error incidents, 4) prospective 
observation of the administration practice, and 5) survey of PICU healthcare 
professionals’ opinions on MAE contributory factors and safety measures.  
Results: Hospital MAE in children found in literature accounted for a mean of 
50% of all reported medication error reports (n= 12552). It was also 
identified in a mean of 29% of doses observed (n= 8894). This study found 
MAE retrospectively in 43% of all medication incidents (n= 412). Additionally, 
a total of 269 MAEs were observed (32% per dose observation). The 
characteristics of the interventions used to reduce MAE are diverse but it 
illustrated that a single approach is not enough. Also for an intervention to be 
a success it is fundamental to build a safety culture. This is achieved by 
developing a culture of collaborative learning from errors without assigning 
blame. Furthermore, MAE contributing factors were found to include; 
interruptions, inadequate resources, working conditions and no pre-prepared 
infusions. The following safety measures were proposed to reduce MAE; 1) 
dose banding, 2) improved lighting conditions, 3) decision support tool with 
calculation aid, 4) use of pre-prepared infusions, 5) enhance the double-
checking process, 6) medicine administration checklist, and 7) an intolerant 
culture to interruption. 
Conclusion: This is one of the first comprehensive study of to explore MAE 
in PICU from different perspectives. The aim and objectives of the research 
were fulfilled. Future research includes the need to implement the proposed 
safety measures and evaluate them in practice.   
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
“If a physician operate on a man for a severe wound with a bronze 
lancet and cause the man's death, or open an abscess in the eye of a 
man with a bronze lancet and destroy the man's eye, they shall cut off 
his fingers.” 
Hammurabi’s Code of Laws (1772 BC) 
 
“Primum Non Nocere 
[First Do No Harm]” 
Hippocratic Oath (400 BC) 
 
Providing healthcare is associated with threats to patient safety. Many of 
these threats are the result of latent failures and some are the result of active 
failures (Reason, 2000). Patient safety has been at the heart of medical 
practice since the beginning of civilisation as demonstrated by Hammurabi’s 
code of law number 218 (Harper, 1904, p. 77). It was also emphasised by the 
Hippocratic oath of medicine. The World Health Organization (2006) have 
defined a patient safety event as “a process or act of omission or commission 
that resulted in hazardous healthcare conditions and/or unintended harm to 
the patient”. 
Ensuring safety in the medical field is becoming ever more complex and 
challenging. This is due to the rapid development and progression of medicine 
and medical practice over time. Patient safety concerns are widespread in 
developed, developing and transitional countries. An epidemiological study 
across 58 hospitals in five Latin American countries found that 1191 out of 
11379 patients (10.5%) had had at least one adverse event related to 
medical care. In all, 60% of these adverse events were considered to be 
preventable (Aranaz-Andrés et al., 2011). Fortunately, Hammurabi’s code is 
no longer practised, however, it is important to enforce legislations, 
monitoring and guidance amongst all healthcare professionals to ensure the 
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safety of patients is maintained at all times. It is also important to make 
changes to the system to minimise mishaps (Department of Health, 2000; 
Kohn, Corrigan, & Donaldson, 2000).  
1.1 Children & Young People: Special Population 
Children and young people are a large, vulnerable group. They are estimated 
by the census of 2011 to number around 15 million persons in the UK, 
representing around 23% of the total UK population (Office for National 
Statistics, 2012). This large group is broken down into: 
 Infants (0–1 year of age) 
 Toddlers (1–3 years of age) 
 Pre-schoolers (3–5 years of age) 
 Middle Childhood (6–11 years of age) 
 Young Teens (11–14 years of age) 
 Teenagers (15–18 years of age) 
They undergo a rapid growth and development process from the very first 
day of life. This process of development will build up their strength physically 
and cognitively. Therefore, they face many challenges in this process. Some 
may require healthcare professionals' advice and a stay in hospital for 
treatment. It is estimated that 2.4 million children (aged 0 to 18 years) were 
hospitalised in 2012/2013 across England (Health & Social Care Information 
Centre, 2013).  
The majority of these hospital admissions receive safe care but some 
encounter a patient safety incident. Most of these patient safety incidents are 
harmless and could be prevented. However, it is still unacceptable and 
lessons must be learnt to prevent these incidents happening again. Every now 
and then patient safety incident attracts wide media attention, one of the 
most recent incidents that attracted a public response related to a 10 year old 
girl who was injected with a glue in her brain instead of a surgical dye 
(Campbell, 2014). This has led to unfortunate permanent brain damage. This 
incident was found to have been avoidable if a simple safety measure had 
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been taken, such as marking the glue injection with a colour code. This case 
is so far the largest medical negligence case that has been settled at a 
London based high court. The hospital responsible was ordered to pay at 
least £24.2 million in compensation for life-long care.  
Therefore, there is no room for error when providing care for this group of 
patients, since preventable incidents can have a major impact on their quality 
of life. High standards of care are always expected for this population 
regardless of pressures. It has been nearly 14 years since the recognition of 
the challenges of providing safe medication care by the Department of Health 
(2001) in their report on building a safer healthcare system. 
 The issue of safety and specifically safe use of medications is an international 
worry. Many agencies and departments formed to tackle this issue. However, 
the key developments for improving hospital patient safety in the United 
Kingdom, including children, are as follows: 
 An organisation with memory report (Department of Health, 2000) 
recommendations included to develop: 
o Safety cultures within the organisation instead of blame 
cultures. 
o Error reporting to encourage learning and improvement to the 
system. 
o Clinical governance to support continuous improvement of care 
quality.  
 Building a safer NHS for patients: Implementing ‘an 
organisation with a memory’ (Department of Health, 2001) 
o  Introduced the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA), an 
independent body to support adverse events and error 
reporting.  
 A spoonful of sugar (Audit Commission, 2001) 
o Review of medicine management policies in hospitals against 
the recommendations of an organisation with a memory report. 
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o Recognised the need for more pharmacist involvement in the 
management of medicines to ensure safe and effective use.  
 High quality care for all report by Lord Darzi (2008) 
o Set out a future vision for NHS organisations of quality of care. 
o Underlined the importance of maintaining patient safety as top 
priority across the different settings. 
o Addressed Patient Safety First initiative by the NPSA. 
 Report of the children and young people’s health outcomes 
forum by Lewis and Lenehan (2012) 
o Putting children, young people and their families at the heart of 
things. 
o Mandatory reporting of medication errors to NRLS. 
o Ensure safe and sustainable services; development of bundle of 
interventions in order to eliminate or reduce medication errors.  
 A promise to learn – a commitment to act: improving the 
safety of patients in England by Berwick (2013) 
o Need of systematic changes to improve leadership and 
transparency of patient safety incidents. 
o Remove blame culture and encourage development of modern 
quality improvement programmes.  
o Support NHS staff to learn and improve on patient safety 
matters. 
 Report of the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public 
Inquiry by Francis (2013)  
o Duty of openness, transparency and candour throughout the 
healthcare system.  
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o Improved support for compassionate, caring and committed 
care and stronger leadership. 
 National Medication Safety Network by NHS England (2014b) 
o Collaborating to increase the number of medication incident 
reports, improve quality of reporting and support local and 
national learning from incidents. 
it is noticeable that all major reviews, reports and initiatives by the various 
governmental organisations highlight the need to improve patient safety in 
children by: 1) being open and transparent, 2) continuously reviewing 
services to improve quality, 3) supporting changes to the system to prevent 
unintentional harm, 4) taking accountability of actions and learning from 
mishaps, and 5) maintaining high standards.   
1.2 Hospital Care: Risky Environment  
Hospitals are meant to be the places where people are least likely to be 
harmed. But they are now considered one of the most dangerous areas, 
compared to other industries such as aviation and nuclear power plants. 
These industries were traditionally associated with a high risk of harm if 
preventable errors occurred. However, these two industries were able to 
transform their safety records by the extensive use of checklists, automation 
of practice and sharing lessons. Children and young people in hospital are 
facing avoidable incidents (Sandars & Cook, 2009, pp. 1–2) such as:  
 Diagnostic errors 
 Infection control incidents 
 Medical equipment failures 
 Medication errors   
 Patient access, admission, transfer or discharge incidents 
 Surgical/Treatment mishaps  
These incidents could be a result of the complex interaction of human factors 
and the healthcare system. In a report by the former National Patient Safety 
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Agency (2009, NPSA) that reviewed the incidents submitted to the National 
Reporting and Learning System (NRLS) for the period of one year (between 
2007 and 2008). It was found that most incidents relate to use of medication 
(16%, n= 10041). The majority of these incidents were reported from acute 
settings (84%). These findings indicate that there is a need to investigate 
medication use in children’s hospitals.  
The issue of safety versus usual practice is a major issue in every regulated 
occupation where innocent lives can be put in risk. Two classic examples are 
the aviation industry or nuclear power reactors. Both industries are quite 
young compared to healthcare. However, they have learnt considerably from 
their mistakes. The introduction of checklists and changing the concept of 
teamwork played a major part in enhancing safety. The vast financial 
investments these industries have made into improving safety have to be 
admired. However, the key safety initiative that is the foundation of safe 
practice is minimising the differences between teams (Gordon, Mendenhall, 
Connor, & Sullenberger, 2013). This cultural change is vital since every 
member of the team can raise a concern without fear (Swartz, 2015).  
Healthcare is very much like these high-reliability industries. Since healthcare 
serves a much wider scale in terms of population size and employs a large 
number of people with diverse professional backgrounds it is increasingly 
utilising advancing technology and providing services around the clock. Thus, 
there is no excuse for not improving safety and learning from others who 
have mastered it.        
1.3 Medication Use & Errors in Children’s Hospitals 
The medicine use process in children’s hospital as demonstrated in Figure ‎1.1 
usually starts with the physician making a clinical diagnosis. Followed by a 
prescribing process in accordance with national guidelines and local protocols. 
A pharmacist will then clinically check this prescription/medication chart 
before dispensing. This process is carried out either in clinical areas such as 
the intensive care units or in the pharmacy dispensary. The third process is 
the administration of the medicine. Nurses mostly carry this out in line with 
administration procedures. The final process is the monitoring of the 
treatment. This is typically carried out using a multidisciplinary approach. The 
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aim of the monitoring process is to review patient’s responses to treatment 
against clinical parameters, symptoms and blood levels.  
A medication error can occur at any stage of this process. Medication errors 
(ME) were defined by the European Medicines Agency (2012, EMA) as 
“unintentional errors in the prescribing, dispensing, administration or 
monitoring of a medicine while under the control of a healthcare professional, 
patient or consumer. They are the most common single preventable cause of 
adverse events in medication practice”. In a systematic literature review,  
Miller, Robinson, Lubomski, Rinke, and Pronovost (2007) found that 
prescribing errors range between 2 and 30 per 100 children's medication 
prescriptions. Whereas dispensing errors in children are between 5 and 58 per 
100 reported ME. A review by Ghaleb et al. (2006) found that administration 
errors in children range between 0.6 and 27 per 100 reported ME. So far, 
limited research has been conducted to investigate monitoring errors in 
children’s hospitals. Only one study is known to have investigated monitoring 
errors in children and this found it to be 4 per 1000 patients (Kaushal et al., 
2001). 
 
Figure ‎1.1: Medicine use process in children’s hospital 
Diagnosis 
Prescribing 
Dispensing  
Admini-
stration 
Monitoring  
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The broad definition of ME evolved from a wide range of research. From this 
research expert consensus has highlighted two important points. The first 
point is that these errors are preventable. This could either be by changes to 
the system or by modification to human factors. The second point is that 
these errors are related to adverse events which refers to “any occurrence or 
injury related to management of a disease” (Goedecke, 2013). This also 
relates to the following concepts:  
• Adverse Drug Reactions 
• Adverse Drug Events 
• Medicine Related Problems  
Adverse drug reaction (ADR) is defined by the Directive 2010/84/EU (2010) 
as “a response to a medicinal product that is noxious and unintended. Effects 
resulting not only from the authorised use of a medicinal product at normal 
doses, but also from medication errors and uses outside the terms of the 
marketing authorisation, including the misuse, off-label use and abuse of the 
medicinal product”. This definition builds upon the World Health Organization 
(1972) and other medication safety experts such as Edwards and Aronson 
(2000). Whereas adverse drug events (ADE) were described by Edwards and 
Aronson (2000) as “an adverse outcome that occurs while a patient is taking 
a drug, but is not or not necessarily attributable to it”. Therefore, ADE is 
related to issues such as drug interactions with other drugs, food or disease. 
But also it indicates that a medication error can lead to ADE that could cause 
an ADR.  
On the other hand, a medicine related problem (MRP) is an “event or 
circumstance involving drug therapy that actually or potentially interferes with 
desired health outcomes” as defined by Pharmaceutical Care Network Europe 
Foundation (2010). Therefore, ADR, ADE and ME are considered to be 
subtypes of MRP. This also relates to patient use of medication. For instance 
in a paediatric context, many patients will be reliant on others administering 
their medication. So if that person is not aware of the dose requirement, the 
child could receive an overdose or an underdose that leads to an MRP. 
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Figure ‎1.2 illustrates this relationship and the research evolution of these 
concepts over time.   
 
Figure ‎1.2: Evolution and relationship of medication safety concepts 
Referring back to the definition of medication errors by the EMA, it was 
suggested that medication errors are the single most preventable adverse 
events. Thus, this is also correct for MRP. Controlling medication errors can 
have a real impact on both patients and the healthcare system, since 
medication errors can lead to serious harm that could be irreversible. 
Reducing patient risk will also reduce risk of readmission to hospital or a 
prolonged hospital stay. These factors are economically costly since the NPSA 
(2007b) estimated the cost of preventable harm from medicines in England is 
more than £750 million each year. This figure is likely to be on the increase 
due to: 1) more ME incident reports since the published report, 2) increased 
financial costs of providing healthcare in hospitals, and 3) lack of evidence 
that supports ME being on the decrease.  
The system is designed to place barriers to stop ME from happening, such as 
pharmacists checking safe prescribing of medicines. However, it is often more 
complicated when dealing with children's medication. For instance, during 
prescribing special consideration is required when it comes to deciding a 
dose, since nearly all children's doses are weight-based. Also the process of 
dispensing is complicated by the need to adjust formulations to meet 
requirements for use in children. Moreover, the administration stage is 
challenged by the small physiology of children. Therefore, children's 
medication processes are likely to be more error-prone. Kaushal et al. (2001) 
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concluded in their prospective study that children are at a higher risk of 
developing potential ADE as a result of ME than adults (p = 0.001). The 
administration process is the last chance for errors to be intercepted, 
therefore, putting patients at a greater chance of unintentional harm. Hence, 
it is important to make sure that this process is secure and physical as well as 
non-physical measures are in place to avoid errors. 
 
1.4 Medication Administration Errors in Children’s 
Hospitals  
The process of medication administration in children’s hospital is complex. It 
is composed of two main procedures: the first is the preparation of the 
medication and the second is the administration of the dose to the child. 
Often a registered nurse carries this out, but occasionally doctors and trainee 
nurses take part in this process too. The process can be lengthy in time 
depending on the number of medicines to be administered and the 
preparation of the dosage form. For example a parenteral dose will take 
longer to prepare than an oral dose. Therefore, the risk of errors in this 
process is high. In a systematic literature review by Ghaleb et al. (2006) it 
was found that the rate of medication administration errors in children’s 
hospitals is between 0.6 and 27 per 100 dose administrations.  
There are different ways to complete this stage of the medicine cycle but the 
key components involve the following:  
 Prescription for the medicine must be present before the process 
begins. The prescription will need to be checked against the 
prescribing protocol of the hospital or recommended resources such 
as the BNF.  
 Assembly of the medicine must be carried out in a safe and clean 
area. Aseptic preparation may be needed for certain formulations such 
as intravenous infusions. 
 Product collected needs to be checked against the prescription to 
ensure it is the correct medicine requested.  
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 The preparation will then be carried out in accordance to 
manufacturers’ recommendations and hospital guidelines. For 
example, injectable medicines may require use of diluent and to take 
into consideration factors such as displacement volume and suitability. 
Similarly, oral doses will need to be measured using labelled/marked 
oral syringes and not intravenous syringes with ports as highlighted by 
the NPSA (2007a) alert.  
 Administration of the medicine is then performed. Making sure that 
the correct medicine is given to the correct patient at the correct time 
with the correct dose via the correct route. 
As can be seen from the description above, the process is lengthy, requires 
concentration and planning ahead. Thus, there are multiple opportunities for 
errors in this task. Each opportunity can lead to a potential for serious harm. 
For example, if the incorrect medicine is picked up due to sound alike/look 
alike cause but were prepared and administered as if it was the correct 
medicine. If no barriers are in place to prevent this from happening, it can 
potentially harm the child. Therefore it is important to study this area and 
develop a better understanding of the factors that could lead to harmful 
errors. This was reflected in a systematic literature review by Keers, Williams, 
Cooke, and Ashcroft (2013b) which found administration errors in children 
between 17.4% and 33.8% per 100 opportunities for error. On the other 
hand, in adult populations the error rate falls to between 4.7% and 27.8% 
per 100 opportunities for error as demonstrated by Keers et al. (2013b).  
Other factors that can contribute to increased risk of errors in medication 
administration practice includes the extensive use of unlicensed and/or off-
label medicines in children’s hospitals (Conroy et al., 2000; Turner, Nunn, & 
Choonara, 1997). This is common in critical clinical areas such as the 
intensive care units. Unlicensed medicines are therapeutic agents without 
marketing authorisation from the medicines regulatory authorities. Whereas, 
off-label use is when a medicine is used for an indication outside the medicine 
regulatory authorities licensed indications.  
The rate of error in these medicines has been investigated by Conroy (2011) 
who found an association of ME with unlicensed and off-label medicines. She 
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found that 42% (n= 34 reported incidents) were incidents in administration 
involving unlicensed and off-label medicines. Additionally, some medications 
are only available in a certain formulation. Hence will require extra 
preparation steps thereby increasing the opportunity for errors to occur 
(Conroy, Appleby, Rostock, Unsworth, & Cousins, 2007a; Gonzales, 2010). 
Also, many of these specially prepared formulations would have a shorter 
expiration date and require special storage conditions. Therefore, this further 
increases the risk of errors by mistakenly administering out-of-date medicines 
or forgetting to store the medicine appropriately in the fridge.  
Also, not to forget that children's doses are relatively smaller than their equal 
adult doses. As is known, nearly all doses are based either on weight or body 
surface area. Thus, resulting in a challenge for the nursing team when 
preparing the doses since many formulations are not friendly for child dosing. 
Therefore, there is a potential for 10-times or more overdose far more easily 
than in adults (Gonzales, 2010). This issue can also lead to wrong infusion 
rate of parenteral medicines. Under dosing is also a potential risk and it could 
be harmful since the patient will be receiving a sub-therapeutic treatment.  
An example of an overdose error was reported in an organisation with a 
memory report (Department of Health, 2000) where a premature baby girl 
died after being given an overdose of 15mg morphine instead of 0.15mg, this 
was due to miscalculation of the dosage by the Senior House Officer, which 
was checked by a nurse and administered by the Senior Registrar. The report 
documented many other examples where patients were harmed because of 
either human or systemic factors. 
These factors relating to humans or the system can be explored using 
Reason’s (2000) model of error causation. Reason suggests that errors occur 
as a result of either active failures or latent conditions. Active failures are the 
direct unsafe acts that led to an error. On the other hand, latent conditions 
are the factors in the system that provokes an error. A systematic literature 
review by Keers, Williams, Cooke, and Ashcroft (2013a) explored causes of 
administration errors in children’s hospitals using Reason’s model. Keers and 
his colleagues concluded that the main causes of administration errors in 
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children’s hospitals were slips and lapses due to interruptions, workload and 
staffing levels.  
Additionally, violations of tasks and knowledge-based errors are also a leading 
cause. Failure to interpret prescriptions correctly was also an associated cause 
along with mismatching patients. These contributory factors can lead to 
errors relating to delay or omission of the dose without a clinical justification. 
Bear in mind that administration of medicine is a skill, which requires training 
and experience.  
Thus, healthcare professionals that are involved in giving medicine may 
encounter errors relating to their administration technique or failure. 
Moreover, normally administration of medicines to children involves use of 
medical devices such as infusion pumps that are subjected to errors in setting 
up and running the infusions. 
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1.5 Paediatric Intensive Care Unit  
The Paediatric Intensive Care Audit Network (PICANet) reports a total of 
60343 paediatric intensive care admissions (up to age 16 years old) for the 
period between 2011 and 2013 across the UK. This represents a 4% increase 
in admissions (PICANet, 2014). The mortality rate in PICU is very low since 
96% of children were discharged alive in 2011 and 2013. The reports also 
document that only 15% (n= 5) of Paediatric Intensive Care Units (PICU) met 
the national standard for level of nursing (7.01 whole time equivalent per 
critical care bed) in 2013. This data is worrying since it is reflecting an 
increase in demand for critical care that is not being met with adequate 
staffing levels.  
Children that are in critical clinical areas such as PICU are at a higher risk of 
being subjected to medication administration errors. This is due to the fact 
that these children are bound to be receiving more frequent administrations 
of medications compared to other acute wards. More likely to be required 
narrow therapeutic window medicines and intravenous infusions (Campino, 
Lopez-Herrera, Lopez-de-Heredia, & Valls-i-Soler, 2009; Suresh et al., 2004). 
Also there is a need for continuous dose calculations due to children specific 
pharmacokinetic considerations.  
Moreover, medicine administration in the PICU is not allocated to specific time 
slots. Hence, administration could be frequent at any time. This is an 
important issue since there is a potential for administering medicines without 
clinical checks by a pharmacist. This also increases the chance of giving 
medicines at the wrong time due to prioritising other clinical duties or due to 
interruptions by other members of the healthcare team and the patient’s 
companions. Also, due to the compromised health status of this cohort, they 
will be more prone to harm and deterioration in the event of an error. This 
will also affect the rate of drug metabolism and excretion (Wilson et al., 
1998). Additionally, PICUs are increasingly employing agency/bank staff to 
address the issue of shortages. This is a huge risk since agency/bank staff will 
not necessary have the knowledge or skills needed for critical care. 
Furthermore, there is a risk of bringing in uncommon practices that are not 
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routinely performed in certain PICUs or not part of the local 
procedures/protocols.  
Despite all these factors, there has been limited research carried out to 
understand fully the true nature of medication administration errors in PICU. 
As will be demonstrated in chapter 3 of this thesis, the majority of  research 
is carried out in general wards. Nevertheless, Wilson et al. (1998) found that 
over two years of continuous monitoring of adverse incidents, medication 
errors are seven times higher in PICU compared to other wards. This is 
extremely distressing since it is similar to the findings of the early research by 
Bates et al. (1995). Although both studies are 20 years old, the trend of risk 
is still the same as demonstrated by Agarwal et al. (2010) and Ghaleb, 
Barber, Franklin, and Wong (2010). Children who are in PICU are much sicker 
and require error free care in order to speed up recovery. Additionally, in the 
PICU there is a 1.5:1 nursing ratio, therefore errors must be limited. 
Moreover, the research that is carried out in PICU is restricted to investigation 
of these errors but not finding out evidence-based solutions to reduce them.  
 
1.6 Research Aim & Objectives 
The aim of this research is to propose safety measures to reduce medication 
administration errors (MAE) in paediatric intensive care units. 
The objectives of this research are: 
1. To review literature on MAE in children’s hospitals. 
2. To investigate the nature of MAE in PICU. 
3. To characterise existing MAE interventions used nationally in PICU. 
4. To identify MAE contributory factors in PICU.  
5. To outline the nature of MAE interventions recommended by 
healthcare professionals in PICU. 
6. To propose safety measures to reduce MAE in PICU. 
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Chapter 2:  Methodology  
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Research is defined as “the systematic investigation into and study of 
materials and sources in order to establish facts and reach new conclusions” 
(Oxford Dictionary). The purpose of conducting a research study can be to:  
 Explore current knowledge in a particular field and recognise a new 
phenomenon. 
 Inspect existing known problems or identify a problem.  
 Suggest a solution to a problem. 
 Hypothesise or develop new procedures or systems. 
 Add new knowledge to current practice/knowledge. 
 Or a combination of any of the above. 
(Blaxter, Hughes & Tight, 2010) 
Therefore the purpose of research can be themed as: exploratory, 
descriptive, analytical, or predictive. Undergoing research will eventually lead 
to a conclusion. Researchers will need to be aware of the two models of 
reasoning: 
 Deductive reasoning is the approach of narrowing what is generally 
known (rules/principles/hypothesis/definition) to the particular 
knowledge needed to reach a logical conclusion with assertiveness. 
Usually known as the “top-down” approach. 
 Inductive reasoning is the claiming of a conclusion to be 
likely/probable to given evidence. Induction makes specific knowledge 
into broader general knowledge. Usually known as the “bottom-up” 
approach. 
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This chapter will discuss the different types of research philosophies used to 
reach a conclusion. The overall research questions in this research and the 
research methodological approach taken will also be explored in this chapter. 
2.2 Research Philosophies 
Research philosophy is an important part of research methodology 
development since it will help researchers to develop new knowledge. It is 
based on a set of assumptions, values, concepts and practices. The following 
is a brief summary of key research philosophies (Blaxter et al., 2010; Bowling, 
2009; Holloway, 2005; Knox, 2004; Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2007): 
 EPISTEMOLOGY– Concerns knowledge and how to acquire it 
o Positivism – Deductive approach  
 Structured observation of phenomena that will lead to a 
synthesis of convincing data and uses current theories to 
produce hypotheses. These hypotheses will undergo 
testing and analysis, this will lead to future research and 
replication of methodology. Researchers use natural 
sciences as a model of investigation, to conclude with 
objective knowledge. 
 Example: Use of direct observation of medication 
administration practice to identify MAE. 
o Realism – Deductive approach 
 Employs scientific approach to collect data similar to the 
positivism approach. However, realism philosophy takes 
into account the independence of reality to the 
researcher and that there is an autonomous external 
reality. Requires triangulation of data from many sources 
to identify knowledge.  
 Example: Implementation of an intervention to reduce 
MAE. 
o Interpretivism / Constructivism – Inductive approach 
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 Supports the requirement for the researcher to recognise 
diversity between humans unlike fixed objects. Involves 
critical thinking of positivism philosophy. Interpretive 
philosophy would suggest different versions of facts to 
build a theory. Researcher concludes with subjective 
knowledge. 
 Example: Interviewing healthcare professionals involved 
in MAE to identify causes or factors that led to the error. 
 ONTOLOGY– Concerns reality and how to view it 
o Objectivism 
 Existence of a single reality to build theory cumulatively 
independently of the researcher. Measurable either 
directly or indirectly.  
 Example: Survey of healthcare professionals’ perception 
of MAE.  
o Subjectivism 
 Perception and consequent actions of humans with 
regard to study of interest to construct a theory 
dependent on the researcher. Process of continual 
interaction to view a phenomenon.  
 Example: Focus group to determine severity of harm as 
result of MAE.  
 PRAGMATISM– Concerns achieving positive research outcomes 
o Research Questions 
 Allows utilising of both epistemological and ontological 
philosophies in order to study what is of specific value to 
the problem of concern. This will overcome the dilemma 
of justifying choosing one research philosophy over 
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another. Furthermore, the approach allows the use of 
both philosophies simultaneously. 
 Example: Investigation of MAE in practice to develop an 
intervention.  
 AXIOLOGY – Concerns ethical judgement  
o Values ethical principles and practice of research. Values the 
researcher-researched interaction. 
The above brief summary is an overview of research philosophies. It 
demonstrates the different approaches that can be used when conducting a 
research study. It is decided that this research project will be adapting a 
pragmatic approach. The reason for this is to make the investigation of MAE 
the central focus of the research. Therefore, the researcher is not restricting 
the methodological approach to a single philosophy. Pragmatic thinking 
provides the flexibility of carrying out research from different perspectives 
using a series of specific research questions.  
 
2.3 Research Questions 
The following is a list of research questions of this project:  
1. What is current evidence around MAEs in children’s hospitals? 
2. What is the nature of MAEs in paediatric intensive care units? 
3. What interventions are used to reduce MAEs in paediatric intensive 
care units nationally? 
4. What contributing factors to MAEs are perceived by healthcare 
professionals in PICU? 
5. What do healthcare professionals recommend to reduce MAEs in PICU? 
6. What safety measures are needed to reduce MAEs in paediatric 
intensive care units?  
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2.4 Research Methods 
According to the Oxford Dictionary, methodology is “a system of methods 
used in a particular area of study or activity” (Oxford Dictionary). Methods are 
typically qualitative or quantitative in nature. Qualitative methods are used to 
explore and to understand social interactions. Whereas, quantitative methods 
are used to test a hypothesis, identify correlations/trends and generate 
predictions, and measure specific variables such as the number of 
interruptions during a medicine administration round (Blaxter et al., 2010; 
Bowling, 2009). However, the methods, when used, are similar in nature. 
The various methods that are used in healthcare research are shown in 
Table ‎2.1. Every method has its advantages as well as disadvantages. These 
need to be taken into consideration when designing the overall methodology. 
Additionally, there are issues of data accuracy, validity and generalisability. 
Table ‎2.1: Features of common research methods used in healthcare practice 
Features 
Healthcare Practice Research Methods 
Focus 
Group 
Interview 
Literature 
Review 
Observation Questionnaire 
Deductive Reasoning      
Inductive Reasoning      
Subjective      
Objective      
Low Cost      
Large Sample      
Quick Reach      
Flexible      
Standardised      
Reliable      
Validity Limitation      
Rapid Data Collection      
Complex Ethical Issues      
 
Chapter  2 :  Methodo logy 
 21 
Qualitative Methods have been widely used in healthcare practice research 
(Pope & Mays, 2008). Qualitative methods are generally interested in the 
description of an individual’s experience rather than the cause-effect 
relationship (Green & Thorogood, 2002, pp. 5–10). Therefore, qualitative 
methods are often described as epistemological approaches to research, 
hence the data collected will be used to build a theory. On the other hand, 
quantitative methods are more ontological. The theory is built using a 
hypothesis and data collected is represented empirically (Fisher & Stenner, 
2011, p. 89).  
In healthcare practice research, qualitative methods can contribute vital 
evidence to knowledge since they provide an account of ‘real’ situations and 
experiences and do not just rely on numbers or frequency to assess the 
situation or experience. This is important in healthcare due to the complexity 
of the system and the multifaceted nature of the problems it encounters 
(Green & Thorogood, 2002, pp. 22–25). Additionally, qualitative methods can 
provide answers to questions that cannot be objectively measured.  
The interview method is the most common qualitative approach used in 
healthcare setting research (Pope & Mays, 2008, p. 12). Interviews are 
essentially a series of conversations between the researcher and the subject 
being studied. There are three types of interview methods: structured, semi-
structured, and the in-depth interview (Pope & Mays, 2008, pp. 13–15).  
Structured interviews typically consist of questions with a fixed choice of 
responses in a form of questionnaire administered by the researcher. This 
yields a standardised approach to conducting the research and eases data 
analysis. However, findings from this method are controlled by the 
researcher’s development of the questions and the choices of responses 
available. Moreover, findings will only be expressed descriptively. On the 
other hand, semi-structured interviews are more flexible and less formal in 
nature since the researcher would be asking open-ended questions as well as 
close-ended questions. Hence it allows the interviewee to freely express their 
thoughts and opinions. In-depth interview methods are precisely focused on 
one or two issues. However, the interviewer would be developing the 
questions depending on the interviewee response. Therefore, the role of the 
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interviewee is more dominant in controlling the interviewer (Pope & Mays, 
2008, pp. 13–15).  
However, there are issues that need to be taken into consideration when 
conducting interview methods: 
 Questions need to be developed in a non-misleading structure.  
 Clear wording to enable the interviewee to provide the information 
required accurately.  
 The interviewer must have a good level of experience of asking 
questions that are sensitive in nature. Be able to adapt the tone when 
required. This illustrates that conducting interviews is a skill and hence 
it requires practice 
 The interviewer must use equipment to record, transcribe and analyse 
the interview 
 Sampling should be purposive in accordance with the research aim and 
should be statistically representative.  
Another method is the use of focus groups. This is similar to the interview 
methods but the researcher is communicating with a group of participants to 
generate responses. The data generated in this method is a result of a group 
discussion in response to the questions asked. This type of interaction will 
help to explore the issue by the extensive use of open-ended questions. 
However, the presence of other participants can hinder confidentiality of 
responses and may alter the individual’s answers due to peer pressure. Focus 
groups also encounter similar issues to those faced in interview methods. 
Alternatively, the survey method can also be in the form of self-completed 
questionnaires. This method is able to collect data using both open-ended 
and close-ended questions. There are different types of questionnaire 
dissemination methods in healthcare research: paper-based distribution of the 
questionnaire either by post or by hand, and web-based questionnaires that 
can be distributed electronically via email client.  
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So far the methods mentioned above will report the beliefs and attitudes 
towards the area of study. However, it cannot be assured that this is reflected 
in their practice or work environment (Green & Thorogood, 2002, p. 131). 
Hence, the observation method can gather information and evidence of what 
actually happens in real practice. The observation method can be utilised to 
gather qualitative data relating to behaviour or causal factors using 
ethnography research techniques (Green & Thorogood, 2002, p. 135; Pope & 
Mays, 2008, p. 33). It can also be used to collect quantitative data by 
measuring the incidence of a certain phenomenon occurring in practice or by 
developing a correlation to a measured variable. The observation method can 
be carried out in disguise and undisguised. However, researchers will be 
faced with a number of challenges when conducting the observational 
method, such as: 
 Hawthorne effect, meaning the presence of the researcher will change 
how the individual or group being observed do things in practice.  
 Researcher access to the setting of the study will often be in an 
opportunistic manner, therefore the observations may not be 
representative of actual practice. 
 The individual or group being observed may be hostile towards the 
observer due to their belief that the observer is judging their 
performance in doing their job. 
 Observation is a skill, hence to carry out this method a good level of 
experience is required to ensure accuracy of the observation. 
 Ethical issues need to be considered carefully especially with disguised 
observations.   
The research method for this research was developed in accordance with the 
research questions. A mixed method was developed pragmatically. It involves 
the use of both qualitative and quantitative approaches. A detailed description 
of the methods used in this research is presented in each study chapter in 
this thesis, but an overview is given in section 2.7 in this chapter. 
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2.5 Research Generalisation  
Generalisation of research findings is the expression of the outcomes to the 
overall area of interest. This is a complex issue, however generalisation of 
conclusion reached by research is of importance since the purpose of 
research is to contribute new knowledge to existing knowledge. Therefore, 
this is vital in order to provide evidence-based practice (Polit & Beck, 2010).  
Issues of generalisability in quantitative methods are less complex since it can 
be determined by number of variable measured or observed i.e. a larger 
sample size will generate more generalisable results. However, Firestone 
(1993) developed three models of generalisation for both quantitative and 
qualitative methods in healthcare research: 
1. Statistical Generalisation  
 Applies to quantitative methods where the researcher identifies a 
study population and tests a sample that represents the total 
population. Representative sample is best achieved by the method 
of random selection that allows each member of the population an 
equal chance of inclusion into the study 
2. Analytic Generalisation  
 Applies to both quantitative and qualitative methods through 
rigorous inductive analysis. Relies on richness and depth of 
findings. This model requires assessment of results credibility in 
order to achieve insightful conclusion.  
3. Transferability Generalisation  
 This model relies on the research to provide a detailed description 
of method, results and conclusion. This will allow the reader to 
make a judgement about extrapolation of findings to the general. 
Therefore, this model makes the reader evaluate the application of 
findings to another setting. This model applies to both quantitative 
and qualitative methods.  
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In order to achieve any of the above models, there are known tactics that can 
be used to enhance generalisation (Polit & Beck, 2010): 
1. Sampling / Study Replication  
2. Triangulation / Integration of Findings 
3. Conceptual Reflection on Findings 
4. In-depth Description  
In this research, generalisability of findings will be assessed in each study 
using one of the above models.  
2.6 Theoretical Framework 
Medication administration errors in children’s hospitals are researched in 
current literature using three domains. The following is a short description of 
these domains: 
1. MAE Investigational Studies  
A number of methods have been used to identify and investigate MAE in 
hospital settings. These are divided into retrospective review studies and 
prospective observational studies. Retrospective review studies identified MAE 
by: review of serious incident reports, analysis of medication errors specific 
reports and medication charts review. Prospective observation methods are 
carried out either in disguised or undisguised manner of the administration 
practice. Another prospective method is using reviews of medical records and 
drug charts of in-situ patients. 
Retrospective review looks at all serious incident reports that have been 
documented. The reports include all patient safety breaches. This method 
allows the measuring of the prevalence of medication errors in comparison to 
other patient safety incidents (Suresh et al., 2004; Thomas & Panchagnula, 
2008). Additionally, this method can be used to target specific quality 
improvement programmes and measure their effect across all patient safety 
issues. Also data availability is dependent on voluntary reporting by 
healthcare professionals that judge the incident to be harmful. 
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Reviewing medication error only reports provides greater understanding of 
the nature, type and possible causes of MAEs (Doherty & McDonnell, 2012; 
Ross, Paton, & Wallace, 2000; Stavroudis et al., 2010). Availability of 
medication error reports can be challenging. Also, the quality of 
documentation can be poor for learning and effective analysis.  
Another approach to identifying MAEs is by reviewing medication charts 
retrospectively (Franklin, Birch, Schachter, & Barber, 2010), however this 
method will provide limited MAE insight since little information is available to 
decide the presence of MAE due to the nature of documentation kept post-
administration. However, medication chart review is useful to identify 
prescribing errors.  
Prospective observation of medication administration practice is a method 
that can identify MAEs that are not reported by healthcare professionals. 
These include two approaches to direct observation: a disguised approach 
(Conroy et al., 2007a; Ghaleb et al., 2010; Prot et al., 2005), and undisguised 
approach (Cousins, Sabatier, Begue, Schmitt, & Hoppe-Tichy, 2005; Feleke & 
Girma, 2010). Also, prospective review of medical notes and drug charts. 
Observation method offers various advantages over retrospective review of 
incidents, medical notes and drug charts. This method is great at identifying 
trends and causes of MAEs. Observation is carried out objectively and is not 
looking to assign blame to individuals but is focused on the system. 
Additionally, it allows quality improvement to the system with evidence from 
actual practice. Moreover, individual observations can be reviewed and 
validated for quality assessment by others. Furthermore, the observation 
method provides real-time MAE documentation. Another advantage is that 
variables such as adherence to standards, number of interruptions during 
medicine administration process and other factors that contribute to a MAE 
can be collected.  
Conducting direct observation will provide great insight into the culture of 
medication safety within the team greatly. However, this method of 
investigating MAE can face a number of challenges, including; observer 
expertise, ethical consideration, and observer effect. Observation involves the 
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requirement of the observer to have knowledge of medication preparation 
and administration procedure. The observer’s clinical experience is also of 
importance since a judgment is required. Additionally, observers will face an 
ethical challenge of when to intervene in stopping an MAE reaching the 
patient and causing harm. The challenge is to balance research interest and 
the fact that MAEs would happen regardless of the observer presence. An 
additional challenge includes the fact that the presence of the observer may 
cause a change in the behaviour of the individuals being observed. This is 
known as the "Hawthorne effect" or "observer effect". The Hawthorne effect 
can be reduced in MAE observation by carrying out the study for longer 
periods of time so that the participants are used to the observer being around 
them. Also assuring the participants that the study is system focused and is 
not aiming to allocate individual blame.  
2. MAE Exploration Studies 
Research in the MAE field is not only focused on detecting the nature and 
prevalence of MAEs in practice but the research is also exploring MAEs from 
the healthcare professionals' perspective. This will identify factors that lead to 
MAEs, barriers to error reporting and the culture of patient safety within the 
team (Lin & Ma, 2009; Lisby, Nielsen, & Mainz, 2005; Stratton, Blegen, 
Pepper, & Vaughn, 2004; Tang, Sheu, Yu, Wei, & Chen, 2007; Wakefield et 
al., 2001). Distributing questionnaires, conducting interviews and setting up 
focus groups are often the methods used to explore MAEs.  
3. MAE Interventional Studies  
There are also studies found which involved testing interventions to reduce 
MAEs (Bertsche et al., 2010; Fontan, Maneglier, Nguyen, Loirat, & Brion, 
2003; Larsen, Parker, Cash, O'Connell, & Grant, 2005). Interventional studies 
cannot be carried out unless MAEs have been quantified, risk factors 
identified and causes explored before designing and implementing an 
intervention. Evaluation of intervention is important and hence re-assessment 
of MAEs in practice will be necessary after putting the intervention in place for 
a prolonged period of time. This type of study provides solutions to specific 
problems during the medication administration process. However, there are 
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also challenges that could hinder the success of these types of studies, such 
as the cost of intervention, uptake by healthcare providers and commitment 
to running of the intervention.   
2.7 Methodological Design 
In this thesis, the context of the research is to develop evidence based safety 
measures to reduce MAEs in PICU as demonstrated in Figure ‎2.1. This 
evidence is collected using a number of studies: (1) gather current knowledge 
from mainstream literature databases, (2) retrospectively review incidents of 
MAEs, (3) observe medication administration practice, (4) find out the current 
interventions used in different PICU to reduce MAE, (5) characterise MAE 
contributory factors and interventions as perceived by PICU healthcare 
professionals, and (6) propose safety measures based on the previous 
studies.  
 
Figure ‎2.1: Illustration of methodological approach 
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Objective 1: To review literature on MAEs in a children’s hospital  
This objective aims to collect the global knowledge regarding MAEs in 
children’s hospital care. Finding out this knowledge will help to understand 
the reported nature of MAEs and identify the interventions used to reduce this 
type of error in children’s hospitals. There are three methods that can be 
used to achieve this; narrative literature review, systematic literature review, 
and meta-analysis literature review.  
Narrative literature review is a method of gathering evidence to give an 
overview of the researched area. This is typically produced without a detailed 
search protocol or specific article selection criteria. But it relies on the 
researcher to populate evidence based on the strength and quality of 
individual articles. Systematic literature review is a process of rigorous 
appraisal of all evidence available that fits a predetermined protocol. This 
protocol is used to select studies using specific key search terms from listed 
literature databases. It will also contain inclusion/exclusion criteria to focus 
the review process to the aims and objectives of the review.  
On the other hand, meta-analysis review is a more extensive form that aims 
to pool the findings of all studies selected. Meta-analysis selection of studies 
is carried out using a more focused protocol to ensure the homogeneity of 
methods. This in turn will allow a statistical analysis of the outcomes across 
multiple studies to generate evidence. Hence this is ideal to review 
randomised control trials.  
For the purpose of this research, it was found that narrative review is not 
suitable since it is a weak form of evidence. Narrative review will not capture 
all the insights of the MAE research field. Whereas, meta-analysis review is a 
strong form of evidence but will be limited by the fact that  there is a wide 
heterogeneity between MAE studies. Therefore, systematic literature review is 
chosen for this objective. Thus, a detailed protocol is described in chapter 3 
for selection of literature. 
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Objective 2: To investigate the nature of MAE in PICU     
As was discussed earlier, there are two broad types of methods to investigate 
MAEs. The first approach is to retrospectively review medication charts, 
medication error reports or serious incident reports to identify MAEs. An 
alternative approach is a direct prospective observation of the medication 
administration practice either in disguise or undisguised.  
The retrospective method offers the advantage of rapidly reviewing a large 
dataset to identify MAEs. The dataset can be used to find trends of MAE and 
find system factors that contribute to MAEs. Additionally, MAEs due to active 
and latent failures can be explored. Moreover, this method has been proven 
to be simple, valid, reliable and auditable.   
Medication charts have been used to identify MAEs, but provided limited 
evidence. The nature of MAE identified using medication charts is mostly 
related to time errors and omitted doses. On the other hand, review of 
medication error reports will provide evidence of MAE trends and risk factors. 
Medication error reports will include both serious incidents that resulted in 
death or severe harm and incidents that did not cause any harm. Therefore, 
reviewing medication error incidents will address all type of incidents. Serious 
incidents are the tip of the medication errors iceberg since they only include 
the incidents that reach the patient and caused serious harm. Hence to 
achieve this objective, analysis of medication error reports method was 
chosen. The alternative approach to achieve this objective was to carry out 
prospective observations. This method of direct prospective observation of 
medication administration practice will be able to identify MAEs that may not 
be reported. This method will also document factors that are not reported, 
such as interruptions. Also, prospective observation methods reduce the 
limitation of the retrospective analysis of medication error reports method 
such as:  
 Disagreement between staff of what constitute a reportable MAE.  
 Concerns of the person involved in the MAE of the response from 
management and colleagues.  
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 The quality of reporting and time needed to document the error. 
 Reporting of the medication incident depends on whether the 
reporter acknowledges that an MAE has occurred. 
However, there are a number of challenges that need to be taken into 
consideration when conducting prospective observation of medication 
administration practice. Observers will need to have experience in the process 
involved when preparing and administering medicines or observers should 
receive extensive training before conducting the study. Also in order to collect 
a good amount of data that is representative, the observation will need to be 
carried out over a long period of time and this should also include night and 
weekend duties. There are other challenges such as ethical issues, such as 
when does an observer intervene to stop an error and the Hawthorne effect. 
Therefore, to achieve the optimal findings for this objective, combined 
methods were used. The retrospective analysis of medication error reports 
will give trends of MAE over a long period of time. The prospective 
observation method will provide an insight into the current practice, 
identifying factors associated with MAEs and exploring areas of improvement 
within the system of medication administration. A detailed method is 
discussed in chapter 4 and 5 respectively.   
Objective 3: To characterise existing MAE interventions used 
nationally in PICUs   
There are a number of methods that can be used to characterise current 
interventions used in different PICU settings. These include: site visits / 
observations, focus groups / interviews, and questionnaires. These methods 
allow the researcher to use a naturalistic or realistic approach that does not 
manipulate the studied group to reach a hypothesis. This is an advantage 
when there is little or no evidence of knowledge, a complex issue and the 
need to reach a maximum opportunity for exploration (Bowling, 2009, p. 
380).  
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In this study a questionnaire method was chosen in order to meet this 
objective. This survey method is in the form of an online self-completion 
questionnaire have a number of advantages over the other methods such as:  
1. Minimises risk of Hawthorne effect and bias by researcher compared to 
focus group, individual interview or site visit/observation. Participants 
will be able to express their thoughts without interference from the 
researcher or other participants.  
2. Participants will have time to consider their answers.  
3. Does not require the presence of the researcher with the participant. 
4. Does not distract the participants from their usual duties and 
responsibilities. 
5. Can be delivered to all sites and participants at the same time. 
6. Standardised collection of responses that ensures consistency and can 
be repeated at a later date.  
7. Data collection occurs in a shorter period of time and it is an 
inexpensive way to cover a large geographical area. 
8. Online questionnaires are being used increasingly in healthcare 
practice; therefore participants will be familiar with the format and 
arrangement of this method. 
9. Large number of responses is possible, thus making the findings more 
representative. 
10.  Online questionnaires are more cost-effective compared to site 
visits/observations and focus groups 
However, survey methods encounter challenges that could question their 
validity such as the actual development and construction of the questions 
asked and the overall content of the questionnaire. This is an important issue 
that will need to be tackled during the survey development and validation 
process. Moreover, it is vital to keep the questionnaire concise, specific and 
not misleading. Therefore, construct validity is required to ensure that the 
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content of the questionnaire meets the objective and at the same time does 
not mislead the participants. This is to ensure a generalisable finding is 
achieved. An additional limitation is that it would be difficult to probe 
participants to elaborate on their responses.   
Online self-completed questionnaire was chosen instead of posted/paper-
based questionnaire for the following reasons: 
1. An online questionnaire will be sent via recognised professional 
networks to the correct person. However, with postal questionnaires 
there is a risk it will not be delivered on time to the correct person 
or not delivered at all due to an incomplete address.  
2. There is minimum cost involved in developing and sending out the 
online questionnaire, compared to the postal questionnaire which 
will cost significantly more 
3. The speed of response is faster with online questionnaires than 
postal. 
4. There can be a rapid analysis of responses since no transcription is 
needed and no validation of the transcription is required either.  
 
Objective 4: To identify MAE contributory factors in PICU  
In order to identify contributory factors for MAE in PICU that could not be 
found using the above studies, it is necessary to approach healthcare 
professionals. This objective can be achieved by the use of focus groups, 
interviews or questionnaires. However, to garner a large response from 
healthcare professionals, an online questionnaire is used. Also, participants 
will be able to express their thoughts without interference from other 
participants or the interviewer. Moreover, when using an online questionnaire, 
responses can be captured from multiple sites nationally. Therefore, this 
increases the generalisability of the findings. These findings will be used to 
propose safety measures to reduce MAE in PICU. 
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Objective 5: To outline the nature of MAE interventions 
recommended by healthcare professionals in PICU 
This objective will be achieved alongside objective 4. The same questionnaire 
will include a question asking participants to describe the nature of an 
intervention that would reduce MAE in their practice. The findings of this 
objective will be used to propose the safety measures for MAEs in PICU. 
Objective 6: To propose safety measures to reduce MAEs 
This objective aims to triangulate the findings from the previous studies in 
order to propose a set of safety measures to reduce MAE as shown in 
Figure ‎2.1. It recognises that MAE is multifaceted and a single intervention 
will not be able to address all MAEs. Following the agreement of the research 
team on the proposed safety measures, opinions on the usefulness of the 
proposed can be sought by: 1) Delphi/Nominal group consensus, 2) focus 
group/interview, or 3) questionnaire.  
Consensus groups are often constituted of key experts in the field of interest 
and are set to seek agreement or collect information focused on close-ended 
material. There are two types of consensus groups: Delphi and Nominal. 
Delphi groups are independent panels of experts that respond to a 
questionnaire without interference from other members. It is often repeated a 
number of times until consensus is reached between members. Nominal 
group experts reached consensus via engagement in open dialogue. The 
limitation of consensus groups is that participants must demonstrate a good 
level of experience in the field. Therefore, this causes bias to the study since 
it does not represent the entire healthcare team who is involved in medicine 
administration. Also it consumes a lot of time since it is often difficult to reach 
consensus from the first round of Delphi groups. Hence this method is not 
ideal for this objective.  
Focus groups are aimed at seeking opinions of participants with a diverse 
range of backgrounds. It is a method of sharing ideas and thoughts on an 
open-ended topic. One limitation of this method is that participants will need 
to commit their time to take part. This is difficult for this study since 
participants are healthcare professionals in a  highly demanding clinical area. 
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Therefore, response to invitation will be low and not representative. Hence 
the optimal method for this objective is to carry out an online questionnaire to 
collect opinions of the PICU healthcare professionals. 
2.8 Thesis Structure 
A pragmatic approach is taken in this research to enable the researcher to get 
a deeper understanding the problem of MAEs in PICU. Also pragmatic inquiry 
was the best fit for the supervisors of this project since they come from 
diverse professional backgrounds and have an enormous level of research 
experience.   
The aim of research is to reach new knowledge that is generalisable and 
based on evidence. This research is not a service evaluation or practice audit 
since this research project is not measuring current practice of medication 
administration against known standards. Therefore, the intent of this research 
is to find out how to reduce MAEs by investigating the current characteristics 
of MAEs, exploring the methods used to reduce these errors nationally and 
proposing evidence-based MAE safety measures for PICU practice.   
This thesis used a deductive method of reasoning to drive the outcomes 
throughout the overall research. Table ‎2.2 represents the objectives of this 
research and the different methods that can be used to achieve that 
objective. This is followed by an indication of which method was selected with 
a given justification, strength/limitations of the method and the chapter 
number where a detailed method with discussion of the findings can be 
found. 
As described above, the research method is divided into six studies: 
1. Systematic literature review 
 This will explore all published literature on MAEs in children’s 
hospitals to ascertain the current state of knowledge.  
 Results from this study will also help to design the method needed 
for the other studies and will contribute to proposing the final 
safety measures. 
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2. Retrospective review of medication error reports at a London based 
PICU 
 Reporting of medication errors are carried out by healthcare 
professionals in the PICUs on a regular basis.  
 The review will indicate the key risk factors that can contribute to 
causing MAEs and will strengthen the understanding of the 
researcher of the commonly reported MAEs. 
3. Prospective observation of medication administration practice in a 
London based PICU  
 Direct observation of the medication practice will reveal MAEs that 
are not usually reported and it will provide vital insight into system 
factors that lead to MAEs. 
 Outcomes of this study will help to shape the safety measures to 
improve practice. 
4. Survey of current interventions used in PICUs nationwide 
 There are a limited numbers of hospitals in the UK that offer PICU 
services. The purpose of this study is to explore the nature of 
interventions used in these units that may not have been reported 
in literature. 
 This study will enable identification of good practice in the 
management of PICUs and adaptation of this practice to a local 
setting.  
5. Survey of MAE contributory factors and interventions as viewed by 
PICU healthcare professionals 
 Many studies explore MAE contributory factors from the perspective 
of the individuals who made these errors. This approach is not 
necessarily fit for purpose, since the factors would not be 
generalised to everyday practice but restricted to that specific 
event. However, approaching all healthcare professionals in PICU to 
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identify contributory factors of MAE will result in a more 
representative view of the true nature of their practice. Also, this 
would engage healthcare professionals in finding solutions to these 
problems. Thus, both frontline practitioners and evidence from the 
other investigational studies will drive the recommendation of the 
safety measures. 
 This study will provide knowledge of how PICU practitioners view 
the factors that cause MAEs and what is needed to reduce these 
errors in practice. This knowledge will be of vital importance in 
proposing the MAE safety measures. 
6. Proposing of MAE safety measures based on the findings of the 
previous studies 
 This study will triangulate the findings from the previous four 
studies to propose a set of safety measures to reduce MAEs in 
PICUs. Local PICU healthcare teams and national expert groups will 
assess the proposal. The assessment will be in the form of 
collecting opinions on the usefulness of the proposed intervention 
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Table ‎2.2: Summary of methods used in this thesis 
Research 
Objective 
Possible 
Methods 
Selected Method & 
Brief Justification 
Strength & Limitation  
Chapter 
Number 
1. To review 
literature on 
MAE in 
children’s 
hospital 
 Narrative 
Review 
 Systematic 
Review 
 Meta Analysis 
Review 
Systematic 
Literature Review 
– A standard method 
using a protocol to 
explore all research. 
Meta analysis not 
carried out due to 
large heterogeneity. 
Comprehensive review of all 
evidence to identify current 
knowledge. Limitation of systematic 
review is the wide heterogeneity 
between studies and the use of 
different numerators and 
denominators to express incidence 
of MAE. 
3 
2. To 
investigate 
nature of MAE 
in PICU 
 
 Review of 
Drug Charts/ 
Medication 
Error 
Reports/ 
Serious 
Incident 
Reports 
 Prospective 
Observation/ 
charts/notes 
Retrospective 
Review of 
Medication Error 
Reports and 
Prospective 
Observation of 
Practice – Combined 
method to investigate 
the nature of MAE in 
PICU from all 
perceptive 
Able to establish the complete 
nature of MAE occurring in PICU. 
Risk factors can be identified in the 
medicine administration practice. 
Review of human factors as well as 
system factors can be assessed. 
However, It will encounter ethical 
difficulties. Observer will need to be 
trained and develop observation 
skills. The method will be consuming 
long time. 
4 & 5 
3. To 
characterise 
existing MAE 
interventions 
used nationally 
in PICUs 
 Site Visits / 
Observation 
 Questionnaire 
 Focus Group/ 
Interview 
Online Self-
Completion 
Questionnaire – A 
rapid method to 
explore the nature of 
interventions used.  
Automation of data entry and safe 
storage. Convenient for participants 
since they can answer at their own 
time and location. Avoiding bias 
from other participants and 
interviewer. Responses to invitations 
sent via email can low.  
6 
4. To identify 
MAE 
contributory 
factors in PICU 
5. To outline 
the nature of 
MAE 
interventions 
recommended 
by healthcare 
professionals in 
PICU 
6. To propose 
safety measures 
to reduce MAE 
in PICU 
 
 Delphi/ 
Nominal 
Group 
Consensus 
 Focus Group/ 
Interview 
 Questionnaire 
Online Self-
Completion 
Questionnaire – 
Rapid responses from 
large group will be 
possible. Opinions on 
the design/nature of 
the intervention can 
be sought from both 
internal and external 
representations. 
Automation of data entry and safe 
storage. More convenient for 
participants since they can answer 
at their own time and location. 
Avoiding bias/interference from 
other participants and interviewer. 
Responses to invitations sent via 
email can low. 
7 
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2.9 Ethical Consideration 
Every clinical pharmacy practice research study faces ethical situations and 
this one is no exception. In fact it has faced some a very challenging ethical 
situations. Examples of these challenges are; firstly, consent to be observed 
and secondly, when to intervene in the event of identifying a potential MAE. 
Therefore, this research required a full ethical committee approval. An 
application was submitted to NHS REC London Bloomsbury and the local NHS 
R&D (Great Ormond Street Hospital). Following a meeting with the committee 
and amendments made to the research protocol, NHS REC London 
Bloomsbury (Appendix 1) and NHS R&D (Appendix 2) granted a favourable 
decision. Moreover, local approval from the PICU risk manager was obtained 
(Appendix 3). The detailed ethical consideration for each study will be 
discussed in its appropriate chapter.  
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Chapter 3:  Systematic Literature Review of 
Hospital Medication Administration 
Errors in Children  
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Over the last 14 years there has been a rapid growth of MAE evidence in 
children's hospitals. However, a limited number of comprehensive systematic 
literature reviews were conducted.  
One of the earliest reviews in this area was by Ghaleb et al. (2006) that 
identified incidences of MAE between 0.6 and 27 per 100 administered doses 
in children’s hospitals. This review focused on medication errors in general. It 
has identified the need to develop validated definitions to help understand the 
true scale of the problem and to test interventions to reduce these errors. 
Another systematic review by Miller et al. (2007) found an MAE rate between 
72 and 75 in every 100 reported medication errors. This review recommended 
unifying numerators and denominators when collecting data and a 
standardisation of definitions. Rinke et al. (2014) reached similar conclusions 
with their review on interventions used to reduce medication errors.   
Keers et al. (2013b) also carried out a systematic literature review on studies 
that reported MAEs per total opportunities for error. They have found the 
MAE rate between 17.4 and 33.8 per 100 opportunities for error. Similar 
concerns regarding standardising definitions and methods were raised. But in 
another review that was focused on identifying the causes of MAE in 
children’s hospitals using Reason’s model of causation, Keers et al. (2013a) 
highlighted the effectiveness of the double-checking procedure and the 
impact of interruptions on MAEs. Raban and Westbrook (2013) reviewed the 
evidence on interventions based on reducing interruptions and found that 
these interventions have weak evidence that support their use in reducing 
MAEs.   
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Despite the various published systematic literature reviews there is still a 
need for a review that addresses: 1) definitions used to identify MAE in 
children’s hospitals, 2) the different methods used to investigate MAEs and 3) 
how interventions are used to reduce MAE. Therefore, this systematic 
review's aim is to investigate all studies of hospital MAEs in children. The 
review's objectives are:  
1. To explore definitions used to identify hospital MAE in children. 
2. To report the prevalence of hospital MAE in children. 
3. To identify the nature and severity of these errors. 
4. To identify the interventions used to reduce hospital MAE in children. 
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3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Data sources and search terms 
Studies were obtained from 12 databases that are used to archive healthcare 
related publications (PubMed, Science Direct, Web of Knowledge, British 
Nursing Index, Scopus, Global Health, EMBASE, NeLM, CINAHL, International 
Pharmaceutical Abstracts, PsycInfo and PsycExtra) in July 2014. The following 
search terms were used; (“Medication Error” OR “Medication mistake” OR 
“Drug error” OR “Drug mistake” OR “Drug mishap” OR “Adverse drug event” 
OR “Near Miss” OR “Death”) AND (“Administration Error” OR “Medication 
administration error” OR “Drug administration mistake” OR “Drug 
administration” OR “preparation error”) AND (“Hospital” OR “Secondary care” 
OR “Tertiary centre”) AND (“Paediatric “ OR “pediatric” OR “Child” OR “Infant” 
OR “Adolescent” OR “Toddler” OR “Neonate” OR “Newborn” OR “Under 16” 
OR “Teen” OR “Teenager” OR “Baby”). Also, a hand search of relevant 
publications from recent systematic reviews to identify all possible studies was 
carried out.  
3.2.2 Selection criteria  
The following inclusion criteria were used to select studies:  
1. Publication date between 01/01/2000 to 01/07/2014. This is to 
avoid repetitiveness of findings since earlier studies have been 
reviewed by other researchers and build on existing reviewed 
evidence 
2. Presented in English language. Studies that are not available in 
English require a different set of search terms. These search terms 
will need to be in different languages to cover all possible 
languages. Also to avoid bias, non-English literature databases will 
need to be searched. Moreover, professional interpreters with 
research background would be required to search, retrieve the 
studies and extract data for this review. The inclusion of non-
English studies would be faced with financial and validation 
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challenges. Therefore, it was decided to restrict search to studies 
presented in English only.    
3. MAEs in children’s hospital settings in children aged between 0 and 
18 years old. This is to reflect the population of interest for this 
research. This will also ensure that the data collected is relating to 
the children’s hospital setting only. 
All articles that are not peer reviewed such as; opinions, letters, comments, 
editorials, reviews studies were excluded. However, they were used to hand 
search for additional studies from their bibliographies. Studies that did not 
report child data were also excluded. 
 
3.2.3 Quality Assessment and Extraction process 
The researcher retrieved studies for review from the above databases using 
the search strategy. A rigorous review to assess suitability against the review 
criteria was carried out. An independent researcher reviewed all the articles 
that were identified. A high level of agreement was established between 
reviewers and the studies that were in disagreement (n= 4) were resolved 
through a discussion and referring back to the criteria set. There was no need 
for a third opinion.   
The Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis 
(PRISMA, 2014) standards were used to extract data and assess the quality of 
the studies. Citations were imported into a reference manager EndNote X7 
(Thomson Reuters, Times Square, New York, US). Microsoft Excel 2010 
(Microsoft, Redmond, Washington, US) was used to store data extracted from 
the selected articles. The following data was recorded: authors, year of 
publication, country of origin, study type, setting, duration, MAE definitions 
used, method of identifying MAEs, key findings and recommendations.  
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3.2.4 Data Analysis 
Data extracted from each study was aggregated into three categories: 1) 
studies that reported a specific definition for hospital MAEs in children, 2) 
investigational studies that found the nature of hospital MAEs in children 
without testing an intervention, and 3) studies that evaluated the 
effectiveness of an intervention.  
Basic descriptive analysis of data was conducted for studies that used the 
same numerator and denominator of MAE.  
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3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Database search results 
The search strategy has found 2936 articles. As illustrated in Figure ‎3.1, 2899 
articles were eliminated in compliance with the inclusion/exclusion criteria. 
This yields 37 studies that were found to be eligible for the purpose of this 
review. These studies were carried out in:  
 US (Herout & Erstad, 2004; Hicks, Becker, Windle, & Krenzischek, 
2007; Kaushal et al., 2001; Larsen et al., 2005; Marino, Reinhardt, 
Eichelberger, & Steingard, 2000; Miller et al., 2010; Morriss et al., 
2009; Pauly-O'Neill, 2009; Russell, Murkowski, & Scanlon, 2010; 
Sowan, Gaffoor, Soeken, Johantgen, & Vaidya, 2010; Stavroudis et 
al., 2010; Suresh et al., 2004; Yamamoto & Kanemori, 2010) 
 UK (Alsulami, Choonara, & Conroy, 2014; Conroy et al., 2007a; 
Ghaleb et al., 2010; Ross et al., 2000; Simpson, Lynch, Grant, & 
Alroomi, 2004; Stewart, Purdy, Kennedy, & Burns, 2010; Thomas & 
Panchagnula, 2008; Warrick et al., 2011) 
 Argentina (Otero, Leyton, Mariani, & Ceriani Cernadas, 2008) 
 Australia (Manias, Kinney, Cranswick, & Williams, 2014a) 
 Canada (Doherty & McDonnell, 2012; Ellis et al., 2011; Trbovich, 
Pinkney, Cafazzo, & Easty, 2010) 
 France (Fontan et al., 2003; Prot et al., 2005) 
 Malaysia (Chua, Chua, & Omar, 2010; Raja Lope, Boo, Rohana, & 
Cheah, 2009) 
 Ethiopia (Feleke & Girma, 2010) 
 Germany (Bertsche et al., 2010) 
 Netherlands (Chedoe, Molendijk, Hospes, Van den Heuvel, & Taxis, 
2012) 
 Saudi Arabia (Sadat-Ali et al., 2010)  
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 Switzerland (Frey et al., 2002)  
 Turkey (Ozkan, Kocaman, Ozturk, & Seren, 2011)  
 Multicentre (Cousins et al., 2005) 
Table ‎3.1 represents a summary of all 37 studies that were reviewed. It 
contains the core information for each study and an overview of the key 
findings. As can be seen, the studies were themed into three groups: studies 
that used a retrospective approach to investigate MAE, prospective 
observational studies, and studies that investigated the effect and impact of 
an intervention.   
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Figure ‎3.1: Flow diagram of article selection for the systematic literature 
review 
Table ‎3.1 Summary of studies relating to hospital MAE in children 
Reference 
(Country) 
Study Type 
Study 
Duration 
Study 
Setting 
Sample Size 
(denominator) 
Key Findings 
Retrospective Studies 
Doherty and 
McDonnell 
(2012) (Canada) 
Retrospective 
Review 
5 years 
Hospital 
(300 Bed) 
252 medication 
error reports 
87 MAE  
(34.5%/ME reports) 
Frey et al. 
(2002) 
(Switzerland) 
Retrospective 
Review 
1 year 
Children 
hospital 
275 medication 
error reports 
200 MAE  
(72.7%/ME reports) 
Articles retrieved from 
databases  = 2936  
Articles after 
duplicates = 1585 
Duplicates removed = 1351 
Opinions, letters, comments, editorials, 
reviews studies removed = 984 
Articles after non-
relevant removed  = 601 
Articles after abstract 
evaluation = 102 
Abstract evaluation removed = 499 
Adult data only or children data 
not excludable = 28  
Articles after adult 
data removed  = 75 No MAE data = 38 
Articles to be systematically 
reviewed = 37 
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Table ‎3.1 Summary of studies relating to hospital MAE in children 
Reference 
(Country) 
Study Type 
Study 
Duration 
Study 
Setting 
Sample Size 
(denominator) 
Key Findings 
Hicks et al. 
(2007) (US) 
Retrospective 
review 
4 years 
MedMARx 
reports 
645 medication 
error reports 
384 MAE  
(59.5%/ME reports) 
Kaushal et al. 
(2001) (US) 
Retrospective 
Review 
6 weeks 
2 
Teaching 
hospitals 
616 medication 
errors identified 
during chart 
review 
78 MAE  
(12.7%/ME) 
Manias et al. 
(2014a) 
(Australia) 
Retrospective 
Review 
4 years 
Children 
Hospital 
(334 bed) 
2753 medication 
error reports 
1952 MAE  
(70.9%/ME report) 
Miller et al. 
(2010) (US) 
Retrospective 
Review  
1 year 
Children 
hospital 
140 medication 
error reports 
79 MAE (56.4%/ME 
report) 
Ross et al. 
(2000) (UK) 
Retrospective 
Review  
5 years 
2 Children 
hospitals 
195 medication 
error reports 
149 MAE reports 
(76.4%/ME report) 
Sadat-Ali et al. 
(2010) (Saudi) 
Retrospective 
Review  
2 years 
Teaching 
hospital  
38 medication 
error reports  
15 MAE reports 
(39.5%/ME report) 
Simpson et al. 
(2004) (UK) 
Retrospective 
Review  
1 year NICU 
105 medication 
error reports 
30 MAE reports 
(28.6%/ME report) 
Stavroudis et al. 
(2010) (US) 
Retrospective 
Review  
5 years 
MedMARx 
reports 
6749 medication 
error reports 
3256 MAE reports 
(48.2%/ME report) 
Suresh et al. 
(2004) (US) 
Retrospective 
Review  
2 years 54 NICU 
1230 critical 
incident reports 
181 MAE reports 
(14.7%/CI report) 
Thomas and 
Panchagnula 
(2008) (UK) 
Retrospective 
Review  
7 months 
NPSA 
database 
12084 critical 
incident reports 
181 MAE reports 
(12.2%/CI report) 
Prospective Studies 
Alsulami et al. 
(2014) (UK) 
Prospective 
Observation 
(Undisguised) 
4 months 
Medical, 
Surgical, 
NICU & 
PICU 
wards 
2000 Doses 
Observed 
191 MAE identified 
(9.6%/dose 
administered) 
Chua et al. 
(2010) 
(Malaysia) 
Prospective 
Observation 
(Undisguised) 
3 months 
Children 
Hospital 
857 doses 
observed 
100 MAE identified 
(11.7%/dose observed) 
Conroy et al. 
(2007a) (UK) 
Prospective 
Observation 
(Undisguised) 
6 weeks 
Children 
hospital    
(92 beds) 
752 doses 
observed 
150 MAE identified 
(20%/dose observed) 
Ghaleb et al. 
(2010) (UK) 
Prospective 
Observation 
(Undisguised) 
2 weeks 
5 
Hospitals  
2240 
opportunities for 
error observed 
429 MAE identified 
(19.1%/OPE) 
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Table ‎3.1 Summary of studies relating to hospital MAE in children 
Reference 
(Country) 
Study Type 
Study 
Duration 
Study 
Setting 
Sample Size 
(denominator) 
Key Findings 
Herout and 
Erstad (2004) 
(US) 
Prospective 
Observation 
(Undisguised) 
1 month 
 
Surgical 
intensive 
care unit  
(16 bed) 
206 doses 
observed 
26 MAE identified 
(12.6%/dose observed) 
Marino et al. 
(2000) 
(US) 
Prospective 
Observation 
(Undisguised) 
5 days  
Teaching 
hospital 
784 medication 
errors identified 
during chart 
review 
16 MAE detected 
(2.1%/ME) 
Ozkan et al. 
(2011) (Turkey) 
Prospective 
Observation 
(Undisguised) 
25 days 
Teaching 
hospital    
(52 bed) 
2344 doses 
observed 
855 MAE identified 
(36.5%/dose observed) 
Feleke and 
Girma (2010) 
(Ethiopia) 
Prospective 
Observation 
(Disguised) 
2 weeks 
Teaching 
hospital  
218 doses 
observed 
196 MAE identified 
(89.9%/dose observed) 
Cousins et al. 
(2005) (UK, 
Germany & 
France) 
Prospective 
Observation 
(Disguised in 
Germany & 
France) 
6 months 
6 Hospital 
units 
UK 273 doses 
observed; 
Germany 425 
doses observed; 
France 100 doses 
observed 
UK 185 MAE 
(67.8%/dose 
observed), Germany 
262 MAE (61.6%/dose 
observed) France 34 
MAE (34%/dose 
observed) 
Prot et al. 
(2005) (France) 
Prospective 
Observation  
1 year 
Teaching 
hospital 
(440 beds) 
1719 doses 
observed 
538 MAE identified 
(31.3%/dose observed) 
Intervention Studies 
Stewart et al. 
(2010) (UK) 
Intervention 
(Workshop) 
2 hours  Simulation 
48 medical 
students & 21 
nursing students  
Improved knowledge 
and awareness of 
children medication 
safety and medication 
errors 
Pauly-O'Neill 
(2009) (US) 
Intervention 
(Simulation) 
5 hours Simulation  
44 students, 3 
hours lecture 
followed by 2 
hour tutoring 
session and a 
stimulation exam 
after 1 week 
Pre-intervention: 22% 
of student administered 
medication correctly 
Post-intervention: rate 
improved up to 96% 
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Table ‎3.1 Summary of studies relating to hospital MAE in children 
Reference 
(Country) 
Study Type 
Study 
Duration 
Study 
Setting 
Sample Size 
(denominator) 
Key Findings 
Trbovich et al. 
(2010) (Canada) 
Intervention 
(Simulation) 
Not 
Reported 
Simulation 
24 nurses, 3 
pump type 
(traditional, smart 
& barcode), 7 
infusion task for 
each pump type 
Participants found 88% 
of wrong patient errors 
using barcode pump, 
smart pump 58% and 
traditional 46% of the 
errors. Smart pump 
remedied wrong dose 
high limit (75%), 79% 
bar code and 38% with 
the traditional pump 
Larsen et al. 
(2005) (US) 
Intervention 
(Standard 
concentration 
& smart 
pump) 
2 years  
Children's 
medical 
centre   
(242 beds) 
Pre-intervention: 
12109 medication 
error reports 
Post- 
intervention: 
12399 medication 
error reports  
Pre-intervention: 28 
infusion errors 
Post-intervention: 8 
infusion errors 
Ellis et al. 
(2011) (Canada)  
Intervention 
(New 
Guidelines) 
22 weeks 
Children 
Hospital  
1000 Morphine 
doses 
No child required 
morphine antidote or 
respiratory support 
following morphine 
administration  
Chedoe et al. 
(2012) 
(Netherlands) 
Intervention 
(Education) 
20 days 
NICU  
(14 Bed) 
Pre-intervention: 
311 doses 
observed 
Post-intervention: 
284 doses 
observed 
Pre-intervention: 151 
MAE identified 
(49%/dose observed) 
Post-interventions: 87 
MAE identified 
(31%/dose observed) 
Otero et al. 
(2008) 
(Argentina) 
Intervention 
(Education) 
2 years 
Children 
unit 
(110 bed) 
Pre-intervention: 
1174 
administered 
dose,  
Post-intervention: 
1588 
administered 
dose 
Pre-intervention 99 
MAE identified 
(8.4%/administered 
dose) 
Post-intervention 94 
MAE identified 
(5.9%/administered 
dose) 
Raja Lope et al. 
(2009) 
(Malaysia) 
Intervention 
(Education) 
1 month 
Teaching 
Hospital    
(34 beds) 
188 doses 
administered  
Pre-intervention: 188 
non-adherence to the 
six rights rule 
Post-intervention: non-
adherence dropped to 
169 
Chapter  3 :  Sys temat ic  L i te rature  Rev iew  
 51 
Table ‎3.1 Summary of studies relating to hospital MAE in children 
Reference 
(Country) 
Study Type 
Study 
Duration 
Study 
Setting 
Sample Size 
(denominator) 
Key Findings 
Bertsche et al. 
(2010) 
(Germany) 
Intervention 
(Education to 
staff & 
parents) 
7 weeks 
Children 
neuro 
ward     
(19 beds) 
Pre-intervention 
646 medication 
administration by 
nurse & 29 by 
parents 
Post-intervention 
453 medication 
administration by 
nurse & 36 by 
parents 
Pre-intervention: 261 
MAE identified 
(40.4%/administered 
dose) by nurse & 28 
MAE identified 
(96.6%/administered 
dose) by parents.  
Post-intervention: 36 
MAE identified 
(7.9%/administered 
dose) by nurse & 2 
MAE identified 
(5.6%/administered 
dose) by parents. 
Fontan et al. 
(2003) (France) 
Intervention 
(CPOE) 
1 month 
 
Children 
hospital 
CPOE: 3943 
opportunities for 
error  
handwritten 
prescription: 646 
opportunities for 
error 
CPOE: 888 MAE 
identified (22.5%/OPE) 
Handwritten 
prescription: 189 MAE 
identified (29.3%/OPE) 
Yamamoto and 
Kanemori 
(2010) (US) 
Intervention 
(CPOE) 
Not 
Reported 
Emergency 
department 
& PICU 
38 Nurses 
Conventional method 
had 70 MAE whereas 
computer assisted 
dosing had 27 MAE. 
Sowan et al. 
(2010) (US) 
Intervention 
(CPOE 
simulation) 
Not 
Reported 
Simulation 108 Infusions 
Nurses were able to 
identify 53% of MAE in 
72 infusions containing 
MAE. Whereas, nurses 
were able to identify 
40% of MAE in 72 
infusions that contains 
MAE of handwritten 
prescriptions. 
Russell et al. 
(2010) (US) 
Intervention 
(CPOE & 
smart 
pumps) 
24 days 
Children 
hospital  
(30 bed)  
296 doses 
administered 
72 infusion 
discrepancies (24%) 
between CPOE and 
setting on smart pump 
Warrick et al. 
(2011) (UK) 
Intervention 
(Clinical 
information 
system) 
3 weeks 
Teaching 
Hospital  
Pre-intervention: 
528 scheduled 
doses 
Post-intervention: 
278 scheduled 
doses  
Pre-intervention: 43 
omitted doses 
(8.1%/scheduled dose), 
Post-intervention: 4 
omitted doses 
(1.4%/scheduled dose) 
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Table ‎3.1 Summary of studies relating to hospital MAE in children 
Reference 
(Country) 
Study Type 
Study 
Duration 
Study 
Setting 
Sample Size 
(denominator) 
Key Findings 
Morriss et al. 
(2009) (US) 
Intervention 
(BCMA)  
9 months 
Teaching 
Hospital  
(36 bed) 
92398 doses, 475 
without Bar-code 
& 483 with Bar-
code.  
19 MAE found in 39 ME 
observed with no 
BCMA. 12 MAE found in 
20 ME observed with 
BCMA 
ADE Adverse Drug Event   BCMA Bar Code Medicine Administration  
CI Critical Incident    CPOE Computerised Physician Order Entry 
MAE Medication Administration Error  ME Medication Error 
NICU Neonatal Intensive Care Unit  NPSA National Patient Safety Agency  
OPE Opportunities for Error   PICU Paediatrics Intensive Care Unit 
 
3.3.2 Definitions of Hospital MAE in Children  
There were eight studies that reported a specific definition for hospital MAE in 
children (Chua et al., 2010; Cousins et al., 2005; Feleke & Girma, 2010; 
Fontan et al., 2003; Ghaleb et al., 2010; Herout & Erstad, 2004; Prot et al., 
2005; Raja Lope et al., 2009). Table ‎3.2 illustrates the key components of the 
definitions found. As can be seen, MAE can generally be defined as "variation 
of the dose given from that originally prescribed". The remaining studies did 
not report a specific MAE definition. However, they utilised a broad ME 
definition such as the one by Kaushal et al. (2001) which describes ME as 
“errors in drug ordering, transcribing, dispensing, administering, or 
monitoring”. 
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Table ‎3.2: Key definition’s components used to investigate MAE in children’s 
hospitals 
Study 
Definition Components 
MAE is variation of dose given from 
Preparation 
Errors 
Other 
Prescription 
Hospital 
procedures 
Manufacture 
Procedures 
Chua et al. 
(2010) 
    
 
Cousins et al. 
(2005) 
    
 
Feleke and 
Girma (2010) 
    
“occurs while 
administering a 
medication to a 
patient” 
Fontan et al. 
(2003) 
    
 
Ghaleb et al. 
(2010) 
    
 
Herout and 
Erstad (2004) 
    
Includes 
omission, dosing 
errors for weight 
based infusion 
were defined as a 
5% difference 
Prot et al. 
(2005) 
    
 
Raja Lope 
et al. 
(2009) 
    
Process of 
“commission and 
omission” by 
nurse 
 
3.3.3 Prevalence of Hospital MAE in Children  
Studies that investigated the prevalence of hospital MAE in children have used 
two methodological approaches. The first was a retrospective method that 
included: critical incident review (Suresh et al., 2004; Thomas & Panchagnula, 
2008), analysis of ME specific incident reports (Doherty & McDonnell, 2012; 
Frey et al., 2002; Hicks et al., 2007; Manias et al., 2014a; Miller et al., 2010; 
Ross et al., 2000; Sadat-Ali et al., 2010; Simpson et al., 2004; Stavroudis et 
al., 2010), and review of medication charts (Kaushal et al., 2001; Marino et 
al., 2000). The second methodological approach was using a prospective 
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method. This was in form of either undisguised observation of the medication 
administration process (Alsulami et al., 2014; Chua et al., 2010; Conroy et al., 
2007b; Cousins et al., 2005; Ghaleb et al., 2010; Herout & Erstad, 2004; 
Ozkan et al., 2011; Prot et al., 2005) or disguised observations (Cousins et 
al., 2005; Feleke & Girma, 2010).  
Retrospective Methods 
As can be seen in Table ‎3.1, retrospective studies are a commonly used 
method to investigate MAE. This approach was utilised by 12 studies to 
investigate hospital MAEs in children compared to 10 prospective studies. It 
involves the review of records kept by healthcare professionals that are in the 
form of critical incident reports, ME reports or medication charts.  
Critical incident reports included MAE as part of all other patient safety 
incidents. Two studies (Suresh et al., 2004; Thomas & Panchagnula, 2008) 
using this approach found 362 MAEs in 13314 critical incidents relating to 
children in hospital care. This is the equivalent of a prevalence rate between 
12 and 15 MAE in every 100 critical incident reports. 
Whereas, ME reports relate specifically to incidents of medication use. This 
includes prescribing, dispensing and administration errors. This approach was 
used in nine studies (Doherty & McDonnell, 2012; Frey et al., 2002; Hicks et 
al., 2007; Manias et al., 2014a; Miller et al., 2010; Ross et al., 2000; Sadat-Ali 
et al., 2010; Simpson et al., 2004; Stavroudis, Miller, & Lehmann, 2008). 
Despite the heterogeneity of data, there were 12552 ME reports in children’s 
hospitals and MAEs accounted for 50% of the reports (n= 6246). This yields a 
prevalence of between 29 and 76 hospital MAEs in every 100 ME reports in 
children.   
Another method found was to identify MAE from medication charts. Screening 
medication charts for ME is carried out first. This is then represented in a 
breakdown of all ME types including MAE. Studies that used this method 
found a prevalence of MAE between 2 and 13 MAE in every 100 ME identified 
(Kaushal et al., 2001; Marino et al., 2000). There was no study that has 
reviewed medical records to identify MAE.  
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Prospective Methods 
The second approach that was found to investigate hospital MAE in children is 
the use of prospective observation of medication administration practice. This 
is conducted in disguise or undisguised manner. The prevalence of MAE is 
dependent on the denominator used. The studies that measured MAE against 
the number of doses observed have found MAE rate between 9 to 90 MAEs in 
every 100 doses observed (Alsulami et al., 2014; Chua et al., 2010; Conroy et 
al., 2007a; Cousins et al., 2005; Feleke & Girma, 2010; Herout & Erstad, 
2004; Ozkan et al., 2011; Prot et al., 2005). Despite heterogeneity, 
cumulatively this represents a total of 2537 children’s hospital MAEs (29%) 
identified in 8894 doses observed.   
As presented in Table ‎3.1, only two studies were conducted in a disguised 
manner. The first study is multi-centred and was undisguised in the UK but 
disguised in Germany and France (Cousins et al., 2005). The study found a 
prevalence of MAE between 34 and 62 MAEs in every 100 doses observed 
respectively. However, using the same definition and method they found 68 
MAEs per 100 doses observed undisguised in the UK. The second study that 
was carried out in a disguised manner was by Feleke and Girma (2010) in 
Ethiopia that found at least 90 MAEs in every 100 doses observed. 
Another denominator that was used to represent prevalence of MAE is the 
number of opportunities for error. This was used by the Ghaleb et al. (2010) 
study that measured MAE in 10 children wards. Ghaleb and colleagues found 
19 MAEs in every 100 opportunities for error. This denominator assumes that 
there are multiple opportunities for error in each dose observed.  
 
3.3.4 MAEs Nature  
The following are categories reported to be types of MAE by seven studies in 
this review (Alsulami et al., 2014; Chua et al., 2010; Cousins et al., 2005; 
Feleke & Girma, 2010; Ghaleb et al., 2010; Prot et al., 2005; Ross et al., 
2000), the remaining 30 studies did not report specific MAE types but 
categorised MAE with other ME types : 
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 Preparation, Administration Technique, Medicine Infusion Rate 
 Dosage, Extra Dose, Dose Omission, Time of Administration 
 Wrong Medicine, Unauthorised Medicine 
 Wrong formulation, Wrong route, Wrong Strength  
In addition, other incidents, such as failure to follow hospital rules or policy 
and administration of doses without double-checking were also classified as 
types of MAE. None of the 37 studies have assessed the severity of the errors 
found or assessed the potential for harm specific to MAE.  
The most reported therapeutic agent that has been associated with hospital 
MAEs in children are antimicrobials (between 22.9% (Miller et al., 2010) and 
50.3% (Feleke & Girma, 2010)). Followed by: anticancer, anticonvulsants, 
steroids, cardiovascular, opioids and insulin agents.  
Only one study (Chedoe et al., 2012) was found to have measured the 
potential harm of MAE to the patient. A doctor, nurse and a pharmacist 
carried out this assessment independently where they were asked to rank the 
potential of harm on a scale of 0 to 10. This was an interventional study that 
concluded the pre-intervention harm was: 42% minor (n= 67), 57% 
moderate (n= 91), and 1% severe (n= 1). Whereas post-intervention harm 
was: 23% minor (n= 24), and 77% moderate (n= 80). This study carried out 
an observation of 10 days before and after the intervention. The intervention 
was based on an educational programme, posters for safe preparation and 
administration, and updated guidelines for the medicine administration 
process.  
 
3.3.5 MAE Interventions  
A review of the literature found five types of interventions evaluated to 
reduce hospital MAEs in children: bar code medicine administration, 
computerised physician order entry, education and training, smart pumps and 
use of standard concentrations.  
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Bar Code Medicine Administration (BCMA) 
BCMA is where patients are wearing a bar coded wristband. The barcode 
contains patient identification details such as patient’s name, date of birth and 
hospital number. Before each medicine administration, the bar code will need 
to be scanned against that of the dispensed medicine in order to confirm that 
the medicine is for the correct patient and is the correct prescribed medicine. 
Morriss et al. (2009) observed the number of ME using a review of medication 
charts and records kept by the infusion pump. The number of ME in the pre-
intervention phase that did not use BCMA was 39 ME, 19 were MAEs. In the 
post-intervention phase of using BCMA fewer ME (n= 20) were identified. 
MAE accounted for 12 incidents. MAE observed with BCMA were relating to 
omission (n= 1), wrong dose given (n= 1), administration technique (n= 1) 
and wrong time errors (n= 9).  
Computerised Physician Order Entry (CPOE) 
CPOE is where a prescription is generated electronically for dispensing and 
administration. This is also known as electronic prescribing. There have been 
studies that looked at the use of CPOE and its relation to MAE. The Fontan et 
al. (2003) retrospective review found that MAEs are lower with the aid of 
CPOE (22.5%) than with handwritten prescriptions (29.3%).  
Additionally, Sowan et al. (2010) found in a simulation study that CPOE 
increase the probability of detecting a MAE. The simulation involved 144 
infusions that are prepared either against a handwritten prescription or CPOE 
form. The simulation found that nurses were able to identify 53% of MAEs in 
infusions that were ordered using CPOE. On the other hand, nurses identified 
40% of the MAEs in the handwritten infusion prescription. Also, Warrick et al. 
(2011) evaluated a clinical information system that was integrated with 
electronic prescribing. This approach has significantly reduced the omitted 
doses from 8.1% (43 omitted doses in 528 doses) to 1.4% (4 omitted doses 
in 278 doses). 
Yamamoto and Kanemori (2010) carried out a prospective comparison 
between two medication administration practices. First practice was using a 
computer-assisted administration that has the prescription integrated and 
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other resources. The second practice was using a conventional method of 
medicine administration and dosing without access to a computer programme 
or electronic resources. They have found that using computer assisted 
administration practice MAE (n= 27 MAEs) rate is lower than conventional 
method (n= 70 MAEs) with significant difference (P < 0.001). This computer 
assisted dosing is a combination of an electronic calculator for preparation 
and administration of children's medicines.  
Education and Training  
Educational programmes to raise awareness and reduce hospital MAEs in 
children have been delivered to doctors, nurses and graduating students. 
Chedoe et al. (2012) was able to reduce MAE by 37% in the Netherlands after 
implementation of a comprehensive educational programme as well as 
individual nurse training of preparation and administration procedures. The 
intervention was able to reduce the potential severity of harm. Notably the 
wrong administration rates both of minor and moderate harm reduced by 
23% and 12% respectively. However, the frequency of MAEs such as 
medication incompatibilities or intravenous lines not flushed increased by 
20% in frequency and severity.   
Otero et al. (2008) looked at the effect of comprehensive educational 
programmes for the nursing team. The intervention designed and 
implemented a “10 steps to reduce medication errors” checklist. The checklist 
was also provided in a plastic pocket card for nurses to carry around with 
them. The study pre-intervention MAE rate was 8.4% and post-intervention 
rate reduced to 5.9% per 100 administered doses. The intervention has 
reduced dose omission, incorrect dosing and wrong infusion rate errors.   
 Another interventional study was by Bertsche et al. (2010) that aimed to 
provide training on medicine administration to both the healthcare team as 
well as the parents. This partnership in improving medication delivery via 
effective training has significantly reduced hospital MAEs in children. MAE rate 
pre-intervention was 40.4 % by the healthcare team and 96.6% by the 
parents. The post-intervention MAE rate reduced significantly for the nursing 
team and parents, 7.9% and 5.6% respectively per 100 doses administered.  
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There have also been interventions that looked at reducing MAEs in the 
undergraduate education of nursing (Pauly-O'Neill, 2009; Stewart et al., 
2010) and medical (Stewart et al., 2010) students. This is to equip newly 
graduates with knowledge and understanding of the medication 
administration process. Another one is training of staff to improve adherence 
to hospital regulations and policy by Raja Lope et al (2009). 
Moreover, Ellis et al. (2011) demonstrated that implementation of new 
guidelines can prevent harm from MAE. They have managed to prevent the 
need for the use of morphine antidote or respiratory support in children 
following administration of a morphine overdose. 
Smart Pumps and Standard Concentrations  
Smart pumps are devices with in-built algorithm that match the patient’s 
parameters such as weight or body surface area with the correct infusion 
rate. Thereby decreasing the incidence of MAEs due to the wrong infusion 
rate and intercepting prescribing errors due to incorrect calculation of dose 
and infusion rate.  
Trbovich et al. (2010) have evaluated three types of infusion pumps: 
traditional infusion pump, smart infusion pump, and bar code infusion pump. 
They have found that overall, bar code pumps helped to minimise wrong 
patient and medicine errors by the nurse scanning a patient wristband against 
the infusion using a bar code scanner. Whereas smart pumps were more 
useful in reducing dose MAEs through its in-build library. However with a 
traditional infusion pump, nurses relied more on their skills and experience. A 
study by Russell et al. (2010) found that 24% of medicine observed had a 
discrepancy between the prescribed dose and the actual dose being given to 
the patient due to the infusion pumps. 
Additionally, Larsen et al. (2005) explored using standard concentrations of 
medication combined with the use of smart pumps. This combination has 
resulted in decreasing 10-fold MAEs from 0.41 to 0.08 per 1000 dose.  
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3.4 Discussion 
The review was able to explore definitions, methods and interventions used to 
investigate MAE in children’s hospitals. Different definitions for MAEs were 
identified, reflecting the diversity in understanding of the problem. However, 
it was possible to recognise key components that constitute a mutual 
definition of MAEs. These components consist of an agreement that MAE is a 
deviation of medicine administered from the prescribed instruction. It also 
includes errors during the preparation process and the failure to follow 
hospital standard procedures. Nevertheless, there is a need to develop a 
definition for MAEs agreed by medication safety experts and practitioners that 
provides a clear and precise statement.  
The definition should address issues such as prescribing, dispensing or 
monitoring errors that were not intercepted before the administration 
process. Such errors should also be considered as a MAEs since most hospital 
standard operating procedures for medication administration require staff to 
conduct adequate clinical checks. The benefit of a standard/agreed MAE 
definition is that it can reduce heterogeneity of future studies. This will lead 
to a possibility of meta-analysis and can also be used to conduct randomised 
control trials of interventions. Also there is a need for clearer defined 
subcategories of MAE. This will enable a better standardisation of 
investigations and interpreting of findings. For example, the majority of the 
studies identify wrong time, but there is no clear indication of what exactly 
constitutes the wrong time, many state it’s the administration of the dose ±1 
hour of scheduled time. Others state ±30 minutes. The impact of these 
differences can be vital since it will affect the number of MAE identified. 
Therefore, this is a major cause for heterogeneity of the data.   
Furthermore, this review found various methods used to investigate hospital 
MAEs in children. There are indeed strengths and limitations for each method 
but a triangulation of methodological approaches to study hospital MAEs in 
children will lead to a better understanding of the true nature, causes and 
severity of the problem.  
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There were variations in the denominators of which MAEs were expressed. 
This could cause confusion, misunderstanding or irregularity in interpreting 
MAE prevalence. Also, the number of MAEs detected prospectively is 
dependent on factors like observer clinical experience and knowledge of the 
medicine administration process. Similar concerns were expressed by the 
McLeod, Barber, and Franklin (2013) review.  
If the heterogeneity between studies due to factors such as: study setting, 
definitions, size, duration of study and tools used to identify hospital MAE in 
children were neglected, this review found cumulatively 12552 reported 
hospital ME incidents. MAEs accounted for 50% (n= 6246). Whereas, using a 
prospective observation method a total of 2537 MAEs (29%) were detected 
when 8894 doses were observed. These findings demonstrate the scale of the 
problem when providing medicine to children in hospital. Yet data is lacking 
regarding the level of harm this is causing or the potential for harm.  
Antimicrobials agents were found to be the medicine most commonly 
associated with MAE. This finding is expected since antimicrobials are 
considered the most prescribed agents in this cohort. However, this is also 
due to difficulties in dose calculations, giving it at the correct time intervals or 
the preparation of intravenous infusions. Moreover, this could have been as a 
result of other errors not intercepted in the prescribing or dispensing process. 
Especially as many medications are used unlicensed and/or off-label in 
children. The review found only one study that carried out an assessment of 
MAE potential harm. Another gap in the literature is that no study has been 
carried out exploring the contributory factors of MAE in PICU. This is 
important since both knowledge of severity of harm and contributing factors 
can help to develop interventions and will facilitate the development of 
interventions that focus on risky practices by both the system and 
practitioners.  
In addition, interventional studies in hospital MAE were explored and 
categorised as: bar-code medicine administration, electronic prescribing, 
education and training, use of smart pumps and standard concentration. 
However, evidence is not strong enough to support their true impact or 
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effects on reducing MAEs. This is possibly due to the multifaceted nature of 
MAE.  
For example BCMA have shown the advantages of reducing MAEs relating to 
wrong patient, wrong medicine and time errors. However, other MAEs may 
not be reduced such as errors in preparation, administration technique or 
wrong dose. Additionally, implementation of this BCMA system will encounter 
financial costs and requires staff training to ensure competence. 
On the other hand, CPOE allows clearer dosage instructions than handwritten 
prescriptions, hence minimising the risk of giving the wrong dose and can 
help detect prescribing errors before administering the medicine. Also use of 
pharmaceutical calculation aids can provide better personalised clinical 
decisions. Therefore, this will help to ensuring correct administration of 
medicines by informing the amount of drug to draw out, diluent volume and 
the infusion rate. However, this approach may not address issues such as 
wrong patient, wrong time or wrong medicine and it may  introduce new 
errors, such as discrepancies between what is electronically recorded and 
what is actually given. Therefore, more evaluation is required of these 
interventions and a study of the impact of multiple interventions on MAE.  
The current evidence suggests that there is a need for more than one 
intervention to reduce MAE in practice. They should focus on supporting good 
medication safety practices that have no blame culture, promote learning 
from errors and involve new technologies. Nevertheless, it is equally 
important to put in place suitable monitoring methods over long periods of 
time to assess the suitability of interventions.  
However, the review identified a key gap in literature and that is the limited 
number of interventions in PICUs, although there have been a number of 
studies carried out in PICUs to quantify the scale of the problem. Additionally, 
no study was found which investigated the opinions of PICU healthcare 
professionals about causes of MAE or sought recommendations from them to 
improve their administration practice. As far as the researcher is aware, there 
were only two studies carried out in the UK that tried to reduce MAEs 
(Stewart et al., 2010; Warrick et al., 2011). Both studies did not actually 
Chapter  3 :  Sys temat ic  L i te rature  Rev iew  
 63 
address MAE fully nor did they reduce MAEs in PICUs. Stewart et al. (2010) 
investigated the use of education and simulation of the administration process 
with undergraduate nurse students. The study is of less application in real 
practice since the study was carried out over a very short period of time. Also 
they did not follow up the students’ performance in real time clinical 
situations. On the other hand, Warrick et al. (2011) utilised a clinical 
information system to provide support for doctors and nurses. However, they 
only measured MAE in means of omitted doses. This is by no means a 
reflection of the true level of the problem in practice. Also, they carried out 
the study in an emergency department where patients are only likely to stay 
for a very short period of time. Hence many of the scheduled doses will be 
missed because they would have either been discharged to another ward or 
sent back home. Therefore, there is a serious need for evidence-based MAE 
safety measures in PICUs.  
This review builds upon knowledge found by other researchers. The 
prevalence of MAE found in this review is similar to that of (Ghaleb et al., 
2006; Keers et al., 2013b; McLeod et al., 2013). It also agrees with Raban 
and Westbrook (2013) that reducing interruption alone is associated with 
weak evidence of reducing MAE.  
This review did not identify research written in non-English language due to 
time constraints and lack of translators. Inclusion of such research would add 
vital insight into the type of research and nature of MAE in different parts of 
the world. However, the databases that were searched did return a number 
of non-English studies that were judged not to be relevant for this review. A 
separate search on non-English databases would be required along with a 
trusted translator that has experience in conducting literature reviews.  
Additionally, only interventional studies related to hospital MAE were 
reviewed, but it would have been beneficial to review overall ME interventions 
as well since this review shed light on the multifaceted nature of MAE. Also 
this review has focused only on hospital interventions to MAE in children. A 
separate review is recommended specifically to identify all the MAE 
interventions in both adults and children to allow shared learning and 
adaptation of interventions across different settings.  
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Moreover, future MAE research involve the need for a validated expert 
consensus on a clear practical guide to carry out MAE studies. This should 
include a standard manner to define, classify and reporting of MAE. This will 
result in a better understanding of the problem and will lead to development 
of evidence-based interventions.   
 
3.4.1 Conclusion   
This review has identified wide variation in the prevalence of hospital MAE in 
children. This is attributed to the methods and definitions used to investigate 
these errors as identified in this review. Additionally, the review found weak 
evidence for one single intervention to reduce hospital MAE in children. This 
illustrates the complexity and multifaceted nature of this issue. Therefore, 
there is a need to develop a set of safety measures to tackle these errors.  
 
3.5 Study Contribution to Knowledge 
1. The overall contribution of this review is that it provided a deeper 
understanding of the nature of MAEs in children’s hospitals and 
identified the gap in PICU-based MAE research.  
2. This review found that the most agreed definition is that MAE is a 
deviation from prescriber’s instructions and hospital procedures.  
3. The most clear and concise definition is by Ghaleb et al. (2010). It 
states that MAE is “the administration of a dose of medication that 
deviates from the prescription, as written on the patient medication 
chart, or from standard hospital policy and procedures. This includes 
errors in the preparation, and administration of intravenous medicines 
on the ward”.  
4. There is no consensus in defining the subtypes of MAE.  
5. No mention of prescribing/dispensing errors that were not intervened 
in before the administration process.  
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6. Only one study carried out assessment of potential harm due to MAE.  
7. No study explored contributing factors of MAE in PICU. 
8. Healthcare professionals’ opinions were not investigated to identify the 
causes or recommendations of MAE prevention methods in PICU. Weak 
evidence found to support use of a single intervention to reduce MAE.  
9. Only two studies carried out an intervention in the UK. Neither 
investigated MAE fully. One looked at the use of simulation in 
undergraduate nurse students and the other developed clinical 
information systems in the emergency department. 
10. No study has been carried out in the UK to reduce MAE in PICU. 
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Chapter 4:  Retrospective Analysis of 
Medication Error Reports of a London 
PICU 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The systematic review of literature in this thesis has identified a number of 
methods to investigate MAE. This includes the review of patient safety 
incidents submitted to a reporting system. The NPSA (2010) have defined a 
patient safety incident as “any unintended or unexpected incident which could 
have or did lead to harm”. The same definition is used by NHS England 
following NPSA function transfer to NHS England in 2012. The following are 
categories of patient safety incidents: 
 Incidents that caused no harm or minimum harm. 
 Near Miss Incidents (NMI). These are incidents that had the potential 
to cause harm but did not reach the patient.  
 Serious Untoward Incidents (SUI) that result in severe harm or death. 
This also includes incidents where there is police involvement or media 
interest and never events. 
Medication errors are included in all categories of patient safety incidents. 
There is a requirement to report these incidents to the National Reporting and 
Learning System (NRLS) within two days of detecting the incident. However, 
for SUIs there is an additional requirement to notify the Department of Health 
within two hours and document a report in the Strategic Executive 
Information System (STEIS) within two days. Moreover, a thorough 
investigation should be carried out by root cause analysis. This will lead to 
identifying areas for improvements and lessons learnt.  
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The NRLS received a total of 42029 incidents relating to the care of children 
between 1st October 2007 and 30th September 2008 (NPSA, 2009). This 
represents 4.2% of the total incidents reported to the NRLS (n= 910089). 
Incidents relating to medication use were found in 17% (n= 7145). It was 
found that administration of incorrect dose or strength of medication was the 
highest reported medication incident type (23%). 
In order to investigate MAEs occurring in PICUs regardless of the level of 
harm caused, reviewing all reported incidents is ideal rather than simply 
review of one specific type of incidents. This will ensure that all reported 
incidents are captured whether they have reached the patient or not. An 
additional advantage is that trends and correlation of risk can be measured 
regardless of harm caused. 
The aim of this study is to identify retrospectively the baseline characteristics 
of MAEs reported in a PICU of a children's hospital. The study objectives 
include: 
1. To characterise occurrences of patient safety incidents in PICU. 
2. To determine the nature of incidents related to medicine use in PICUs. 
3. To report the documented severity of harm caused by the medicine 
incidents in PICUs. 
4. To identify prevalence of MEs and MAEs reported in PICUs. 
5. To investigate factors associated with MAEs in PICUs.  
6. To assess the quality of medication incident reports in PICUs. 
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4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Setting 
The study was carried out at Great Ormond Street Hospital (London, UK) 
PICU. It hosts 13 beds, with approximately 1200 patients admitted annually.  
 
4.2.2 Study Definitions 
The hospital’s classifications of patient safety incidents were used to 
categorise the incidents not relating to medication use. The NPSA definition of 
ME was used in this study to classify errors relating to medicines. It states 
that ME incidents are “patient safety incidents involving medicines in which 
there has been an error in the process of prescribing, dispensing, preparing, 
administering, monitoring, or providing medicine advice, regardless of 
whether any harm occurred” (National Patient Safety Agency, 2007b, p. 9).  
A more specific definition for MAE was also used to explore the incidents 
relating to administration. In this study MAE has been defined as "the 
administration of a dose of medication that deviates from the prescription, as 
written on the patient medication chart, or from standard hospital policies and 
procedures. This includes errors in the preparation, and administration of 
intravenous medicines on the ward" (Ghaleb et al., 2010).  
Another definition used to categorise medication incidents is near miss. A 
near miss is “where the error was discovered before the medicine was 
supplied to the patient” (NPSA, 2007b, p. 11). 
4.2.3 Selection Criteria  
All patient safety incidents reported to the PICU risk management system 
between 1st January 2007 and 30th September 2012 will be analysed. The 
study excluded any errors related to blood related products and blood 
transfusion. Detailed analysis was carried out only on medication incidents 
that relate to prescribing and administration errors.  
Chapter  4 :  Analys is  o f  Medicat ion Inc idents  
 69 
4.2.4 Data Collection 
All patient safety incident reports from 1st January 2007 to 30th September 
2012 submitted, whether as paper-based reports or to the electronic risk 
management system (Datix), were collected. The following data will be 
recorded: 
 Date and time of incident or when it was reported. 
 Name of medication involved. 
 Patient age at the time of the incident.  
 Detailed account of the incident. 
 Nature of incident. 
 Subtype of incident (i.e. wrong dose, wrong time, dose omission). 
 Reported severity of harm by the incident. 
Paper based patient safety incident reports were recorded manually by the 
researcher. The data was transcribed into a Microsoft Excel 2007 Worksheet 
(Microsoft, Redmond, Washington, US) for analysis. Patient safety incident 
reports that were submitted electronically were extracted into a Microsoft 
Excel file format from Datix. All patient identifiable information or details of 
staff involved were removed. The risk management assessment of severity of 
harm data was used in this study.  
4.2.5 Data Analysis 
A single dataset was created in Microsoft Excel combining both paper-based 
critical incident reports and the Datix dataset. Thematic analysis was carried 
out on all medication related incidents to identify the subtypes of MEs. 
Moreover, NHS England (2014c) Medication Optimisation Dashboard was used 
to calculate the level of medication safety. This measurement is carried out as 
a percentage ratio of number of medication incidents resulting in harm over 
the total number of medication incidents.  
4.2.6 Data Validation 
The researcher asked a PICU nurse to select a random sample of 20 patient 
safety incident reports. The nurse compared the documented incident to that 
recorded by the researcher electronically into Microsoft Excel. The nurse 
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found all 20 reports to match the associated transcribed reports. Also, the 
nurse noted that the researcher complied with all information governance 
requirements. Moreover, an independent fellow PhD candidate validated a 
further random sample of 50 patient safety incident reports that were 
thematically analysed by the researcher. The independent researcher was 
given all definitions and was briefed on the aim and purpose of this study. 
There was agreement in 48 reports (96%) and the remaining two reports 
were agreed after discussion, there was no need for a third opinion.  
4.2.7 Calculation of medication error prevalence  
The Paediatric Intensive Care Audit Network (2014, PICANet) provided 
various data such as number of admissions. This data is available to the 
public to view individual PICUs' annual activities. Therefore, the number of 
admissions and number of patient bed days were collected. These were used 
as denominators to work out the overall prevalence of medication errors. The 
following equations were used to calculate the incidence per 100 admissions 
(equation 4.1) and incidence per 1000 bed days (equation 4.2). 
 
                              
                   
                   
      Equation 4.1 
 
                              
                   
                  
       Equation 4.2 
4.2.8 Quality Assessment  
A random sample of medication incident reports (20%) was reviewed to 
assess the quality of reporting. This is carried out on the Datix incidents only 
since it is the only currently used reporting system. The researcher used the 
following criteria were used to review each incident: 
1. Did the report provide patient demographics (e.g. age/ gender)?  
2. Was the date and time when the incident occurred or was identified 
reported? 
3. Was the name of the medication(s) involved documented? 
4. Were details of medication formulation or strength involved in the 
incident documented? 
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5. Was the stage at which the incident occurred documented and 
correctly identified (e.g. administration)? 
6. Is the category of incident correctly identified (e.g. wrong dose)? 
7. Were the professions of the staff involved in the incident reported (e.g. 
doctor)? 
8. Is the description of the incident detailed enough?  
9. Were the underlying causes of the incident documented? 
10. Are there actions to be taken to avoid this incident from happening 
again? 
Each medication incident was assessed and scored out of 10. The following 
scores determine the level of report quality in relation to opportunity for 
learning: 
 A score between 9 and 10 is excellent.  
 A score between 7 and 8 is good.  
 A score between 5 and 6 is average. 
 A score between 3 and 4 is poor. 
 A score between 1 and 2 is inadequate. 
4.2.9 Ethical Consideration 
There was a requirement to ensure that all data recorded complied with the 
hospital's information governance policy. Therefore, the researcher removed 
all identifiable information of the persons involved, the person who reported 
the incident and patient information. As discussed in the methodology chapter 
of this thesis, an ethical approval was obtained.    
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4.3 Results: 
4.3.1 Characteristics of Patient Safety Incident Reports 
There were 1686 patient safety incident reports documented at the PICU 
between 1st January 2007 and 30th September 2012. As presented in 
Figure ‎4.1, the highest number of reports relates to medications which 
account for 35% (n= 583).  
This is followed by health and safety incidents (13%, n= 224), equipment 
(10%, n= 162), communications (9%, n= 147), self-extubations (8%, n= 
135), bed management and other staffing issues (8%, n= 133), other not 
classified incidents (6%, n= 97) which includes, for example, incidents 
relating to security issues or raising concerns regarding patient wellbeing at 
home, incidents relating to services from other departments (5%, n= 83) 
which includes examples of delayed response or delayed transfer of patient’s 
records, extravasations (4%, n= 69) and tissue viability (3%, n= 53). There 
were a total of 1207 paper based reports for the period of January 2007 to 
March 2011. Medicine related reports accounted for (20%, n= 237). In the 
period between March 2011 and September 2012 there were 479 Datix 
reports. Medicine incidents accounted for 72% (n= 346).  
As the aim of this study is to review patient safety incident reports that are 
directly related to medication use in PICU, a total of 1103 incidents were 
excluded. The incidents that related to medication use (n= 583) were 
analysed further.  
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Figure ‎4.1: Distribution of patient safety incident reports in PICU (n= 1686) 
for period of 1st January 2007 to 30th September 2012 
4.3.2 Nature of Medicine Related Incident Reports 
A breakdown of all medicine related incidents (n= 583) shows a further 
division into six main categories: near-miss (i.e. error intercepted before a 
dose administered, 17%, n= 95), prescribing errors not prevented before 
administration (24%, n= 141), incidents at administration stage (30%, n= 
176), issues relating to supply from pharmacy or other departments (8%, n= 
48), storage or control drug (CD) balance issues (11%, n= 64), and total 
parenteral nutrition (TPN) incidents (10%, n= 59). This is illustrated in 
Figure ‎4.2 that shows the breakdown in a pie chart. 
In order to meet the study objectives, incidents relating to CD balance 
discrepancies, supply and TPN reports were excluded (n=171). Therefore, the 
incidents of the following nature were further analysed: administration 
incidents, incidents relating to both the prescribing and administration stages, 
and near misses. These yielded 412 reports, representing 71% of total 
medicine related reports and 24% of the overall patient safety incident 
reports. Table ‎4.1 provides examples of these incidents. 
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Figure ‎4.2: Breakdown of medicine related incident reports 
Table ‎4.1: Examples of Incidents reported 
Class of Error Subtype Incident as reported 
Multiple 
Medication 
Process 
Incidents 
Wrong Diluent 
Morphine and Midazolam infusions prescribed in 0.9% Sodium Chloride. 
Made up in 5% Glucose. Noticed at morning handover.  
Wrong Patient 
Hyoscine patch was prescribed for the wrong patient and given when that 
patient should have remained only on Glycopyrronium Bromide oral 
solution. 
Wrong Dose 
Piperacutin/Tazobactam (8 doses), ciprofloxacin (5 doses) and Vancomycin 
(4 doses) given as full doses to patient with long standing renal impairment. 
Medication 
Administration 
Errors 
Omission 
Amikacin trough and hold reported performed at 02.00 on prescription 
chart, but was not administered. Night staff told day staff dose could be 
given. Amikacin level 1.2mg/l (range 1–10) reported at 06.26. Child septic 
with gram-negative rods in pus found in vaginal remnant. 
Wrong Dose 
Checking drug infusions, child prescribed 132mg of midazolam documented 
on syringe that 26.4mg was in the syringe 
Extra Dose 
Checking drug chart child was prescribed 530mg of midazolam as bolus 
PRN. Dose had been signed as given times 2. [given twice within 30minutes 
gap] 
Near Miss 
Incidents 
Wrong Dose 
Dexamethasone prescribed as 160mg IV QDS. The dose that should have 
been prescribed was 4mg IV QDS. Prescription changed. 
Wrong 
Infusion Rate 
Hydralazine infusion was prescribed with a calculation error therefore the 
rate prescribed was ten times too high. This incorrect prescription was then 
copied by another prescriber incorrectly. Drug was not administered. 
Illegal 
Prescription 
Furosemide prescribed on drug chart but no dose given and not signed by 
doctor. No doses given by nursing staff 
Supply 
n = 48 
8% 
TPN 
n = 59 
10% 
Storage/CD 
Balance 
n = 64 
11% 
Near-Misses 
n = 95 
17% 
Multiple Medication 
Process 
n = 141 
24% 
Administration  
n = 176 
30% 
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Near Misses Incident Reports  
Near Miss Incidents are incidents of errors prevented before reaching the 
patient. There were 95 near miss reports found by the researcher. This 
represents 17% of all medication related incidents and 6% of patient safety 
incident reports. Figure ‎4.3 illustrates the different categories of near miss. 
They break down into: wrong doses prescribed (n= 44), prescribing wrong 
infusion rates (n= 17), failure to prescribe in accordance with the legal 
requirements of prescriptions (n= 13), prescribing wrong dose frequency (n= 
10), documentation issues in prescription (n= 5), omission (n= 3) and 
prescribing wrong route (n= 1). There were other related incidents (n= 2) 
due to failure to prescribe appropriately. 
No reports relating to a near miss during the administration process were 
identified. This includes the double-checking process and the preparation 
process.  
 
Figure ‎4.3: Nature of reported near miss incident reports (n= 95) 
Review of the near miss incidents found Paracetamol (n= 7), Amikacin (n= 6) 
and Midazolam (n= 5) to be the drugs most reported  as shown in Table ‎4.2. 
It is worth noting that Amikacin is a narrow therapeutic drug that requires 
careful adjustment of dose in accordance with weight and status of renal 
function. 
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Table ‎4.2: Top drugs associated with near miss reports 
Drug Number of Reports 
Paracetamol  7 
Amikacin  6 
Midazolam  5 
Hyoscine  4 
Morphine  4 
Veccuronium 4 
 
MAE Incident Reports 
The most prevalent incidents relating to medicine use were MAEs (30%, n= 
176). These also account for 10% of all patient safety incident reports. It was 
possible to categorise these reports into various types as presented in 
Figure ‎4.4. These are incidents where the prescribed dose was correct but 
error occurred either during preparation or administration process. All MAEs 
reached the patient and were identified later by either a nurse or the ward 
pharmacist.  
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Figure ‎4.4: Breakdown of incidents relating to MAE (n= 176) 
As it is demonstrated in Figure ‎4.4, the nature of MAE is extended over a 
number of types. Reports relating to wrong infusion rate are the leading 
category of MAE (n= 26) and administration of unauthorised drug (n= 26), 
followed by wrong dose (n= 22) errors, and time errors (n= 21). Table ‎4.3 
represents the top five drugs that are associated with MAE reports. As can be 
seen Morphine is the most reported drug linked with MAE, followed by 
Midazolam and Vancomycin. It should be noted that all of these medicines are 
considered to be high risk medicines. 
Table ‎4.3: Top drugs associated with MAE reports 
Drug  Number of Reports 
Morphine  15 
Midazolam  12 
Vancomycin  10 
Amikacin 8 
Phenobarbitone  8 
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There were incidents relating to failure to prescribe correctly that were not 
intercepted during the administration process (n= 141). These incidents were 
mostly identified by the ward pharmacist (n= 124). Figure ‎4.5 demonstrates 
the breakdown of these incidents. These incidents represent 24% of all 
medication related reports and 8% of all patient safety incident reports. 
As can be seen in Figure ‎4.5, the majority of the incidents are due to dose 
given (n= 73), and followed by reports of prescriptions that are considered to 
be illegal due to failure to fulfil the prescription requirement (n= 47). 
Table ‎4.4 presents the most common drugs that are associated with this type 
of error. Once again high-risk medicines and narrow therapeutic agents are 
reported to be associated with these incidents.  
 
 
Figure ‎4.5: Nature of incidents relating to multiple medication process errors 
(n= 141) 
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Table ‎4.4: Top drugs associated with multiple medication process error 
Drug Number of Reports 
Midazolam  11 
Morphine  11 
Veccuronium 8 
Paracetamol  6 
Vancomycin 6 
Aciclovir  5 
Amikacin  5 
Ciprofloxacin  5 
 
4.3.3 Medicine Incidents Severity of Harm  
The PICU risk management team assess all incident reports in accordance 
with the NPSA scale of harm. Their assessment of the medicine related 
incidents found in this review (n= 412) were extracted and presented in 
Figure ‎4.6. As illustrated, the majority of the incidents did not lead to harm, 
but 12 incidents were found to involve severe harm and are listed in 
Table ‎4.5.  
The level of safety using the NHS England Medicines Optimisation Dashboard 
is 30% in this PICU over the dataset collected. This represents the ratio of 
incidents documented with harm (low, moderate, severe and death, n= 125) 
over the total number of incidents (n= 412).   
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Figure ‎4.6: Severity of harm for medicine related incidents 
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Table ‎4.5: All severe incidents associated with medicine related reports 
Category Description of incident as reported 
Multiple 
Medication 
Process 
Incidents 
Patient was prescribed carbamazepine 750mg BD PO in error, dose should have 
been 150mg BD. 750mg Dose has been signed as having been given & 
documented as been given at 20:00 on xx/xx/07 (nursing staff not yet contacted 
to confirm what dose was administered) CBZ Level to be monitored pre-dose on 
xx/xx/07 (after 2 days) dose of 150mg already administered on 08:00 therefore 
too late to take level 
Incorrect dose of Vancomycin had been prescribed by Dr on the xx/xx/08. The 
dose had then been given over the next 3 days the level was found to be high. 
Four medications incorrectly prescribed, not signed and wrong dose calculated. 
Patient was prescribed aminophylline continuous infusion for diuresis. 
Recommended dose was 0.5mg/kg/hr due to interaction between amlodipine 
and aminophylline (usual dose range 0.5–1mg/kg/hr however calcium channel 
blockers may increase aminophylline levels therefore require lower end of dose 
range). 
Near Miss 
Incidents 
 
Amlodipine prescribed as 60mg QDS (max adult dose 10mg OD) prescribed in 
error was supposed to be nimodipine. No drug was given to patient 
Hydralazine infusion was prescribed with a calculation error therefore the rate 
prescribed was ten times too high. This incorrect prescription was then copied 
by another prescriber incorrectly. Drug was not administered. 
Vasopressin prescribed as units/kg/hour instead of minutes. Sodium bicarbonate 
infusion prescribed with dose and rate incomplete. Noradrenaline prescribed 
with no dose units specified. 
Administration 
Incidents 
 
Triclofos had been given at 06:00 but not prescription for it. 
Amikacin trough and hold reported performed at 02.00 on prescription chart, but 
was not administered. Night staff told day staff dose could be given. Amikacin 
level 1.2mg/l (range 1–10) reported at 06.26. Child septic with gram negative 
rods in pus found in vaginal remnant. 
Newly diagnosed diabetic patient, continued to have BMs >25 despite novo 
rapid insulin being given via pen. Thought to be a drug delivery issue. 
Discovered after Nurse in charge spoke with pharmacy and researched the pens 
that needle is not situated in pen as previously has been. needles need to be 
fitted to pen for each use. Therefore, patient had not received any of the 
novorapid insulin thought to have been administered. 
Pre-made syringe of milrinone being administered, concentration 50mg in 50mls. 
Prescribed for 10mg in 50mls. Pump also set for 10mg concentration not the 
50mg/50ml being administered. 
Patient on Fentanyl infusion. Infusion made up not according to prescription 
chart and running above prescribed rate. 
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4.3.4 Prevalence of Medicine Related Incidents  
The prevalence of medicine related incidents were calculated using the annual 
reports of PICANet. The total number of patient admissions and total number 
of bed days for the period of 1st January 2007 to 30th September 2012 were 
extracted from PICANet. Table ‎4.6 present the breakdown for each 
medication related incident category. The prevalence was expressed using 
two denominators: number of admissions, and number of bed days. As the 
table demonstrates, there is a positive correlation of reporting across six 
years. The prevalence of medication incidents were found to be seven reports 
in every 100 admissions and 10.4 reports per 1000 bed days. The prevalence 
of MAEs was found to be three in every 100 admissions and 4.4 in every 1000 
patient days. As can be noted, the number of admissions post 2007 has 
steadily levelled out. It illustrates that there is a mean of 940 admissions per 
year (based on data between 2008 and 2011). This indicates the high 
demand on this small sized PICU (13 beds).  
Table ‎4.6: Prevalence of medicine related incidents for period between 2007 
and 2012 
 Year 
Total 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012* 
Number of Admissions 1473 892 953 934 983 675 5910 
Bed Days 9792 5951 6066 6348 6568 5044 39769 
Administration Incidents 
Number of Reports 41 37 16 13 21 48 176 
Prevalence per 100 Admission  2.8 4.1 1.7 1.4 2.1 7.1 2.9 
Prevalence per 1000 Bed Days  4.2 6.2 2.6 2.0 3.2 9.5 4.4 
Near Miss Incidents 
Number of Reports 9 8 8 6 31 33 95 
Prevalence per 100 Admission  0.6 0.9 0.8 0.6 3.2 4.9 1.6 
Prevalence per 1000 Bed Days  0.9 1.3 1.3 0.9 4.7 6.5 2.4 
Multiple Medication Process Incidents  
Number of Reports 20 11 37 26 25 22 141 
Prevalence per 100 Admission  1.4 1.2 3.9 2.8 2.5 3.6 2.4 
Prevalence per 1000 Bed Days  2.0 1.8 6.1 4.1 3.8 4.4 3.5 
All Medication Related Incidents  
Number of Reports 70 56 61 45 77 103 412 
Prevalence per 100 Admission  4.6 6.3 6.4 4.6 7.8 15.3 6.9 
Prevalence per 1000 Bed Days  7.1 9.4 9.6 6.9 11.7 20.4 10.4 
* Data up to 30th September 2012 
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4.3.5 Associated Factors: Patient Age  
Not all reports collected stated patient’s age or patient’s date of birth. Only 
217 reports documented this information out of the 412 reports. Since data 
collected were specifically from PICUs, it can be seen that reports affected 
patients of all paediatric age groups as illustrated in Figure ‎4.7. The most 
commonly reported errors were associated with patients aged between 0 to 2 
years old (n= 111), followed by those aged 3 to 5 years old (n= 37) and then 
patients aged 12 to 14 years old (n= 29).  
 
 
Figure ‎4.7: Medicine related incidents according to age-group of patients in 
PICU (n= 217) 
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4.3.6 Associated Factors: Seasonal Variation 
It was possible to investigate seasonal variations of incident reporting within 
the unit. Figure ‎4.8 reveals in chart (A) the medicine related incident (n = 
412) reporting per month over the period from January 2007 to September 
2012. It illustrates that festive and summer holidays are associated with lower 
numbers of reporting compared to mid seasons. This can also be seen in 
chart (B) which demonstrates a similar pattern. Moreover, differences in 
reporting also exists across weekdays as shown in chart (C). Weekends are 
associated with a lower number of reports than the first three days of the 
week. Further variation can be observed across the 24 hour cycle as shown in 
Figure ‎4.9. However, the data represents time that incident was reported as 
well as time that the incident actually occurred. Nevertheless, it can be seen 
that errors are more likely to be picked up at the beginning of each shift (8am 
or 8pm).  
 
4.3.7 Associated Factors: Therapeutic Agents 
In this study, 101 different therapeutic agents were identified as being 
associated with medication related incidents. Table ‎4.7 represents the number 
of reports for each therapeutic agent. As can be seen, the most associated 
agents are: Morphine (n= 30), Midazolam (n= 28), Amikacin (n= 19), and 
Vancomycin (n= 18). Additionally, a total of 13 high risk medicines and 
narrow therapeutic agents have been associated with 159 incident reports. 
This represents 38% of the incidents reviewed in this analysis (n= 412). 
Figure ‎4.10 demonstrates the reported therapeutic agents group. 
Antimicrobials are the most reported group of medicines (n= 119), followed 
by sedation agents (n= 71) and cardiovascular agents (n= 70).  
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Figure ‎4.8: Graph (A) shows the distribution of reports (n= 412) over 5 years and graph (B) shows the cumulative count of reports 
for each calendar month with the average number of reports per month. Whereby, chart (C) shows the breakdown of reports A 
A 
B C 
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Figure ‎4.9: Hourly fluctuation of medication error reporting in PICU (n= 141) 
 
 
 
Figure ‎4.10: Therapeutic agents associated with medicine related incidents 
(n= 412) 
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Table ‎4.7: List of the number of medication related incident reports for each 
therapeutic agent 
Drug Reports Drug Reports Drug Reports 
Morphine HR 30 Sodium Nitroprusside 3 Magnesium Sulphate 1 
Midazolam HR 28 Spironalactone  3 Montelukast  1 
Amikacin HR 19 Teicoplanin  3 Movicol  1 
Vancomycin HR  18 Ursodeoxycholic Acid 3 Mycophenolate  1 
Paracetamol  17 Hydrocortisone 3 Omeprazole  1 
Veccuronium HR 17 Metronidazole  3 Ondansetron  1 
Clonidine 12 Adrenaline  2 Oseltanivr  1 
Noradrenaline  10 Amlodipine  2 Pancuronium 1 
Phenobarbitone HR 9 Amphotericin 2 Pentoxifylline  1 
Aciclovir  8 Ampicillin  2 Potassium Canrenoate  1 
Fentanyl HR 8 Baclofen 2 Prednisolone  1 
Furosemide HR 8 Chloramphenicol  2 Propofol  1 
Rantidine  8 Cotrimoxazole 2 Pyridoxine  1 
Hyoscine  7 Epoprostenol 2 Rocuronium 1 
Cefotaxime  6 Hydralazine 2 Sirolimus  1 
Ciprofloxacin  6 Ipratropium 2 Sodium Chloride  1 
Piperacillin/Tozobactam 6 Pentamidine  2 Sulfasolazine  1 
Potassium Chloride HR 6 Remifentanyl  HR 2 Total  412 
Azithromycin 6 Sildenafil  2 HR High Risk Medicine 
Alimemazine  5 Sodium Bicarbonate  2  
Aminphylline  5 Sodium Feredetate 2 
Chlorphenamine  5 Spironolactone  2 
Dexamethasone 5 Diazepam  2 
Erythromycin  5 Amiodarone 1 
Insulin HR 5 Amoxicillin  1 
Ketamine HR 5 Atricurium 1 
Meropemum  5 Azathrioprine  1 
Milrinone 5 Carbamazepine  1 
Triclofos  5 Choral Hydrate  1 
Clarithromycin  4 Clindamycin 1 
Gancicilovir  4 Clobazam  1 
Octreotide  4 Co-Trimoxazole  1 
Phenytoin HR 4 Colomycin  1 
Salbutamol 4 Dapsone  1 
Co-Amoxiclav 4 Digoxin 1 
Ambisone  3 Flucytosine 1 
Chloral Hydrate  3 Folic Acid  1 
Ciclosporin  3 Foscarnet  1 
Domperidone  3 Glycopyrrolate 1 
Dopamine 3 Glyceryl Trinitrate 1 
Fluconazole 3 Levomepromazine 1 
Methyprednisolone  3 Loperamide  1 
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4.3.8 Quality of Medication Related Incident Reports 
A random sample (20%) of the medication related incident Datix reports were 
selected to assess the quality of reporting. The 35 randomly selected 
incidents were reviewed against set criteria and it was found that the majority 
of the incident reports were of a poor level (n= 24). Table ‎4.8 illustrates the 
findings and provides examples for each quality level. This assessment is 
aimed at level of opportunity for learning from the incident.  
 
Table ‎4.8: Findings of quality assessment for learning and examples 
Quality Level Total (%) Examples 
Poor 24 (69%) 
Patient prescribed midazolam and vecuronium infusions with 
no dose or rate prescribed. Both drugs had been administered 
against illegal prescription. 
Average 5 (14%) 
Amphotericin prescribed for TDS, transcribed incorrectly from 
ward electronic charting. Dose of 4mg/kg TDS not 4mg/kg 
Once a day. 
Good 5 (14%) 
Patient prescribed both long acting and short acting insulin, 
both medication dispensed as flexpens, no needles were 
dispensed with the pens and no patient information leaflet was 
available. As a ward we are unfamiliar with this method of 
administering insulin as we usually give it iv as an infusion. 
consequently I was unable to deliver the dose of short acting 
insulin as prescribed and had to request an alternative 
preparation from pharmacy, this led to a delay in the patient 
receiving the drug and a potential problem with managing 
blood sugars, on reflection it was unclear as to whether the 
long acting insulin had been given appropriately as there were 
no needles available at this time either. 
Inadequate 1 (3%) Medication administered via the incorrect route 
Total 35 (100%)  
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4.4 Discussion 
The aim of this study was to identify retrospectively baseline characteristics of 
MAEs reported in a PICU. The study characterised medication related incident 
and it was also possible to identify factors associated with these incidents. 
The severity of harm associated with these incidents was also reported. 
Additionally, assessment of quality of reporting of medication incidents was 
carried out.  
This analysis of patient safety incident reports in the PICU of a London based 
children's hospital over a period of 68 months (5.6 years) found 1686 reports. 
The most reported incidents were related to medicines (n= 583, 35%). It was 
found that 412 incidents were specifically associated with medication use in 
the PICU. This includes errors in prescribing and administration processes. 
The 412 incidents represent 24% of all reported patient safety incidents (n= 
1686). The most reported incidents related to medication administration 
incidents (n= 176, 43%), followed by prescribing errors that were not 
intercepted (n= 141, 34%) and near miss incidents (n= 95, 23%).  
Medication administration incidents are errors in preparation or administration 
process when using a correct prescription. However, the hospital standard 
procedure for medicine administration requires staff to ensure that the 
prescribed dose is within the prescribing protocol. Therefore, failure to do so 
will constitute an administration error. This type of incident was classified in 
this report as a multiple medication process error. This is to reflect that a 
better physical barrier is required to avoid these errors. This is indicated by 
the fact that the majority of these incidents were only identified by the PICU 
pharmacist after the dose had already been given. It is known that the 
pharmacist does play a major role in reducing medication errors (Manias, 
Kinney, Cranswick, Williams, & Borrott, 2014b) but they will not be always 
present in the PICU. On the other hand, near miss incidents that are 
intercepted before reaching the patient are considerably lower. This illustrates 
a real problem and the need to introduce measures to support staff picking 
up these incidents more.  
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Over the study period of 5.6 years, there were a total of 5910 admissions to 
this small sized PICU (13 beds). This represents a total of 39769 bed days. 
The prevalence of medication related incidents was 6.9 reports in every 100 
admissions and 10.4 reports per 1000 bed days. This is broken down into: 
administration error prevalence of 2.9 per 100 admissions and 4.4 per 1000 
bed days, multiple medication process incidents are 2.4 per 100 admissions 
and 3.5 per 1000 bed days, and near misses were 1.6 per 100 admissions 
and 2.4 per 1000 bed days. However, this is considerably lower than that 
reported by Raju, Kecskes, Thornton, Perry, and Feldman (1989) and Vincer 
et al. (1989), which was 14.7 MAE per 100 admission and 13.4 per 1000 
patient days respectively. 
The systematic literature review found the rate of MAEs using analysis of 
medication error reports was between 29 and 76 in every 100 ME reports in 
children's hospitals. Despite heterogeneity of data, this represents 12552 
hospital ME reports in children of which MAEs account for 50% (Doherty & 
McDonnell, 2012; Frey et al., 2002; Hicks et al., 2007; Manias et al., 2014a; 
Miller et al., 2010; Ross et al., 2000; Sadat-Ali et al., 2010; Simpson et al., 
2004; Stavroudis et al., 2008). Therefore, the findings of this study are in line 
with other research. However, as far as the researcher is aware, this is the 
first study that identified incidents due to failure in multiple medication 
processes. This is important as it demonstrates the complexity and the 
multifaceted nature of MAE. Additionally, this reveals that current MAE 
definitions used require more clarification.  
The majority of the medicine related incidents were due to either wrong dose 
or wrong infusion rate. This is concerning since this type of error can have a 
direct influence on the patient’s therapy. However, the risk management team 
identified most errors as being of low risk of harm. But it was not clear if this 
assessment of harm was based on the actual level of harm caused or the 
potential of harm it could cause. It is often difficult to establish the true level 
of harm due to the complexity of conditions under treatment. Hence, it is 
challenging to correlate harm or deterioration of a child’s health to a 
medication error; nevertheless, there were 12 (2.9%) incidents classified as 
severe harm. Moreover, this review utilised the new medicine optimisation 
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assessment of safety by NHS England (2014c). It found that in this PICU the 
safety of medication practice using NHS England medicine optimisation 
dashboard is 30%. Although there is no guidance on the meaning of this rate, 
a possible interpretation is that it indicates moderately severe harm. Since it 
illustrates that 30% of the incidents are associated with potential harm (low 
to death). It is understood that the lower the rate, the better the safety of 
medicine. Additionally, it can be interpreted as a need for medication safety 
improvement and used as benchmark for assessing suboptimal use of 
medicines in children over 1 to 2 years as recommended in the National 
Institute for Health and Care Excellence (2015) guidelines for Medicine 
Optimisation.   
It was clear that the current reporting of medication incidents was focused 
mostly on incidents that have the potential to cause harm. This review found 
a worrying number of incidents relating to high risk or narrow therapeutic 
medicines, this indicated by the fact that top four drugs reported are 
Morphine (n= 30), Midazolam (n= 28), Amikacin (n= 19) and Vanomycin (n= 
18), all of which could have a devastating effect on a child’s health. This is a 
highly specialist area and these incidents should not be tolerated. It also 
proposes a question regarding the safety of the actual pharmaceutical 
preparations and how friendly it is in adjusting to a child’s dose. Therefore, 
this is an issue of both human and systemic factors. Although medication 
incidents are the most reported incidents, it clear that there is an under-
reporting culture, since, improvement of the reporting system has directly 
influenced the number of reports submitted. A positive correlation was seen 
following implementation of the electronic risk management system Datix in 
March 2011. This suggests that an infrastructure that supports ease of 
reporting and learning will lead to quality improvement. Moreover, the 
following can also contribute to under-reporting of MAEs: 
1. Voluntary reporting of incidents; healthcare staff may only report direct 
serious or severe harm to patients.  
2. Fear of disciplinary, dismissal or clinical duties restrictions. 
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3. Being blamed and recognised as incompetent and being subjected to 
negative attitude from colleagues and patients or patient’s family.  
4. Not receiving adequate training on what, how, when or where to 
report. 
5. No clear definition of what contributes an MAE incident and not being 
able to recognise one. 
6. Lack of feedback from management and the absence of shared 
learning from errors across the team. 
7. The misconception of reporting as a comment on individual 
performance and not the overall system factors that contribute to MAE. 
8. Individual perception of MAEs and belief that an incident which did not 
cause harm is not worth reporting; difficulty accepting an MAE has 
occurred. 
9. Poor design of the actual mechanism of reporting; paper based 
reporting will take longer to complete than electronic reports.  
10. Pressure of daily clinical duties that are of higher priority than 
reporting.  
As anticipated, the agents most associated with medication incidents are 
antimicrobials. Since these are the most used agents in this clinical speciality. 
The study also found a variation in time of reporting of medication incidents. 
It is found that the beginning of a shift is the peak slot of reporting. This 
could indicate the presence of a blame culture. But it could also indicate that 
alertness level is highest during that time. This is probable since the new staff 
are not tired yet and not involved in complex clinical duties straight away. It 
was found that weekend days are associated with the lowest number of 
reports compared to the first two days of the week. This has also been seen 
across the months of the year, where holiday and festive months are 
associated with lower reporting rates. A possible justification is the use of 
temporary staff compared to permanent staff who are more familiar with 
incident reporting procedures and have an awareness of the patient safety 
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culture policy. But this fluctuation in reporting could also be attributed to low 
staffing level, absences of managers and absences of experienced staff. 
It has often been a criticism that medication incident reports do not provide 
sufficient amounts of information to support future learning. This was also 
established by the World Health Organization (2014) on reporting and 
learning systems. However, as far as the researcher is aware no previous 
attempts were made to assess the quality of reports. Therefore, this study 
assessed the quality of Datix reports using criteria developed by the 
researcher, as there were previously no criteria available to assess the 
quality. This criteria was developed in light of the recommendations by NHS 
England (2014b) of what constitutes a good report to facilitate learning. From 
a 20% (n= 35) random sample, the majority of the reports (69%) were found 
to be of a poor quality in relation to opportunity for learning. However, 29% 
were assessed to be of a good or average quality for learning. Nonetheless, it 
is important to praise these reports in order to identify lessons to be learnt 
and promote opportunities for change. As far as the researcher is aware, this 
is the first study that assessed the quality of medication error reporting. 
The study had a number of potential limitations. Firstly, not all of the reports 
had the full information required for data collection. Secondly, the review did 
not investigate the actual harm caused by medicine related incidents. Thirdly, 
the study did not explore the causes of the incidents or the lessons learnt by 
staff involved. Fourthly, the review did not explore the incidents from the 
patient’s perspective nor did it identify the number of patient’s parents or 
carers who were informed of the error. Fifthly, the study did not distinguish 
errors caused by temporary or permanent staff nor the reported level of 
experience of who caused or identified the errors. Improvement of reporting 
quality will reduce these limitations and will provide better understanding of 
the scale of the problem. Additionally, this review did not attempt to identify 
incidents that are listed as never events by NHS England (2013) since there is 
not enough evidence of actual harm received by the patient. Additionally, the 
study supported the findings of the systematic literature review in developing 
an expert led definition of MAEs and their subtypes. This should include 
incidents of failure to intercept errors from other medication processes such 
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as prescribing, dispensing and monitoring. Moreover, a root cause analysis of 
specific MAEs such as wrong dose or wrong infusion rate will lead to a better 
understanding and identify contributory factors. 
4.4.1 Conclusion  
 A considerable number of patient safety incidents are occurring due to 
medication use in PICUs. Reports relating to failures in administration 
processes are the highest. All patient age groups are affected and 
antimicrobials are associated with the highest number of reports. Medicines 
that are high risk and those with narrow therapeutic window are correlated 
with an increased risk of MAE. Reported level of harm is low, but severe harm 
was documented in 12 incidents. Findings of the study illustrated the 
complexity and multifaceted nature of MAE. The overall quality of reports is 
poor for learning but they can be utilised to explore risk trends. Root cause 
analysis is required in order to establish actual causes of incidents.  
4.5 Study Contribution to Knowledge 
1. First large scale UK based PICU study that characterised nature of 
patient safety incident reports over 5.6 years (n= 1686). Incidents 
relating to direct use of medicines in PICU accounted for the most 
(n= 412). Medication administration errors were found in 43% (n= 
176) of all reported medicine related incidents (n= 412). 
2. Identified new category of errors relating to multiple medication 
processes. Data was found to support the assertion that there were 
prescribing errors that were not intervened in before administration 
but were identified afterwards. The clinical pharmacist reported the 
majority of these incidents. This was found in 34% of all reported 
medicine related incidents (n= 412).  
3. Severity of harm due to different types of medication incidents was 
reported. Majority of incidents were associated with no or low harm 
but severe harm was found in 12 incidents.  
4. The overall prevalence of medication incidents in PICU was found to 
be 6.9 ME in every 100 patient admissions to the PICU. This is also 
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equivalent to 10.4 ME per 1000 PICU bed days. This is the first study 
to give this measurement since the Raju et al. (1989) and Vincer et 
al. (1989) studies. 
5. Study utilised NHS England Medicine Optimisation dashboard for 
medication safety assessment. It found a ratio of 30% for incidents 
that caused harm over the total number of medication incidents. This 
is concerning since it represents the seriousness of medication 
incidents. Also the quality of reports were assessed, 69% of a random 
sample (n= 35) were found to be of a poor quality for learning.  
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Chapter 5:  Prospective Observation of 
Medication Administration Practice  of a 
London PICU 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
One of the most efficient methods to investigate MAE is the prospective 
observation of medication administration practice. The concept of this method 
is to observe the administration process in real-time practice. Usually trained 
nurses are predominantly responsible for this process in hospital setting but 
doctors also administer medication in certain situations. It is important to 
note that this is not a method of appraising an individual’s performance but it 
assesses the overall medication safety practice of administration. This 
includes the system infrastructure. There are two approaches for this method: 
disguised or undisguised. Both share similar benefits and challenges.    
This method avoids the following significant barriers to self-reporting of MAE: 
 Disagreement between staff of what constitute a reportable MAE.  
 Concerns of the person involved in the MAE of the response from 
management and colleagues.  
 The quality of reporting and time needed to document the error. 
 
Therefore, prospective observation can eliminate some of the limitations of a 
retrospective review of medication incidents. Additionally, direct observation 
allows the researcher to collect information that is not being reported, for 
example, number of interruptions. Moreover, by using a good data collection 
tool and effective analysis of data collected, this method can be very 
accurate, reliable and precise. This methodological approach is supported by 
strong evidence and is considered the gold standard method for investigating 
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MAEs (Allan & Barker, 1990; Barker, 1980; Dean & Barber, 2001; Flynn, 
Barker, Pepper, Bates, & Mikeal, 2002; Murff, Patel, Hripcsak, & Bates, 2003; 
Thomas & Petersen, 2003).  
However, this approach encounters a number of challenges that need to be 
taken into consideration. This includes issues relating to Hawthorne effect and 
ethical issues such as when to intervene. All these issues and others are 
required to be addressed at the methodological development phase.  
The aim of this study is to investigate MAE using prospective observation of 
medication administration practice in PICU. The study objectives are as 
follow: 
1. To investigate the incidence of MAE in PICU. 
2. To determine the nature and type of MAE in PICU. 
3. To assess the potential severity of harm caused by MAE in PICU.  
4. To explore factors associated with MAE in PICU. 
5. To compare findings of retrospective analysis of MAE reports 
versus MAE observed prospectively. 
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5.2 Method 
5.2.1 Study Setting 
The study was carried out at Great Ormond Street Hospital (London, UK) a 
paediatric intensive care unit (PICU) that host 13 beds, with approximately 
1200 patients admitted annually.  
5.2.2 Observation Criteria  
The study did not observe administration of total parental nutrition, blood 
related products or blood transfusion. Only participants who consented for the 
observation of their practice when administering medicines were observed.   
5.2.3 MAE Study Definition & Types  
The study used the following MAE definition developed by Ghaleb et al. 
(2010): 
 "The administration of a dose of medication that deviates from the 
prescription, as written on the patient medication chart, or from standard 
hospital policies and procedures. This includes errors in the preparation, and 
administration of intravenous medicines on the ward."  
This definition was selected for this study since it provides a complete 
understanding of what constitute an MAE and was developed through a 
process of two-round Delphi by experts in medication safety research. 
Therefore, there is no need to redevelop the definition since it has been 
shown to be valid and reliable (Ghaleb, 2006, pp. 49–86).  
The definitions of MAE subtypes that were used in this study are presented in 
Table ‎5.1. The definitions were developed following a review of literature and 
discussion within the research team. The subtype definitions were adapted 
from Dean and Barber (2000) and Greengold et al. (2003). Definitions were 
found to be valid during the pilot study and fit for the purpose of this study 
following a review with the PICU clinical pharmacist.  
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Table ‎5.1: Definitions of MAE subtypes used during the observation study 
Incident 
Subtype  
Definition 
Preparation  
Incorrect preparation of the medication dose, an example incorrect dilution or 
reconstitution, not shaking a suspension, using an expired drug, not keeping a light-
sensitive drug protected from light, not following non-touch technique for IV 
formulations, and mixing drugs that are physically or chemically incompatible. 
Additionally, failure to follow hospital standard operating procedures in medicine 
preparation and administration, or failure to follow specific manufacture’s instruction 
in preparing the medication.   
Wrong 
medicine 
A dose of medicine administered that was not the drug prescribed. However, generic 
substitution was not considered an error. 
Wrong Diluent 
The use of incorrect diluent than that prescribed or recommended by the intravenous 
administration guide.  
Wrong 
Infusion Rate 
Administration of intravenous dose with incorrect rate of infusion as recommended by 
the intravenous administration guide 
Wrong Patient Administering a prescribed medication but to the wrong patient  
Wrong Route The administration of correct medicine by a route that was not prescribed.  
Wrong 
formulation 
The administration of the correct medicine by the correct route but in a formulation 
that was not the prescribed. Appropriate purposeful alteration to facilitate 
administration not considered an error. 
Administration 
Technique 
Giving the correct medication but improper administration technique used, an example 
is failure to use specific medication administration device or not measuring specific 
parameters prior to drug administration. 
Dosage 
The administration of the correct medicine by the correct route but in a quantity that 
was not that prescribed. This includes administration of the incorrect number of dose 
units, selection of the wrong strength of dose unit, and the measurement of an 
incorrect volume of an oral liquid. Where liquid preparations were not measured but 
instead were poured into ungraduated medicine cups, if failure to shake a suspension 
resulted in a visible concentration gradient, this was also considered a wrong dose 
error. 
Extra Dose 
The administration of an additional dose of a prescribed medication. This included the 
administration of a drug more times during the day than prescribed and the 
administration of an additional dose of a drug following its discontinuation.  
Time Administering a medication ± 1 hour of the prescribed dosage regime  
Omission  
A dose of medication that had not been administered by the time of the next 
scheduled dose. Doses omitted according to doctors’ instructions, according to a 
nurse’s clinical judgment (including where the patient refused the medication or was 
designated nil-by-mouth) or because the patient was not on the ward were not 
considered as omitted medicine 
Unauthorised 
Medicine 
The administration of a dose of a drug that was not prescribed for the patient 
concerned. However, if drug X was prescribed but drug Y given instead, this was 
classified as a wrong medicine error 
Other 
Any other error that is not mentioned above, errors such as violation of hospital 
Standard operating procedures. Additionally administration of a drug that had exceeded 
its expiry date or for which the physical or chemical integrity had been compromised. 
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5.2.4 Study Preparation  
Approvals to conduct this study were obtained from the NHS Research Ethics 
Committee – Bloomsbury London (appendix 1) and GOSH Research and 
Development (appendix 2). Additionally, a written authorisation letter has 
been taken from the PICU Risk Manager/Sister to allow an undisguised 
observation of the current practice (appendix 3). The researcher was also 
given an honorary contract for purpose of conducting research in the hospital. 
Nursing staff was provided with an explanation of the purpose of this study 
using: a group presentation (appendix 7), distribution of study information 
sheets (appendix 8) and face-to-face discussions. It was made clear to 
nursing staff that the researcher will be acting in a professional non-
judgemental way; interception will only happen if the error would result in 
harm to the patient and their personal identity will not be taken or recorded. 
Nursing staff were also asked to inform parents or patient’s representatives if 
questioned, that the researcher will not be intervening in their child’s therapy 
or treatment and is shadowing the nurse.  
Moreover, the researcher undertook an extensive and comprehensive training 
by the PICU senior clinical pharmacist and a sister nurse to gain experience in 
the medication administration process and clinically screen drug charts.  
5.2.5 Participants Recruitment & Consent Procedure  
A series of study introductory presentations (appendix 7) given over one 
month (January/February 2013), twice weekly during nurse’s study days to 
introduce the study, collect informed consents and answer any queries or 
worries were carried out. A study information sheet (SIS) was given to each 
nurse (appendix 8). Also, an email was sent to all members of staff containing 
the presentation with the SIS by the PICU risk manager to inform them of the 
study. An informed consent was obtained at the end of the presentation and 
discussions (appendix 9).  
At the beginning of each observation slot verbal consent is taken from the 
nurse in charge of the PICU on that day. Before each observation, verbal 
consent is also taken from the person preparing and administering medication 
to ensure that it is appropriate for the observer to be present. An informed 
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consent was also requested for those that did not sign one already. Moreover, 
posters were displayed for both staff and patient’s parents and visitors to 
inform them of the study (appendix 10). 
5.2.6 Observer Medicine Administration Training 
The Senior PICU Specialist Pharmacist conducted a series of training sessions 
with the observer. The training consisted of tutoring on specific PICU 
pharmaceutical calculations, effective review of drug charts, and use of PICU 
guidelines for prescribing and administration of medicines since the 
researcher is community pharmacist trained. The observer also shadowed the 
PICU pharmacist and nursing staff over a period of three months to gain 
experience in medicine administration practice since the observer is a 
community pharmacist. Another aim for this was for the nursing staff to be 
familiar with the observer in order to reduce Hawthorne effect.  
5.2.7 Pilot Study  
Undisguised pilot observations were carried out over three weeks (March 
2013) covering different time slots, weekdays and weekends. The majority of 
the observations were carried out in the presence of a senior PICU clinical 
pharmacist to ensure reliability and accuracy of the observation. The clinical 
pharmacist also provided guidance on clinical queries for the observer. Each 
observation was recorded on a paper-based data collection form (appendix 
11). The aim of this pilot study was: to validate the method of medication 
administration observation and the tools used to collect data, and to explore 
the logistics in place at the site of observation. 
A total of 14 day shifts (8am to 8pm) and three night shifts (8pm to 8am) 
were observed. Sixteen nurses participated, 214 doses were observed being 
administered to 20 patients aged between one month and 15 years old and 
giving 35 different medicines. MAEs were identified in 54 doses (25.4%). On 
three occasions, two MAEs were identified in the same observation. One 
intervention was required (when an Aciclovir infusion was about to be 
administered but it was noticed by the observer that it had expired two 
months ago). Figure ‎5.1 show the nature of MAE identified in this pilot study.  
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Key findings of this pilot study suggested the need to develop a standard 
procedure for observation. Also the need for agreed criteria on when to 
intervene in MAEs to ensure consistency and the observer’s ethical duty. 
Additionally, it was discovered that having a paper-based data collection was 
not ideal. This is since issues of documentation quality and validity were 
identified; along with logistics issues of keeping the paper forms safe. 
Moreover, paper-based data consumes more time in the extraction of each 
observation into a Microsoft Excel worksheet. Additionally, it is more likely to 
encounter a transcription error due to poor/fast handwriting or missing 
information therefore, reducing the data reliability. Thus, an iPad based data 
collection tool was designed by the researcher to ease entry of observation. It 
improves the quality of data and facilitates an accurate analysis. The iPad-
based data collection form can also allow real-time monitoring of each 
observation.   
 
Figure ‎5.1: Nature of MAE identified during pilot study 
The iPad based data collection tool was piloted over three days (8am to 
8pm). It was possible to observe 12 patients. A total of 51 doses were 
observed with an MAE rate of 25.4% (n= 13 MAEs). This is an identical 
finding to the initial pilot study, suggesting the high robustness of the method 
used in observation. Dose errors were found in seven observations, followed 
by preparation errors (n= 4) and errors in time given (n= 2). The iPad pilot 
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data was analysed and presented by the researcher to the Senior PICU 
Specialist Pharmacist. Minor recommendations were made. Once the changes 
were made and validated to ensure the tool was fit for purpose, the research 
team agreed commencement of the observations.  
5.2.8 Standard Observation Procedure 
The following standard observation procedure was developed and agreed by 
the research team in response to the findings of the pilot study: 
1. Introduce the study to the nurse in charge to gain verbal 
consent to carry on the observation by giving out SIS and 
addressing any queries appropriately.    
2. Approach bed site nurse by handing out the SIS and take 
informed consent if not taken previously. A verbal consent is 
needed before each observation. 
3. Follow hospital infection control procedure when at patient’s 
bedside and during time at the PICU.  
4. To review all medications the patient is due prior to observation, 
cross-check the following against the GOSH Rough prescribing 
protocol (Sharma & Booth, 2013) and record in the observation 
collection tool that: 
a. Doses are within the recommended prescribing limits.  
b. All legal prescription requirements are followed.  
c. The prescribed dose is judged clinically appropriate if a 
pharmacist has reviewed the drug chart. 
5. Once the dose is due, check and record the following: 
a. Medication administration SOP, involving aseptic 
procedure, five rights and preparation steps taken by the 
nurse. 
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b. For intravenous infusion medications, cross-check against 
GOSH Intravenous Administration Guide (Medicines 
Information, 2013) for advice on dilution requirement 
and infusion rate for individual drugs.  
6. If an error is noticed, clinical significance of the error needs to 
be judged by the observer before intervening at the last point of 
medicine delivery to the patient in accordance with the MAE 
Interception Criteria. This error needs to be documented as an 
MAE. However, if the nurse discovers the error before 
administration, then it is not an error. 
7. Document all the observations on the iPad-base data collection 
form. 
5.2.9 MAE Interception Criteria  
A Senior PICU Specialist Pharmacist, Paediatrician Consult Doctor and a 
Senior PICU Nurse have agreed the following criteria. If during an 
observation, a potential MAE is about to occur and was noticed by the 
observer, then the observer will have to intervene at the last point of 
medicine delivery if any of the following conditions were met:  
1. The error involves a narrow therapeutic window medicine and 
the drug levels exceed the reference range.  
2. Renal impaired patients given unadjusted normal doses.  
3. Medicine infused exceeds the recommended infusion rate per 
protocol.  
4. Therapeutically dangerous overdose, for example 10 fold 
overdose.  
5. Inappropriate preparation practice of medicine that may lead to 
patient harm, for example infusing a solution with precipitated 
particles.    
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5.2.10 Data Collection Form  
Initially a paper-based form was designed to collect observation data but 
findings from the pilot study addressed issues that required changes to the 
tool. Therefore, it was decided to design a data collection form based on an 
iPad Application (FormConnections). It allowed ease of data entry, extraction, 
analysis and avoided transcription of data (Figure ‎5.2). The form allowed the 
collection of the following data: 
1. Observation date and time. 
2. Patient reference number, age and weight. 
3. Medication prescribed: name, dose, frequency, formulation and 
route. 
4. Indication if a pharmacist clinically checked the drug chart. 
5. Total number of doses due for the day and time of the next 
scheduled dose. 
6. Medication administered: name, dose, formulation, route, 
infusion rate, diluent used, technique of administration and time 
given.  
7. Indication of if an error occurred and total number of 
interruptions that occurred during the preparation and 
administration processes. 
8. Nature of MAE identified and participants' demographic 
information such as level of experience. 
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Figure ‎5.2: iPad data collection form used in medication administration 
practice observations 
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5.2.11 Number of Observations (Sample Size) 
Statistical advice has been taken to work out the minimum number of 
observations required based on the reported incidence of MAE in PICUs from 
literature that used the prospective observation method. A statistician has 
performed the following:  
1. A fixed effect model was identified to be 0.2942 (95% 
confidence interval (0.2882–0.3003) based on systematic review 
of MAE error rate. For the random effect model it was very 
similar 0.2992 with wider 95% confidence (0.2094–0.3976) due 
to large differences among the studies.  
2. Given the fixed effect rate from above and Ghaleb et al. (2010) 
of 0.191 the effect size was assessed on 0.2419872 level using 
a Cohen's measure. Such an outcome can be classified as a 
small effect size.  
3. Assuming the 5% significance (type I error) and 90% power (1-
type II error), the minimal sample size needed to find the effect 
size significant is 179 doses.  
The recommendation from the statistical consultant suggests that a minimum 
of 179 dose observations is required to achieve a 20% MAE rate. However, 
this study will be aiming to reach the highest possible number of dose 
observations.  
5.2.12 Observation Process  
The study was carried out after reaching agreement within the research team 
on the approach of observation, the tool used to collect data and when to 
intervene upon recognition of a potential MAE by the researcher. The 
observation was carried out for 14 days (8am to 8pm) and 14 nights (8pm to 
8am) including weekends. This was between the period of September 2013 
and November 2013. The researcher conducted all of the observations. The 
PICU nurse and pharmacist provided extensive training for a period of three 
months.  
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The researcher used the definition in section ‎5.2.3 to identify MAE by 
observing the preparation and administration practice of medicines in PICU. 
The observer approached the patient bedside nurse who had agreed to take 
part in this study as described previously. Before the observation the patient’s 
drug chart was clinically reviewed and screened by the researcher using the 
current Rough Prescribing Guidelines to ensure there were no prescribing 
errors. It was assumed that if the PICU clinical pharmacist had screened the 
drug chart then it would contain a prescribing error. Patient parameters and 
prescribed medicines were documented in the data collection tool. The 
researcher also documented the time slots the patient was due their 
medications.  
At the time the dose is due, the researcher approached the patient's bedside 
and waited for the nurse to start preparing and administering the patient 
medications. Using the standard operating procedure for medication 
administration in GOSH, the researcher observed the different steps involved 
and documented them on the data collection form. If a potential MAE was 
observed, the researcher referred back to the criteria of intervention and 
assessed the need to stop the MAE from happening. In the event that an 
intervention was required, the researcher politely asked the nurse to recheck 
before administering but at the very last point of medication delivery. This 
was documented as an MAE. However, if the nurse noticed the error prior to 
administration and acted without the researcher’s intervention this was not 
documented as an MAE.  
5.2.13 Observer Reflexivity 
This study is a form of ethnographic research where the behaviour and 
practice of others is being observed and studied to inform outcomes. It is 
important that the observer’s behaviour or judgement during the study is 
recognised. Since the observer's perception of the observed setting and 
knowledge of procedures will change through time. It is extremely difficult for 
the researcher to be neutral during observations due to the systematic 
methodology, definitions used and the researcher's professional background 
knowledge of medicines (Bryman, 2012). Hence to ensure that the 
observation is a true reflection of practice, the researcher spent a three 
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month period in training as described earlier to establish a professional 
relationship with the observed group and to gain a better understanding of 
the administration procedure. Also, during the observation, the researcher will 
ensure that he is positioned appropriately around the patient’s medicine 
preparation trolley and not in the way of the observed group. In addition, the 
researcher’s personal characteristics and interaction with the observed group 
will be professionally maintained throughout the study.   
Additionally, to ensure consistency of the observations, the researcher 
reviewed all collected data after completion of the observations and before 
further data analysis. This is to ensure that each observation was 
documented and interpreted reliably.    
5.2.14 Severity Assessment of MAE  
Assessing the severity of MAEs identified in this study was carried out by a 
panel. This consisted of a consultant paediatrician, senior clinical pharmacist, 
sister nurse and the researcher. The MAEs were presented to the panel in the 
form of case vignettes (appendix 12) and the panel was asked to rank the 
potential for causing harm on a scale of zero to ten (where zero is no harm at 
all and a score of ten indicates the potential of death) individually and asked 
to send back their ranking via email to the researcher for analysis. A mean 
score for MAEs of between 1 and 3 indicates a low level of harm, a score 
between 4 and 6 is a moderate level of harm whereas a score between 7 and 
9 is severe harm and 10 is indicating a potential of death. This method of 
assessing the potential of severity has been used in the General Medical 
Council PRACTICE study for prescribing errors in primary care settings (Avery 
et al., 2012). However, it was initially developed by Dean and Baber (1999) 
specifically to assess the severity of medication errors without knowing the 
patient outcomes. This method of assessing potential of severity was selected 
since it was found to be valid and credible (Taxis & Barber, 2003). 
The reliability of the panel scoring was statistically assessed. Typically kappa 
coefficient is used to measure the level of agreement between participants. 
However, kappa coefficient is suitable for two raters only. Hence it cannot be 
used as measure of reliability in this study. Similarly, Pearson correlation 
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coefficient only relates the source of variance/error to one (Briesch, 
Swaminathan, Welsh, & Chafouleas, 2014). Therefore, this type of intraclass 
correlation cannot be applied in this study since there are four different 
individuals. They all have different professions and will view MAEs from 
completely different perspectives. 
Alternative correlations are Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) and the Cronbach's 
Alpha. ANOVA allows multiple raters but attributes variance to one like the 
kappa and Pearson coefficients. However, Cronbach's Alpha will measure the 
reliability of the raters and measure which variable increases or decreases 
consistency. Cronbach’s Alpha is the most commonly used test in 
psychometric studies to measure level of reliability. Therefore, it is chosen to 
assess the reliability of MAE severity rating.  
5.2.15 Data Validation  
The same expert panel that assessed the severity of harm for MAE were 
asked to indicate on the case vignettes if they agreed or disagreed that the 
observation contained an MAE. Consensus was measured by means of two 
out of the three experts in agreement.  
 
5.2.16 Data Analysis  
Data collected using the iPad application was analysed using Microsoft Excel 
2007 (Microsoft, Redmond, Washington, US) and IBM SPSS Statistics 20 
(Armonk, New York, US) programmes. The incidence of MAE can be 
calculated by dividing the number of MAEs observed by the total number of 
doses observed; this is the most common way of presenting incidence of MAE 
as demonstrated by the systematic review findings. This approach of 
expressing the incidence of MAE is simple since it does not require the 
researcher to collect additional variables or take into consideration conditions 
during analysis and interpretation of the data.  
Another method is by using the total number of opportunities for error as a 
denominator. The definition for opportunities for error is the “sum of any dose 
given plus any dose prescribed but omitted” (Allan & Barker, 1990; Barker & 
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McConnell, 1962). Ghaleb et al. (2010) used this approach to calculate the 
incidence of MAEs in paediatric units. However, there are multiple 
opportunities for error since an error could happen in the preparation phase 
(e.g. using a diluent that is not per protocol) and another error could happen 
in the administration phase (e.g. infusing the dose at wrong rate). Therefore, 
two opportunities for error for each observation are needed for doses that 
require preparation such as intravenous medicine and oral antibiotics that 
require reconstitution with water or solvent. But if no preparation was needed 
and the dose was ready to be administered, there would be only one 
opportunity for error. Furthermore, each opportunity for error could have 
more than one MAE (e.g. administering at wrong infusion rate and two hours 
later than scheduled time).   
For this present study it was decided to use the total number of doses 
observed as the denominator. This is since it is more representative and less 
confusing when analysing and interpreting the data. The opportunity for error 
approach requires additional calculations that may cause issues of reliability 
and validation of the data. Moreover, there is a chance that the rate of MAE 
exceeds 100% due to the various conditions that need to be fulfilled as 
described above. Additionally, using the total number of doses observed is a 
more convenient way for the purposes of a research audit trail. The data 
generated can be compared to other published research of a similar nature 
and be a benchmark for future research. Therefore, the MAE incidence was 
calculated as shown in equation 5.1 and will be expressed as a percentage. 
The Chi-square test was used to assess the significance difference of MAE 
incidence across day/night shifts and weekday/weekend shifts. 
 
                  
                     
                           
        Equation 5.1 
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5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Demographic Data  
Direct prospective observation of medication administration practice at a 
London-based PICU in a children's hospital was conducted over 28 shifts. 
Each shift was covering 12 hours of the rota, either from 8am to 8pm or 8pm 
to 8am. An equal amount of observation was carried out for day (n= 14) and 
night (n= 14) and included both weekdays (n= 20) and weekends (n= 8). 
There were a total of 1953 scheduled doses during the duration of the 
observations. It was possible to observe 42.6% (n= 832 doses) of scheduled 
doses, suggesting a good representative data. The majority were of 
intravenous doses (n= 572), followed by oral doses (n= 242) and inhaled 
doses (n= 18).  
In total, 42 nurses participated in the observations and 46 patients with a 
median age of 18 months (range 1 month to 16 years) were involved. There 
was good uptake by all PICU staff for this study and all were made aware of 
the purpose of the study. There was no objection by any member of staff to 
being observed. The nurse in charge and the doctors on duty supported the 
observer with their advice and resources. There was no discomfort reported 
by the patients or their representatives due to the presence of the observer. 
On six occasions, the parents of patients gave feedback to the researcher that 
they were satisfied and delighted that this study was being carried out. Also 
none of patient’s parents or carers found the observer to be of concern.   
Two hundred and eighty three (283) MAEs were identified. The observer 
intervened in five MAE cases before the error reached the patient at the last 
point of medicine delivery. No patient safety incident reports were submitted 
during the time of the observation to the reporting system Datix. Table ‎5.2 
describes the overall demographic data of the study. There were also 20 
MAEs that had been corrected by the nurse observed or by the second nurse 
checking the administration before reaching the patient. These were treated 
as a near miss and were not included in the count of 283 MAEs. The 20 MAEs 
that were intervened in by the nurse were relating to: wrong dose (n= 9), 
preparation error (n= 6), and infusion rate errors (n= 5).  
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Table ‎5.2: Medicine administration observation study demographic data 
Characteristic 
Day Shift 
(8am –8pm) 
Night shift 
(8pm – 8am) 
Total 
Number of Shifts Observed 14 14 28 
Number of Weekdays Shifts 10 10 20 
Number of Weekends Shifts 4 4 8 
Number of Nurses Observed 20 22 42 
Total Number of Interruptions 603 225 828 
Number of Patients Involved 19 27 46 
Median Patient Age (months) (range) 36 (3 – 180) 12 (1 – 192) 18 (1 – 192) 
Median Patient Weight (Kg) (range) 12 (4 – 50) 10 (1 – 60) 11 (1 – 60) 
Total Number of Doses Observed 458 374 832 
Number of Oral Medicines Observed (doses)  98 144 242 
Number of IV Medicines Observed (doses) 349 223 572 
Number of Inhaler Medicines Observed (doses) 11 7 18 
Total Number of Potential Doses Due to be 
administered during study period 
1018 935 1953 
Medication Administration Errors 146 137 283 
Observer MAE Intervention 5 0 5 
 
The total number of MAEs identified by the research were found to be 
categorised into six MAE subtypes. These were namely: wrong dose errors 
(n= 165), preparation errors (n= 51), wrong infusion rate (n= 26), 
administration at an incorrect time (n= 25), wrongly omitted doses (n= 11), 
and wrong formulation used (n= 5). Each type of MAE will be individually 
discussed. Two MAEs were identified in the same observation of nine doses 
and in one observation three MAEs were observed.  
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5.3.2 Nature of MAEs Following Data Validation  
An expert panel independently reviewed all the observations that were 
identified by the researcher as containing an MAE. The researcher identified 
283 MAEs. However, 14 were excluded following the review since they were 
judged as not containing an MAE and thus this yields a total of 269 MAEs. 
Figure ‎5.3 represents the distribution of MAE across the different subtypes. As 
highlighted, the majority of errors is relating to dose (n= 152, 56.5%), 
followed by preparation errors (n= 50, 18.6%) and wrong infusion rate (n= 
26, 9.7%). 
 
 
Figure ‎5.3: Overall nature of MAEs (n= 269) identified 
 
 
5.3.3 Wrong Dose Errors 
These have been defined as the administration of the correct medicine by the 
correct route but in a quantity that was not that which was prescribed. This 
includes administration of the incorrect number of dose units, selection of the 
wrong strength of dose unit, and the measurement of an incorrect volume of 
an oral liquid. Where liquid preparations were not measured but instead were 
poured into ungraduated medicine cups.  
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If failure to shake a suspension resulted in a visible concentration gradient, 
this was also considered a wrong dose error otherwise considered as a 
preparation error. The researcher observed a total of 165 wrong dose 
incidents.  
Two subtypes of dose error were found during the observations. Firstly, there 
were doses given which deviated from the prescribed because they could not 
be accurately calculated (n= 69). This was due to the formulation used which 
is expressed with a concentration or strength that has a wide ratio. For 
example, a patient required 9mg of Ranitidine IV and it is only available as a 
50mg/2mL vial, therefore the exact volume which should be drawn out from 
the vial is 0.36mL. However, in practice 0.4mL is given, and this would result 
in the patient receiving 10mg instead of the prescribed 9mg. It is not likely to 
cause any harm but it was considered to be an MAE.  
Secondly, there were doses that deviated from the prescribed dose but that 
could have been given without difficulty (n= 96). For example, a patient that 
was prescribed 360mg of Sodium Valproate orally was given 8mL (320mg) 
from a 200mg/5mL oral solution instead of 9mL (360mg).  
Table ‎5.3 represent the breakdown of dose error subtypes across day and 
night shifts. As can be seen, there were 62 incidents during the night where 
doses could have been administered accurately compared to only 34 incidents 
in the daytime shift. Moreover, Table ‎5.3 also shows that there is a problem 
with formulations with a difficult concentration ratio in both day and night-
time shifts.   
 
Table ‎5.3: Type of dose medication administration errors 
Shift 
Observed 
Dose Errors Type  
Total Dose can be 
accurately 
administered 
Dose cannot 
be accurately 
administered 
Day 34 31 65 
Night 62 38 100 
Total 96 69 165 
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A panel of three experienced PICU healthcare professionals validated the 
wrong dose MAEs identified by the researcher. Table ‎5.4 presents the panel's 
findings. The key outcome is that the panel found independently that the 
majority of observations did contain a wrong dose MAE. However, it also 
found that 18 observations should not be reported as containing a wrong 
dose MAE since the difference between the dose prescribed and that which 
was administered was negligible. Thus, it is decided to exclude these 
incidents (n= 18) from the count of wrong dose MAEs and that yields a total 
of 152 wrong dose incidents.  
Table ‎5.4: Outcome of panel review of wrong dose MAEs identified by the 
researcher 
Outcomes Example 
Full panel agreement wrong dose 
MAE occurred (n= 134) 
Alimenazine 35mg oral prescribed. Alimenazine 
30mg/5mL oral solution, 6mL (42mg) given 
Two-thirds panel agreed wrong 
dose MAE occurred (n= 18) 
Aciclovir 350mg IV prescribed. Aciclovir 500mg/20mL 
solution for injection, 15mL (375mg) with NS 100mL 
@ 100mL/hr 
Full panel agreement no wrong 
dose MAE occurred (n= 5) 
Metronidazole 130mg oral prescribed. Metronidazole 
200mg/5mL oral solution, 3.2mL (128mg) given 
Two-thirds panel agreed no wrong 
dose MAE occurred (n= 8) 
Ibuprofen 75mg oral prescribed. Ibuprofen 
100mg/5mL oral solution, 3.8mL (76mg) given 
 
It is also possible to identify the drugs that are associated with the cause of 
wrong dose administered to the patient as seen in Table ‎5.5. Ranitidine is the 
therapeutic agent that is most often causing wrong dose MAEs (n= 33), 
followed by Piperacillin/Tazobactam (n= 16) and Morphine (n= 15). 
Additionally, the table shows that there were four high-risk medicines. 
Moreover, cumulatively, Antimicrobials are the main group of agents that are 
associated with wrong dose MAEs (n= 47), followed by agents of 
gastrointestinal drugs (n= 38) and those that are analgesic agents (n= 28). 
Furthermore, Table ‎5.5 illustrates the drugs with difficult pharmaceutical 
ratios of strength or concentration compared to the small volumes that 
paediatric patients require. Examples include Ranitidine 50mg/2mL, 
Dexamethasone 4mg/mL or Clonidine 150mcg/mL.  
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Table ‎5.5: Drugs associated with wrong dose MAE 
Drug Number of Wrong Dose MAE 
Ranitidine DF 33 
Piperacillin/Tazobactam 16 
Morphine HR 15 
Paracetamol 13 
Aciclovir  10 
Dexamethasone DF 10 
Clarithromycin 7 
Salbutamol 7 
Azithromycin 6 
Clonidine DF 6 
Chloral 5 
Lansoprazole 5 
Phenyotin HR DF 5 
Teicoplanin 4 
Alimenezine 3 
Cefotaxime 2 
Sodium Valporate HR 2 
Co-Trimoxazol 1 
Flucloxacillin 1 
Furosemide HR DF 1 
Total 152 
DF Drug Formulation with difficult strength expression 
HR High Risk Medicine 
5.3.4 Preparation Errors 
Preparation errors were defined as incorrect preparation of the medication 
dose. Examples include: incorrect dilution or reconstitution, not shaking a 
suspension, using an expired drug, not keeping a light-sensitive drug 
protected from light, not following non-touch techniques for IV formulations 
and mixing drugs that are physically or chemically incompatible. It also 
includes failure to follow procedures for medicine preparation. There were a 
total of 51 incidents observed relating to preparation errors.  
The incidents were broken down into six subtypes: failure to shake oral 
preparations (n= 12), failure to follow non-touch technique for IV 
formulations (n= 12), dose spillage (n= 11), failure to ensure powder was 
fully dissolved in diluent/solvent (n= 7), using incorrect diluent (n= 5), failure 
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to double check dose by another nurse (n= 4). An example of each subtype is 
demonstrated in Table ‎5.6. 
Table ‎5.6: Examples of preparation errors observed 
Preparation Errors  Example  
Failure to shake oral 
preparations (n= 12) 
Propranolol 9mg oral prescribed.  
Propranolol 10mg/5mL oral solution, 4.5mL (9mg) given 
but not shaken 
Failure to follow non-
touch technique for IV 
formulations (n= 12) 
Piperacillin/Tazobactam 2475mg IV prescribed.  
Piperacillin/Tazobactam 4/0.5g powder for injection, NS 
16.6mL, 11mL (2475mg) neat, dose spillage & non-
touch technique not followed 
Dose spillage (n= 11) 
Benzylpencillin 500mg IV prescribed. Benzylpencilin 
600mg powder for injection, NS 5.6mL, 5mL (500mg) to 
NS 15mL @ 30mL/hr, Dose spillage occurred when 
withdrawing from syringe containing drug. 
Failure to ensure 
powder fully dissolved in 
diluent/solvent (n= 7) 
Vancomycin 2g IV prescribed. Vancomycin 1g powder 
for injection, WFI 20mL x2. 40mL (2g) in Sodium 
Chloride 400mL @ 200mL/hr. Powder not fully dissolved 
in vial.  
Using incorrect diluent 
(n= 5) 
Midazolam 0 – 4 mcg/kg/min continuous IV @ 0-2mL/hr 
in Glucose 5% prescribed.  
Midazolam 50mg/10mL solution for injection, 32.4mL in 
sodium chloride 17.6mL @ 20mcg/kg/min (1mL/hr). 
Dose spillage noticed and wrong diluent used  
Failure to double check 
dose by another nurse 
(n= 4) 
Co-Amoxiclav 1.2g IV prescribed.  
Co-Amoxiclav 600mg powder for injection, WFI 10mL 
x2. 20mL (1.2g) neat given without double check. 
 
The expert panel as described earlier, independently reviewed all preparation 
errors that were identified by the researcher. It was found that the panel was 
in full agreement that a preparation error had occurred in 39 observations. 
Also, in 11 observations there was a two-thirds agreement. However, the 
panel was in full agreement that no preparation error was present in one 
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observation. This was relating to the preparation of Rifampicin/Isonazide 
750mg for oral administration, three tablets of 250mg Rifampicin/Isonazide 
were dissolved in 50mL of water. The researcher observed poor aseptic 
technique but the panel disagreed that this should be treated as a preparation 
error since it is not an intravenous preparation and it was within normal 
practice. Therefore this observation was excluded from the total count of 
MAEs and this results in 50 agreed preparation errors. Table ‎5.7 represent the 
drugs that are associated with preparation errors. As it can be seen, Morphine 
and Paracetamol are the drugs most correlated with preparation errors, 
followed by Cefotaxime (n= 7) and Midazolam (n= 4).  
 
Table ‎5.7: Drugs associated with preparation errors 
Drug Number of Preparation Errors 
Morphine HR 9 
Paracetamol 9 
Cefotaxime 7 
Midazolam 4 
Ceftazidime 3 
Salbutamol 3 
Aciclovir  2 
Benzylpencillin 2 
Co-Amoxiclav 2 
Ibuprofen HR 2 
Phenyotin HR 2 
Flucloxacillin 1 
Metronidazole 1 
Piperacillin/Tazobactam 1 
Propanolol 1 
Vancomycin HR 1 
Total 50 
HR High Risk Medicine 
 
 
5.3.5 Wrong Infusion Rate Errors  
Wrong infusion rate errors were defined as the administration of intravenous 
doses with incorrect rate of infusion as recommended by the intravenous 
administration guide. During the observations a total of 26 incidents were 
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identified as containing a wrong infusion rate error. The majority of the 
incidents (n= 24) were fully agreed by the panel that they did contain a 
wrong infusion rate error and a further two incidents were agreed by two-
thirds of the panel. There were two incidents where the nurse had selected 
an incorrect infusion rate expression (mcg/kg/hr was selected instead of 
mcg/kg/min). The researcher intervened in both incidents and this will be 
discussed more in section ‎5.3.9. Table ‎5.8 shows examples of the wrong 
infusion rate incidents that were observed.  
Table ‎5.8: Examples of wrong infusion rate incidents 
Prescribed 
Medicine 
Administered Medicine  
Correct Infusion 
Rate 
Clarithromycin 
90mg IV 
Clarithromycin 500mg powder for 
injection, WFI 9.6mL, 1.8mL (90mg) in 
50mL NS @ 100mL/hr (over 30min) 
Over 1 hour  
Metronidazole 
75mg IV 
Metronidazole 500mg/100mL solution for 
injection, 15mL (75mg) in G5W 85mL @ 
400mL/hr (over 15min) 
Over 30 minutes 
 
Ranitidine 40mg IV 
Ranitidine 50mg/2mL Solution for 
injection, 1.6mL (40mg) given in less 
than 2min 
Over at least 5 
minutes  
 
Table ‎5.9 presents the drugs that are associated with causing wrong infusion 
rate errors. As it can be seen, Ranitidine is the agent that most often triggers 
a wrong infusion rate (n= 11), followed by Clarithromycin (n= 4) and 
Furosemide (n= 4).  
Table ‎5.9: Drugs associated with wrong infusion rate errors 
Drug Number of Wrong Infusion Rate Errors 
Ranitidine DF 11 
Clarithromycin 4 
Furosemide HR DF 4 
Metronidazole 2 
Cefotaxime 1 
Midazolam 1 
Paracetamol 1 
Vancomycin HR 1 
Vecuronium 1 
Total 26 
   DF Drug Formulation with difficult strength expression 
HR High Risk Medicine 
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5.3.6 Time Errors  
Time errors in medication administration are defined as the deviation of the 
time a dose is given by ± 1 hour from the scheduled time. The researcher 
observed a total of 25 incidents that fell within the definition of time error 
with an average delay of 1 hour and 37 minutes (± 23 minutes). Examples of 
the errors are shown in Table ‎5.10. As described earlier, an independent 
panel reviewed all the incidents and gave full agreement that all the incidents 
were time errors. Table ‎5.11 represents the drugs that are associated with 
administration at the wrong time. As it can be seen, time errors are most 
prevalent with antimicrobial agents (n= 17 incidents) compared to the other 
therapeutic agents such as analgesics (n= 4 incidents) and cardiovascular 
(n= 3). 
Table ‎5.10: Examples of wrong administration time incidents 
Prescribed Medicine Administered Medicine  
Aciclovir 350mg IV 
Aciclovir 500mg/20mL solution for injection, 14mL (350mg) 
in NS 100mL @ 100m/hr given 1hr:45min late 
Benzylpencillin 500mg IV 
Benzylpencillin 600mg powder for injection, NS5.6mL, 
5mL(500mg) in NS 15mL @ 30mL/hr given 1hr:50min late 
Dexamethasone 1.35mg IV 
Dexamethasone 4mg/mL solution for injection, 0.3mL 
(1.2mg) given neat 2hr:10min late 
 
Table ‎5.11: Drugs associated with administration time errors 
Drug Number of Time Errors 
Cefotaxime 3 
Morphine HR 3 
Piperacillin/Tazobactam 3 
Aciclovir  2 
Ciprofloxacin 2 
Meropenem 2 
Metronidazole 2 
Potassium Chloride HR 2 
Benzylpencillin 1 
Clarithromycin 1 
Dexamethasone 1 
Flucloxacillin 1 
Ibuprofen HR 1 
Propanolol 1 
Total 25 
HR High Risk Medicine 
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5.3.7 Omitted Doses  
Omission has been defined as when a dose of medication was not 
administered by the time of the next scheduled dose. Doses omitted 
according to doctors’ instructions, nurse’s clinical judgment (including where 
the patient refused the medication or was designated nil-by-mouth) or 
because the patient was not on the ward were not considered omitted 
medicines. Thus, using this definition it was possible to identify 11 omitted 
medicine incidents without any reason or documentation. When these 
omission errors were presented to the review panel, there was full agreement 
on nine incidents and two-thirds of the panel agreed on two incidents being 
omission errors. Table ‎5.12 illustrates the drugs that are associated with 
omitted doses. As it is seen, the most common drugs that are associated with 
omitted doses are Furosemide (n= 3) and Paracetamol (n= 3). 
Table ‎5.12: Drugs associated with omitted dose errors 
Drug Number of Omitted Doses 
Furosemide 3 
Paracetamol 3 
Ranitidine 2 
Chloral 1 
Disopyramide 1 
Morphine 1 
Total 11 
 
5.3.8 Wrong Pharmaceutical Formulation Errors 
Wrong pharmaceutical formulation was defined as the administration of the 
correct medicine by the correct route but in a formulation that was not as 
prescribed. Appropriate purposeful alteration to facilitate administration was 
not considered an error. The researcher identified five incidents relating to 
wrong formulation. All five incidents were fully agreed by the expert panel to 
contain a formulation error. Table ‎5.13 provides some examples that were 
observed by the researcher. Furosemide was associated with formulation 
errors (n= 4 incident) and was followed by Co-Trimoxazol (n= 1 incident).  
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Table ‎5.13: Examples of pharmaceutical formulation errors 
Prescribed 
Medicine 
Administered Medicine  
Co-Trimoxazol 
480mg PO 
Co-Trimoxazol 480mg/5mL solution for 
injection, 5mL (480mg) in NS 125mL @ 
120mL/hr administered, 
Furosemide 5mg 
IV QDS 
Furosemide 20mg/5mL oral solution, 
1.2mL (4.8mg) administered. 
5.3.9 MAEs Intervened by Researcher 
There were five MAE interventions during the study by the researcher. 
Table ‎5.14 lists all the MAEs that were intervened in by the researcher at the 
last point of medicine delivery. All five interventions were during the day shift 
observations. As can be seen in Table ‎5.14, incidents involving phenytoin 
occurred twice where the patient was about to be administered 17mg less 
than the prescribed dose. It was found later, when discussed with the PICU 
pharmacist, that this patient had been reported to have had a sub-therapeutic 
phenytoin plasma level for three days. The researcher intervention helped to 
identify the underlying cause.  
Table ‎5.14: MAE intervened by the researcher 
Prescription Administration Nature of MAE 
Vecuronium 30mg (0-4mcg/kg/min) 
Continuous IV @ 0 - 2mL/hr for 1 
year old patient (10kg) in 25mL 
Sodium Chloride 0.9% 
Vecuronium Powder for Injection (10mg) 
dissolved with 5mL WFI x3 (30mg) and further 
diluted with Sodium Chloride 0.9% (10mL), 
infused @ 1mL/hr as 2mcg/kg/hr  
Infusion Rate 
(2mcg/kg/min 
not per hr) 
Phenytoin 125mg PO BD for 8 years 
old patient (27kg)  
[This incident occurred twice!] 
Phenytoin Oral Solution 18mL (30mg/5mL) 
prepared and double-checked. Intercepted before 
administration  
Dose  
(20mL (125mg) 
not 18mL 
(108mg)  
Midazolam 50mg (0-4mcg/kg/min) 
Continuous IV @ 0 - 2mL/hr for 1 
year old patient (9.6kg) in 50mL 
Glucose 5% 
Midazolam Solution for Injection 10mL 
(50mg/10mL) diluted to 40mL Glucose 5%, 
infused @ 1mL/hr as 2mcg/kg/hr 
Infusion Rate 
(2mcg/kg/min 
not per hr) 
Phenytoin 45mg IV BD for 1 year old 
patient (9.2kg) 
Phenytoin Solution for Injection 0.6mL 
(250mg/5mL) prepared and double checked, but 
intercepted before administration   
Dose 
(0.9mL (45mg) 
not 0.6mL 
(30mg) 
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5.3.10 Therapeutic Agents Correlating with MAEs 
Figure ‎5.4 demonstrates the number of MAEs observed per medicine during 
the study. Ranitidine (n= 46) is the most associated medicine with MAE. 
Followed by Morphine (n= 28) and Paracetamol (n= 26). Figure ‎5.5 
represents the therapeutic classes of agents and its prevalence of MAEs. It 
shows that antimicrobials (n= 93) and analgesics (n= 57) are associated with 
the most MAEs.  
 
5.3.11 Incidence of MAEs 
Incidence of MAE by doses observed 
The incidence of MAE is calculated using the number of doses observed as 
denominator since both preparation and administration processes were 
observed for all medications. Table ‎5.15 presents the breakdown of MAE 
incidence across the two shifts and the subtypes of MAEs. As illustrated, the 
overall incidence of MAE identified in this study is 32.3% (per 100 doses 
observed). Night shifts were associated with a slightly higher incidence of 
MAEs (32.9%) compared to day shifts (31.9%). Dose errors are the leading 
type of MAE (18.3%), followed by preparation errors (6%).  
Table ‎5.15: Incidence of MAEs by doses observed 
MAEs Type 
(Numerator)  
Number of Doses Observed 
(Denominator) 
Day  
(n= 458) 
Night  
(n= 374) 
Total  
(n= 832) 
Dose (n= 152) 14.2% 23.3% 18.3% 
Preparation (n= 50) 6.8% 5.1% 6.0% 
Infusion Rate (n= 26) 4.6% 1.3% 3.1% 
Time (n= 25) 4.8% 0.8% 3.0% 
Omission (n= 11) 1.5% 1.1% 1.3% 
Formulation (n= 5) 0.0% 1.3% 0.6% 
Total  31.9% 32.9% 32.3% 
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Figure ‎5.4: Number of MAEs identified per medicine, medicines marked with 
darker colour are high risk medicines or narrow therapeutic medicines. 
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Figure ‎5.5: Number of MAEs in relation to therapeutic classes  
Incidence of MAE by pharmaceutical formulations  
Using the demographic data breakdown in section ‎5.3.1, it is possible to work 
out the incidence of MAE by pharmaceutical formulation as shown in 
Table ‎5.16. The majority of MAEs are associated with intravenous medicines 
(n= 170, 63.2%). However, intravenous MAE is in 29.7% of all observed 
intravenous medicines (n= 572).  
On the other hand, the rate of MAE in oral preparations was 33.1% (n= 89) 
of the overall number of MAEs identified, but this represents an error rate of 
36.7% (n= 89) of the total number of observed oral medicine (n= 242). It is 
of interest to note that all the doses that were given using an inhaler device 
at night (n= 7) had MAEs compared to 27.3% (n= 3) that were administered 
during the day shift. Inhaler device errors include administering the wrong 
number of puffs and not shaking inhaler before administration. 
Table ‎5.16: Incidence of MAE by pharmaceutical formulations 
MAEs per formulation 
(Numerator) 
Dose observed (Denominator) 
Day 
(n= 458) 
Night 
(n= 374) 
Total 
(n= 832) 
Intravenous Medicine (n= 170) 29.5% 30.0% 29.7% 
Inhaler Device (n= 10) 27.3% 100.0% 55.5% 
Oral Preparation (n= 89) 40.8% 34.0% 36.7% 
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Incidence of MAE by number of patients 
A total of 46 patients (day shift= 19; night shift= 27) were observed in this 
study. A minimum of one MAE occurred in 80.4% (n= 37) of patients. Day 
shift patients were at a higher risk of MAEs (84.2%, n= 16) compared to 
night shift patients (77.8%, n= 21). This represents that at least 1 MAE 
occurred in 8 out of every 10 patients. Chia-square test found a significant 
difference between patients of day shifts and night shifts (p < 0.01).   
5.3.12 Correlation of MAEs with time of observation  
In this study, 28 observations were carried out equally over 12 hours' rota for 
day (8am–8pm) and night (8pm–8am) shifts. The number of MAEs observed 
during the day shifts were 8.6% greater than night shifts as demonstrated in 
Table ‎5.17. However, it was found that this difference is not significant using 
a Chi-square test (p > 0.05). The breakdown of MAE into categories also 
showed no significant difference between the day and night using a Chi-
square test (p > 0.05). Additionally, the number of MAEs varied across the 
weekdays as shown in Figure ‎5.6. As can be seen, the first day of the week is 
associated with the most MAEs (n= 58), followed by the last day of the week 
(n= 42). A total of 198 MAEs were observed in 606 doses administered on 
weekdays (32.7%) whereas 71 MAEs were observed in 226 doses 
administered on weekends (31.4%). The Chi-square test found no significant 
difference between rates of MAE across weekdays or weekends (p > 0.05) 
Table ‎5.17: Breakdown of MAEs into day and night shifts 
Type of MAE 
Number of MAE identified 
Day (%) Night (%) Total(%) 
Dose 
65  
(44.5%) 
87  
(70.7%) 
152  
(56.5%) 
Preparation 
31  
(21.2%) 
19  
(15.4%) 
50  
(18.6%) 
Infusion Rate 
21  
(14.4%) 
5  
(4.1%) 
26  
(9.7%) 
Time 
22  
(15.1%) 
3  
(2.4%) 
25  
(9.3%) 
Omission 
7  
(4.8%) 
4  
(3.3%) 
11  
(4.1%) 
Formulation 
0  
(0%) 
5  
(4.1%) 
5  
(1.9%) 
Total (%) 
146  
(54.3%) 
123 
(45.7%) 
269 
(100%) 
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Figure ‎5.6: Variation of MAEs across the weekdays (n= 269) 
 
5.3.13 Correlation of interruption to rate of MAEs 
During the observation of the 832 doses, a total of 948 interruptions (day 
shift = 603; night shift= 345) were recorded. Observations that encountered 
MAEs (n= 269) were interrupted 333 times by other PICU staff members and 
patients' relatives. Night shifts were associated with lower numbers of 
interruptions (n= 127) compared to day shifts (n= 206). Using correlation 
matrix analysis in SPSS, it was possible to calculate the effect of interruptions 
and other variables on the rate of MAEs as illustrated in Table ‎5.18.  
Number of Interruptions is the main variable that had a significant correlation 
with all other variables. Interruptions have a weak correlation with the time of 
observation (r2= 0.174, p < 0.05), suggesting that the number of interruption 
is specific to a time slot and it is not continuous throughout. There is a strong 
correlation of interruption with number of MAEs (r2= 0.708, p < 0.01). This 
illustrates that the number of interruptions increases the risk of MAEs. 
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Table ‎5.18: Correlations matrix for other variables with MAE 
Variables 
Time of 
Observation 
Number 
of MAE 
Number of 
Interruptions 
Time of 
Observation 
Pearson Correlation 1 0.040 0.174* 
Sig. (2-tailed)  0.700 0.030 
Significant 
Correlation 
 No Yes 
Number of 
MAE 
Pearson Correlation 0.040 1 0.708* 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.700  .000 
Significant 
Correlation 
No  Yes 
Number of 
Interruptions 
Pearson Correlation 0.174* 0.708* 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.030 0.000  
Significant 
Correlation 
Yes Yes  
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
5.3.14 Severity Assessment of MAEs 
A panel consisting of three reviewers has independently rated the potential of 
harm for the MAEs identified (n= 269) on a scale of 0 to 10. As shown in 
Figure ‎5.7 there is a variation between the reviewers. It can be noted from 
Figure ‎5.7 that the ranking carried out by the experienced PICU risk 
management nurse is normally distributed across the four levels of harm (no 
harm= 49, low harm= 122, moderate harm= 91, severe harm= 7). Whereas, 
the pharmacist rating is normally distributed over three levels (no harm= 28, 
low harm= 205, moderate harm= 36). However, ranking carried out by the 
consultant PICU doctor is skewed left (no harm= 177, low harm= 89, 
moderate harm= 3). Shapiro-Wilks test of normality was conducted and it 
confirmed that ranking of severity by all three raters cumulatively is not 
normally distributed (p < 0.05; 95% CI). Cronbach’s Alpha reliability test was 
carried out to evaluate the overall reliability of the raters and it found an 
overall alpha level of 0.442. This is poor since it is suggests it is 44% reliable 
as a group. However, the test found keeping the raters together has 
improved reliability by 2%.   
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Figure ‎5.7: Breakdown of MAE's severity of harm by reviewer (n= 269) 
 
The individual rater distribution of harm level on the scale of 0 to 10 in a 
histogram is illustrated in Figure ‎5.8. The histogram shows the wide variation 
of means between the raters. The first rater who is a doctor had a mean 
score of 0.54 (96% CI 0.43 – 0.64; SD 0.879) but the second rater who is a 
nurse had a mean score of 2.61 (95% CI 2.38 – 2.83; SD 1.853) and the 
pharmacist had a mean score of 1.53 (95% CI 1.40 – 1.67; SD 1.135). All 
three raters had outliers as demonstrated in Figure ‎5.8.  
Furthermore, the assumption of homogeneity of variances was tested and 
found to be significantly different using Levene’s test (F2, 91.647; p < 0.05) 
and therefore ANOVA cannot be carried out to test the significance of 
difference between the three means. But the robust tests of equality of 
means Welch and Brown-Forsythe both rejected the null hypothesis (p < 
0.05) that states there is no significant difference between raters in 
assessment of level of harm since the data is not normally distributed. 
Therefore, a nonparametric test was conducted using the Kruskal-Wallis test. 
The difference between raters was again confirmed to be significant (p < 
0.05; df 2). Moreover, the Mann Whitney U test also found a significant 
difference (p < 0.05) when pairing the raters (i.e. Doctor/Nurse, 
Doctor/Pharmacist and Nurse/Pharmacist). 
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Figure ‎5.8: Histogram of raters’ distribution of harm level with mean, median 
and range of distribution 
Additionally, a nonparametric correlation using Kendall’s Tau-b was carried 
out since it assumes complete nonlinearity unlike Pearson and Spearman 
correlations. Kendall’s Tau-b as shown in Table ‎5.19 correlates significantly (p 
< 0.05) the ranking carried out by the nurse and the pharmacist. But the 
pairing of the doctor ranking shows very poor correlations with neither the 
nurse nor the pharmacist as expected.  
 
Table ‎5.19: Kendall's Tau-b correlations of rater's severity ranking (n= 269) 
Severity Correlation Doctor Ranking Nurse Ranking Pharmacist Ranking 
Doctor Ranking 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .067 .035 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .245 .552 
Nurse Ranking 
Correlation Coefficient .067 1.000 .229 
Sig. (2-tailed) .245 . .000 
Pharmacist 
Ranking 
Correlation Coefficient .035 .229 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .552 .000 . 
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Following a series of statistical analyses, it was found that although the 
assessment of harm that was carried out by the doctor did not correlate well 
with the other raters, it does not affect the overall reliability of the severity of 
harm assessment and that the difference between the raters is due to the 
different clinical point of views. Therefore, the rating will not be aggregated 
together but will be presented separately as shown in Table ‎5.20. which 
demonstrates the breakdown of severity of harm per type of MAEs.  
Table ‎5.20: Individual assessment of harm by three raters (n= 269)  
Type of MAEs 
No Harm Low Harm Moderate Harm Severe Harm 
D  N P  D  N P  D  N P  D N P  
Dose 127 9 3 25 86 126   57 23 
 
  
 
Formulation     5 5       5   
 
  
 
Infusion Rate 12 4 3 14 4 17   12 6 
 
6 
 
Omission 6   6 5 10 5       
 
1 
 
Preparation 23 22 1 24 11 42 3 17 7 
 
  
 
Time 9 14 10 16 11 15       
 
  
 
Total 177 49 28 89 122 205 3 91 36 
 
7 
 
D Doctor  
N Nurse   
P Pharmacist 
 
The breakdown of harm assessment reveals an interesting insight into the 
different clinical perceptions of the three professionals. Closer examination of 
Table ‎5.20 can provide trends, such as that dose error incidents were all 
judged by the doctor to be of no harm whereas the pharmacist assessed 
them as having a potential of a low harm instead. Also, there seems to be an 
agreement in nearly half of the cases between the nurse and the pharmacist 
of a moderate harm level to an MAE, whereas the doctor downgraded them 
to a low harm level. However, looking at MAEs relating to formulation, there 
is a clear disagreement among the raters. The pharmacist judged all five 
MAEs to be of no harm because although a wrong formulation was used, the 
actual dose given was still clinically suitable. Whereas the doctor has ranked 
them to have a potential of a low harm suggesting the new formulation may 
affect the clinical therapy. This seems to be agreed with by the nurse who 
ranked them to be of a moderate harm.  
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The same trend is noticed with wrong infusion rate errors where the doctor 
rated the incidents of no harm or a low harm. But the nurse and the 
pharmacist are shifting more into assigning a moderate or severe harm level 
to these incidents. A similar trend can be observed with preparation errors. 
Interestingly there seems to be some sort of consensus between the raters 
that omission and time errors are assessed as having a low potential for 
harm. 
5.3.15 Comparison of Retrospective Analysis of MAE Reports 
versus MAE Observed Prospectively  
The retrospective analysis of patient safety incidents relating to MAE found a 
total of 176 incidents. Table ‎5.21 presents the findings of the incident reports 
analysis compared to findings of this study using the same definitions. It is 
clear that this study found significantly more MAEs since 269 MAEs were 
identified during the 28 day observation compared to 176 reports of MAEs 
over six years. This study was able to identify a similar pattern of MAEs as it 
can be seen that the number of dose errors found during the observation 
study was much higher than that found retrospectively. However, it is 
interesting to note that there were no unauthorised drug incidents during this 
study in contrast to the patient safety incident reports. Also, it is evident that 
this study did not capture all MAEs that were reported. This includes incidents 
of wrong route and others such as equipment failure.   
Table ‎5.21: Comparison of the MAE identified retrospectively using patient 
safety incident reports and prospective observation of practice 
MAE Subtypes 
Incident 
Reports 
(n) 
Prospective 
Observation 
(n) 
Preparation 36 50 
Wrong Dose 33 152 
Wrong Infusion Rate  26 26 
Unauthorised Drug  26 
 
Time 21 25 
Omission 20 11 
Wrong Route  2 
 
Wrong Formulation  1 5 
Other 11 
 
Total  176 269 
Chapter  5 :  Observat ion of  Medicat ion Admin is t rat ion  
 134 
5.4 Discussion 
A direct prospective undisguised observation of medication administration 
process was conducted in the PICU of a London based children's hospital. 
This was carried out using a validated method and definition of MAE 
developed by Ghaleb et al. (2010). Undisguised observational method to 
identify MAEs in practice has been proven to be a valid and reliable method 
(Dean & Barber, 2001) and it has been used previously to study MAEs in 
children's hospitals (Chua et al., 2010; Ghaleb et al., 2010; Taxis & Barber, 
2003). In this study the method of Ghaleb et al. (2010) was used but with a 
number of modifications.  
The first difference was that in this study the researcher clinically reviewed 
drug charts before the observation of the medicine preparation and 
administration. This was to identify possible MAEs prior to the observation 
and allow time for the researcher to check if the dose prescribed for the 
patient was within the recommended prescribing protocol. Therefore, this will 
enable the researcher to intervene quickly in a serious MAE if not spotted by 
the nurse. Whereas iGhaleb et al. (2010) study, the drug charts were 
screened after the observation. However, this approach relies solely on the 
observer’s clinical knowledge during the actual observation and there would 
be no system to check whether the dose that is being administered has been 
prescribed correctly but is based on an assumption that the dose prescribed is 
correct. Which is questionable since the retrospective review of medication 
error incidents showed that 24% (n= 141) of the reports (n= 583) were due 
to administration of medicine that was incorrectly prescribed. This is 
important since the definition for MAE used in this study includes deviation 
from hospital standard procedures, and these procedures require the nurse to 
check that medicine prescribed is correct before administration.  
The second modification to the method was relating to the tool used to collect 
the observation data. Ghaleb et al. (2010) used a paper based data collection 
tool but in this study an iPad based data collection tool developed by the 
researcher was found to be more reliable and accurate. It also made the 
observation more discreet since less writing was involved and the researcher 
was more focused on the actual observation. Moreover, the tool enabled 
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more reliable data transfer since no transcription was required and this saved 
a lot of time in the data analysis phase.  
The third modification of the method was that the researcher developed 
criteria for when to intervene in the event of observing an MAE. The criteria 
was modified and agreed by a consultant paediatrician, senior registered 
PICU nurse and a senior clinical PICU pharmacist. As far the researcher is 
aware, this is the first study that set specific conditions for when to intervene 
during an observation. The advantage of this approach is to make sure that 
consistency is maintained throughout the study, not relying solely on the 
observer's clinical judgement on when to intervene and ensuring that the 
study is reflective of normal practice and is not altered by the presence of the 
researcher (although it was found by the Dean and Barber (2001) validation 
study for observational method that MAE intervention does not change the 
rate of MAE).  
The fourth modification made was that the researcher received extensive 
training from a senior clinical PICU pharmacist and a senior registered nurse. 
This was to ensure the validity of the observations and to develop the 
required skills and knowledge. Also it reduced the Hawthorne effect. This 
approach was taken instead of prolonging the observation length since it 
would ensure a better quality of data and also it was found that the rate of 
MAE does not change significantly over prolonged observations (Dean & 
Barber, 2001). This training also helped to improve the reflexivity aspect of 
this ethnographic study. The researcher was able to develop professional 
relationships with the observed group to ensure a true reflection of actual 
practice.    
As a result, this study was able to effectively investigate the incidence, nature 
and severity of MAEs in PICUs, as well as factors that lead to MAEs. In this 
present study, 42 nurses were observed administering 832 doses from a 
possible 1953 scheduled doses to 46 patients aged between one month and 
192 months (16 years) old. The study was able to capture 42.6% (n= 832) of 
the total scheduled doses during the observation of 28 shifts. Each shift 
lasted 12 hours, either 8am to 8pm or 8pm to 8am. The researcher was able 
to identify 283 MAEs. This demonstrated an incidence rate of 34% of the total 
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observed doses. The researcher identified at least two MAEs in the same 
observation on 12 occasions.  
A panel of three members consisting of a doctor, nurse and a pharmacist who 
have clinical PICU and medication safety experience, individually reviewed all 
the 283 MAEs. Panel members have agreed that an MAE occurred in 95% (n= 
269) of the possible MAEs observed. Therefore the incidence of MAE in this 
study is 32.3% of the doses observed. This panel acted as an additional 
method of results validation and ensured intra-consistency of the data since 
the researcher solely carried out the observations. Whereas, other studies 
that conducted this type of research used two or more observers and 
assessed the inter-reliability to validate the data (Barker, Flynn, Pepper, 
Bates, & Mikeal, 2002; Buckley, Erstad, Kopp, Theodorou, & Priestley, 2007; 
Dean & Barber, 2001).  
The incidence of MAEs found in this study is consistent with the current 
literature. The systematic review study in this thesis found that incidence of 
MAEs cumulatively using observational methods is 34% (n= 2346 MAEs) per 
the total number of doses observed (n= 6894 doses) despite heterogeneity.  
Following review of the MAEs by the panel, the 269 MAEs were found to be 
divided into errors relating to: wrong dose (n= 152, 56.5%), preparation (n= 
50, 18.6%), wrong infusion rate (n= 26, 9.7%), wrong time (n= 25, 9.3%), 
omission (n= 11, 4.1%), and wrong formulation (n= 5, 1.9%). The 
researcher intervened in five MAEs before the medicine reached the patient at 
the last point of medicine delivery. The interventions involved three doses 
that were about to be given with an under dose and two incidents that were 
involved with an incorrect infusion rate programmed into the infusion pump. 
The study also identified that Ranitidine is associated with the most MAEs (n= 
46), followed by Morphine (n= 28) and Paracetamol (n= 26). There were also 
six high risk medicines that were associated with 56 MAEs. Additionally, it was 
observed that Antimicrobials had the highest number of MAEs (n= 93), 
followed by Analgesics (n= 57) and gastrointestinal agents (n= 57). This was 
anticipated since these therapeutic agents are the most used in the PICU.  
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The panel was also asked to assess the potential of harm using a validated 
scale that was developed by Dean and Baber (1999). It was clear that 
healthcare professionals perceived the harm of MAEs differently since the 
reliability assessment of the reviewers using Cronbach’s Alpha was 0.442. 
Also the distribution of rating is noticeably different. A consultant doctor's 
assessment is noticed to be skewed to the left (i.e. MAEs were mostly of no 
harm or low harm) whereas the assessment by the senior registered nurse, 
who is also a risk manager of the PICU, was normally distributed between no 
harm and severe harm. On the other hand, assessment by a clinical 
pharmacist was normally distributed between no harm and moderate harm. 
This variability could be related to the fact that healthcare professionals are 
educated and trained differently. The clinical priorities of healthcare 
professionals will be different. For example, doctors will be focused on the 
status of the actual clinical condition and treatment plan rather than the 
delivery of medication. Pharmacists would be concentrating on the safety of 
the prescribed treatment and its delivery methods. However, nurses are 
interested in the patient’s experience of aspects of the treatment. Therefore, 
the potential of harm will vary accordingly.    
The most prevalent type of MAE is the wrong dose administered to patients, 
since this contributed to 56.5% (n= 152) of all MAEs. This represents an MAE 
rate of 18.3% of all doses observed. This is first study that reports such a 
high rate of dose errors compared to other studies such as Ghaleb et al. 
(2010) which reported dose error as 9.3% of all MAEs observed and Prot et 
al. (2005) which identified 15% of all MAEs to be related to wrong dose. The 
fact that the researcher clinically reviewed drug charts before the 
administration process may have contributed to this high rate, since as far the 
researcher is aware no other study has used this approach before. Night time 
observations were associated with more wrong dose errors (n= 87) than 
daytime observations (n= 65 MAEs). This could be contributed to by the poor 
lighting conditions, fatigue and the fact that small doses are required to be 
drawn out from pharmaceutical formulations that are expressed with a wide 
ratio of active ingredient per diluent. For example Ranitidine intravenous 
ampule is available as 50mg/2mL. This can cause great difficult in drawing 
out the correct volume in order to achieve the correct prescribed dose.    
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The second most common type of MAE observed in the PICU was relating to 
the incorrect preparation of the dose before administration. A total of 50 
preparation errors were identified and agreed by the panel, this is 
representing 18.6% of all MAEs. This is consistent with the findings of Ghaleb 
et al. (2010) that reported preparation errors to be 20.7% of all MAEs 
identified.  
Administration of medicines using the wrong infusion rate was the third most 
common type of MAE observed in this study. It contributed to 9.7% of all the 
MAEs. Many of these MAEs were related to administering Ranitidine (n= 11) 
too quickly since it is meant to be administered over at least five minutes but 
it is commonly being given bolus over one to two minutes. This could have 
the potential to cause bradycardia when given intravenously. Wrong infusion 
rate has been associated with intravenous therapy and has been documented 
previously by Ghaleb et al. (2010) to account for 19.8% of all MAEs and by 
Cousins et al. (2005) to be 35.6% of all MAEs. It is important to note that 
both studies were conducted in a number of hospitals whereas this study was 
carried out in a single unit, hence this may have been a factor in the low 
incidence rate of wrong infusion rate.  
In this present study, administration of medications at the wrong time by ±1 
hour was included since it was associated mostly with Antimicrobials and a  
delay in receiving these doses at the correct time will have an impact on the 
clinical treatment and recovery of patients. A total of 25 doses (9.3% of all 
MAEs) were given at a wrong time. Delay in treatment was primarily due to 
interruptions caused by other healthcare professionals and patients' visitors. 
However, other studies reported wrong time error in a range between 12.5% 
(Cousins et al., 2005) and 40.3% (Feleke & Girma, 2010) of all MAEs as 
highlighted in the systematic review study. 
Other MAEs that were observed by the researcher were due to doses being 
omitted without clinical or logistical reasons (4.1%). This is consistent with 
findings by Ghaleb et al. (2010) that identified omission errors to be 5.1% of 
all MAEs. Moreover, administration of medicines in a pharmaceutical 
formulation that is different to the prescribed has been found in 1.8% (n= 5) 
of all MAEs. However, the appropriate dose was given for the alternative 
Chapter  5 :  Observat ion of  Medicat ion Admin is t rat ion  
 139 
formulation. This change of formulation was not required since the patient's 
clinical situation was not changed at the time of the observation and the 
correct formulation was available to be used.  
Current published research correlates an increased rate of MAEs with the use 
of intravenous medication therapy in children's hospital settings. An example 
is the investigation by Taxis and Barber (2003) in children’s hospitals in the 
UK and Germany. They have found 212 MAEs in observations of 430 
intravenous drug doses (49.3%) whereas this present study found 170 MAEs 
associated with observation of 572 intravenous doses (29.7%). This 
difference could be attributed to the difference in healthcare practice across 
the two studies and study clinical setting. The PICU is a specialist area with 
one-to-one nursing; hence less opportunity for error compared to general 
wards.  
Another finding of this study is that overall, there were more MAEs during the 
day observations (n= 146) than the night observations (n= 123). Van den 
Bemt et al. (2002) found a similar correlation. However, correlation of time of 
observation to number of MAEs is of no significance (p > 0 .05). It was also 
found that an increase in level of interruptions during medication preparation 
and administration does correlate positively with increased risk of MAE (r = 
0.7; p < 0.05). Additionally, there was no significant difference between the 
rate of MAE during weekdays or weekends (p > 0.05). This is an important 
finding since it illustrates that the practice of medication administration across 
the week is similar and the risk of MAEs across the week remains equal. 
It was interesting that this study found more MAEs than the retrospective 
analysis of patient safety incident reports since there were 269 MAEs 
identified during the 28 days observation while there were only 176 MAEs 
over six years’ worth of patient safety incident reports. It is important to note 
that this is not like for like comparison between the methods. This is due to 
the fact that reporting of errors is voluntary and there are factors that hinder 
reporting as explained in the previous chapter. However, the increased 
number of identified MAEs through the prospective observation could an 
indicator of the method strength but also an indication of the poor reporting 
culture of medication errors. Additionally, this study was able to identify a 
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similar pattern of MAEs. However, it was remarkable to see that there is a 
minimum of a 4-fold hike in the number of wrong dose incidents. This is 
alarming, since wrong dose incidents can potentially put patients at risk of 
serious harm. However, it was also noticeable that there were no 
unauthorised drug incidents during this study in contrast to the patient safety 
incident reports. Also, it is evident that this study did not capture all MAEs 
that were reported. This includes incidents of wrong route and others such as 
equipment failure. The presence of the observer may have contributed to 
reduction of these errors. However, not enough supporting evidence is 
available.  
This study could have encountered a number of potential limitations. First, 
the observations were carried out over 28 shifts, which can be considered as 
a moderately small sample size. However, this is common in this type of 
research due to the difficulties associated with conducting observational 
methods and observer fatigue. Second, the actual clinical outcomes of the 
MAEs were not followed up, since the patients in the PICU were suffering 
from complex conditions. It would not be possible to find out whether the 
patient is suffering directly because of an MAE or due to deterioration of their 
clinical condition. Third, it was not possible to find out if the nurses were 
aware that they have made MAEs and if they learnt from their mistakes. A 
future recommendation would be to carry out a failure effect mode analysis of 
the administration process. This should be based on baseline data and expert 
consensus. The analysis will help to identify areas of high-risk practice and 
potential consequences.  
5.4.1 Conclusion  
 In conclusion, this observational method of medication administration 
practice found a high rate of MAE in PICUs. It involves a range of 
medications, some considered high-risk. Findings suggest a need to develop a 
set of safety measures to deal with the issue from different perspectives such 
as wrong dose errors and interruptions. Also the need to improve system 
factors that cause MAEs such as the use of standard concentrations of 
intravenous infusions or use of pharmaceutical formulations that are not 
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difficult to prepare doses from. The findings of this study will contribute to the 
development of these safety measures in the next study of this thesis.  
5.5 Study Contribution to Knowledge 
1. Development of data collection tool for both research and practice 
use purposes to measure safety of medicine administration in PICU. 
2. Development of strong method for observation with criteria for when 
to intervene in the event of identifying MAE. Method was able to 
observe 42.6% (n= 832) of all scheduled doses (n= 1953).  
3. First study to build upon the practitioner-led definition of MAE that 
was developed by Ghaleb (2006). The study identified an MAE rate of 
32.3% (n= 269) of all doses observed (n= 832).  
4. Assessment of harm severity of MAE by practitioners and identified 
the different attitude towards MAE seriousness by different healthcare 
professionals.  
5. Evidence found correlating increased risk of MAE with level of 
interruption. 
6. Confirmation of the gross underreporting of MAE by healthcare 
professionals. Over 28 shifts, a total of 269 MAEs identified compared 
to 176 reported MAEs over 5.6 years by healthcare professionals. 
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Chapter 6:  National Survey of 
Interventions Used for Prescribing & 
Administration Errors in Paediatric 
Intensive Care Units 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Findings from the systematic literature review identified a number of 
interventions to reduce MAE. As was highlighted in chapter three, these 
interventions are limited. It was concluded that there is a need to explore 
other interventions that are used in everyday practice. The review also found 
the complexity of medication administration errors and that this type of error 
has a multifaceted nature. In the light of these findings, a national survey of 
both prescribing and administration error interventions is to be carried out. 
It was particularly identified that there have been no studies carried out in the 
UK that investigated MAE interventions in the PICU. This is extremely 
worrying since the focus in the UK based literature has been on quantifying 
the scale of the problem only. Unlike other research based in Canada and the 
US for example, that is moving towards implementing solutions by the use of 
educational programmes and advancing technology. Therefore, the aim of 
this study is to characterise existing interventions used nationally in PICUs to 
reduce prescribing and administration errors. The study objectives are as 
follows: 
1. To characterise the interventions used in PICUs to reduce 
prescribing and administration errors. 
2. To assess the impact of interventions used on reducing 
prescribing and administration errors.  
3. To identify challenges and barriers for implementing 
interventions in practice. 
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6.2 Method 
6.2.1 Study Setting and Participants Recruitment  
There are 28 hospitals that have PICUs across the UK. To capture all these 
PICUs it was decided to distribute the questionnaire electronically via an 
interest group such as the Paediatric Intensive Care Society (PICS) and the 
Neonatal and Paediatric Pharmacists Group (NPPG) which have members 
across all 28 PICUs. Online distribution was chosen instead of a paper-based 
method in order to achieve the highest possible response and to make sure 
that the right person completes the questionnaire.  
The participants were recruited to take part in this questionnaire by email. 
This was sent from the PICS and NPPG research heads. The email was 
attached with an invitation letter from the researcher (Appendix 4) to their 
members to take part in this study. The letter introduced the purpose of this 
study, explaining the overall aims and objectives. It contained a URL link to 
the questionnaire to be self-completed on the SurveyMonkey website. 
Participants were also informed that responses would be anonymised and that 
ethical approval was obtained for this questionnaire. Additionally, contact 
details for the researcher were provided in case participants had any enquires 
or were not sure about a question. 
An additional email was sent two weeks after the initial invitation to non-
respondent PICUs by the research heads of the PICS and NPPG. The 
researcher identified the non-respondents. Moreover, the researcher made 
telephone calls to the risk managers and chief pharmacists asking them to 
take part after four weeks from the follow-up email. 
6.2.2 Sample Size  
A purposive sample was used via the PICS and NPPG which have members 
who are doctors, nurses and pharmacists from all 28 PICUs. They represent 
more than 850 healthcare professionals. However, the sample size for this 
study was to receive at least one response from the 28 PICUs. The rate of 
response was calculated by equation 6.1.  
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        Equation 6.1 
6.2.3 Questionnaire Development 
The actual wording of the questions was developed in accordance with the 
objectives of this study. It was decided to have a short concise questionnaire. 
If an intervention is in place, the participant would be asked to describe the 
nature of that intervention. They will then need to indicate if the intervention 
was having an impact on the errors. Participants would then be asked to 
describe the challenges or barriers they faced when implementing the 
intervention. The researcher developed a draft questionnaire initially 
consisting of a mix of open and closed questions. The questionnaire collected 
the following data: 
1. Hospital Name 
 Format: open question  
 Response: objective single line free textbox 
 Purpose: to identify which PICU this response is from in 
order to calculate the response rate and follow up non-
respondent PICUs. 
2. Nature of intervention for prescribing errors and/or MAEs 
 Format: open question  
 Response: objective multiple line free textbox 
 Purpose: This is where participants input the characteristics 
of the intervention in place in order to meet objective one of 
this study. 
3. Intervention outcome/impact 
 Format: open question 
 Response: subjective multiple line free textbox 
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 Purpose: opportunity for the participant to highlight if the 
intervention was able to reduce medication errors and to 
express the how the intervention impacted on their practice. 
This component will meet objective 2 of this study.  
4. Challenges/barriers to implementing the intervention 
 Format: open question 
 Response: subjective multiple line free textbox 
 Purpose: This is a subjective account of what the 
participants faced when implementing the intervention into 
practice. This will help to identify the different factors that 
need to be taken into account when developing an 
intervention. Objective 3 of this study will be met by this 
component.  
The final questionnaire (appendix 5) also collected whether participants were 
interested in being informed of the overall study findings. It asked if they had 
any other comments regarding this study in order to allow them to express 
their thoughts.  
6.2.4 Validity and Transferability 
In order to find out whether the questionnaire is measuring what it is 
supposed to be measuring, construct validation was first carried out. A 
content validation process followed this. Two clinical pharmacy practice 
lecturers carried out a construct validation. They both have extensive 
experience in conducting this type of research. They were asked by the 
researcher to validate the questionnaire by checking that: 
1. Questions asked reflect the aim and objectives of the study. 
2. Questions are not ambiguous or have the potential to be 
misunderstood/misleading. 
3. Questions are not double barrelled.  
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4. The overall structure of the questionnaire and wording of the 
questions is concise. 
5. No problem of access to the questionnaire and navigation 
through the different sections of the questionnaire.  
The research team assessed the extent to which the data collected addressed 
the aim and the objectives of this study. This content validation found that all 
the responses were relevant and suitable for the purpose of this study. The 
responses reflected the questions asked.  
6.2.5 Credibility  
There is no method available to check that the participant answers to the 
questions are truthful. However, this questionnaire was distributed to two 
networks that represent doctors, nurses and pharmacists. They are active in 
PICU care and research. Additionally, it is expected to have more than one 
response from the same PICU. This will help to see if the answers are 
correlating as a form of triangulation or participant validation. Moreover, it is 
assumed that all the responses are truthful since all participants are 
registered healthcare professionals. Their respected professional body 
governs them to be truthful.  
 
6.2.6 Reliability and Dependability   
Reliability and dependability relates to the extent to which the findings of this 
study are reproducible and replicable. There is no measure to estimate this, 
but all tools used to carry out this study have been provided. This includes 
the codes used to analysis the data. However, due to the nature of this study, 
which is to investigate the current interventions used in practice to reduce 
prescribing and administration errors in PICU, the findings might be different 
depending on when the study is replicated since it is expected that new 
interventions will be developed.  
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6.2.7 Pilot Study 
It was decided not to carry out a pilot study for this survey since the sample 
of the participants is small and if a pilot study were to be carried out, the 
responses would then be excluded from the main findings. Thus, there is a 
risk of losing valuable data. Another concern about a pilot study is that it may 
introduce data contamination, as pilot participants will be included in the 
actual study. Leading to participants providing different data when responding 
to the main study.  
6.2.8 Data Analysis  
Responses from each participant were collected on a web-based portal 
(SurveyMonkey). Responses were extracted into a Microsoft Excel 2010 
(Microsoft, Redmond, Washington, US) worksheet to manage the data 
analysis process. Each question was analysed independently. Basic descriptive 
analysis was carried out. However, due to the nature of this questionnaire, 
complex inferential statistical analysis (e.g. Chi-Square or T-Test) was not 
performed. Moreover, the questionnaire did not have specific factors that 
could be used to test internal reliability and stability over time nor to test for 
generalisability since participants and interventions will always be changing 
and not traceable. A mix analysis of themes and contents was conducted 
using Grounded Theory approach. 
The Grounded Theory concept by Glaser and Strauss (1967) was used to 
analyse the data in this study. Grounded Theory is an inductive approach 
used to reach phenomena from the data. This concept is the most suitable 
approach for this study since there is a lack of a theoretical framework and 
this approach acts as a measure of conformability to ensure that the 
researcher's personal values or theories are not interfering in the conduct of 
this study and its findings (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). However, it is important 
not to ignore current literature to help with coding of the responses, since 
Grounded Theory is not a presentation of raw data but a method of 
systematically analysing the data thematically. Another consideration is that 
this concept is not a method of content analysis that presents the findings in 
a quantitative manner. However, content analysis was carried out to quantify 
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the number of code repetitions so as to highlight the frequency of 
interventions used in practice across the UK.    
The data was analysed by the researcher using the Bryman (2012, p. 576) 
stages of qualitative analysis: 
1. Responses for each question were read as a whole and codes 
emerging were highlighted.  
2. Re-read of responses to label codes and emerging themes.  
3. Systematic coding of responses.  
4. Synthesis of major themes by connecting different codes together to 
help interpretation of the findings in relation to study objectives.  
The research team reviewed all the codes used to mark responses and the 
themes produced. During thematic analysis, the researcher utilised Strauss’s 
version of Grounded Theory which emphasises that analysis should be 
consistent with current knowledge and literature (Charmaz, 2005, p. 509). 
This approach was taken since it is in-line with the pragmatic thinking of the 
researcher. It also enables use of the terminologies found in the systematic 
literature review in chapter 3 of this thesis.   
6.2.9 Ethical Consideration 
The questionnaire gathered information regarding the current practice around 
interventions used to reduce prescribing and administration errors. This 
information is sensitive and can be misused. Therefore it was decided to 
anonymise all the findings. This will ensure that the responses of specific 
PICUs cannot be recognised and extracted. The identity of the participants or 
other related information that can be used to identify them was not collected 
to encourage questionnaire take up. Only the names of the hospitals were 
used for the purpose of calculating response rate and used to identify the 
participation spread nationally. Ethical approval was obtained from NHS REC 
to conduct this study as discussed in chapter 2. 
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6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Demographics  
The questionnaire was sent to 28 hospitals offering PICU care via two 
professional networks that represent more than 850 doctors, nurses and 
pharmacists. A total of 46 participants representing 23 hospitals across the UK 
and one from the Republic of Ireland responded to the survey. This yields a 
response rate of 82% (n= 23) from the UK, this rate is considered excellent. 
Figure ‎6.1 illustrates the geographical spread of the participants.  
Table ‎6.1 shows the names of the hospitals that took part and the number of 
respondents from each organisation. Participants were from multidisciplinary 
professions. However, it was not possible to trace back the breakdown of 
participants by profession, level of experience, age or gender. This 
information was intentionally left out in order to increase the uptake of the 
survey. The researcher contacted the remaining five PICUs that did not 
respond to the invitation, but due to lack of interest and/or commitment to 
other clinical and research duties they did not take part. The raw data of each 
response per questions asked is presented in appendix 6. 
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Figure ‎6.1: Geographical spread of survey respondents 
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Table ‎6.1: Number of respondents from each represented hospital 
Hospital 
Number of 
Respondent 
Birmingham Children's Hospital 8 
Alder Hey Children's Healthcare Hospital - Liverpool 4 
Great Ormond Street Hospital - London 4 
Leeds Teaching Hospitals 3 
Nottingham Children's Hospital 3 
Royal Manchester Children's Hospital  3 
Bristol Royal Hospital for Children 2 
University Hospital Southampton 2 
University Hospitals of Leicester 2 
Cambridge University Hospitals NHS Trust  1 
Evelina Children’s Hospital - London 1 
Freeman Hospital – Newcastle 1 
Great North Children's Hospital - Newcastle 1 
Hillingdon Hospital NHS Trust - London 1 
Our Lady’s Children’s Hospital Crumlin – Dublin  1 
Oxford University Hospital - John Radcliffe 1 
Royal Brompton Hospital - London 1 
Royal Hospital for Sick Children – Glasgow 1 
Royal London Hospital - Barts 1 
Sheffield Children's Hospital 1 
The James Cook University Hospital - Middlesbrough 1 
The Portland Hospital for Women and Children - London 1 
The Princess Elizabeth Hospital Guernsey 1 
Wirral University Teaching Hospital - Merseyside 1 
Grand Total 46 
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6.3.2 Nature of Interventions in PICU 
All the responses received were found to be relevant. Only two responses 
from the total of 46 responses indicated that no interventions were in place to 
tackle prescribing errors or medication administration errors. The rest of the 
responses all described interventions for prescribing errors or MAEs. A total of 
38 responses indicated interventions related to prescribing errors, and 28 
related to medication administration errors. There were 27 responses with 
interventions for both prescribing errors and medication administration errors.  
Prescribing Error Interventions 
The analysis of 38 responses that indicated prescribing error intervention 
identified the following themes: 
1. Education and Training  
 Initiatives were identified that supported the preparation and 
learning of healthcare professionals involved in the prescribing 
process. These were categorised to the following subtypes: 
o New Doctor Induction (n= 7): This is a structured 
training programme which new doctors undergo to learn 
how to safely prescribe in PICU. It’s also to make sure that 
they follow the standard prescribing practice in the unit 
before allowed to practice prescribing.  
o Learning from Errors (n= 5): This is a post-prescribing 
learning event where prescribing errors are used to support 
learning from mistakes. The aim is to avoid it happening 
again. This initiative was also used for group learning and 
sharing of experience.  
o Pocket information Cards (n= 1): This initiative provides 
prescribers with rapid access to prescribing information for 
commonly used treatments during the process of 
prescribing. 
o Prescribing Information Stickers (n= 2): This is 
another form of education initiative that provides important 
prescribing information for commonly used treatments 
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during prescribing. These stickers are usually placed on top 
of BNF or other key resources. 
 
2. Error Monitoring and Reporting  
 These are interventions used to raise awareness and support the 
management of PICUs to identify medication risks.  
o No Blame Culture (n= 1): Policy to promote non-punitive 
culture of dealing with errors.  
o Error Incident Reporting (n= 3): System in place to 
report prescribing errors in a confidential manner. It also 
supports reporting of near-misses.  
o Error Instant Feedback (n= 6): Mechanism to provide 
feedback in a rapid manner from the risk management team 
to the reporter or person involved in that prescribing error. 
This to speed up learning from mistakes and avoid them 
happening again in practice.  
o Error Incident Audit (n= 3): This is a regular review of 
prescribing incidents reported to identify trends of risk and 
support improvement. 
 
3. Prescribing Policies 
 These are improvement policies that are used in PICUs to prevent 
prescribing errors before and during the prescribing process.  
o No Bedside Prescribing (n= 1): Policy that isolates the 
prescriber from the highly demanding clinical area near the 
patient's side. This to carry out prescribing in less busy area 
in the PICU. 
o Bedside Prescribing (n= 1): This policy requires 
prescribers to be near the bedside of the patient to do the 
prescribing process and not in any other area.  
o No Interruption (n= 2): Policy that obliges other 
members of the healthcare team not to interrupt the 
prescriber when they are busy with the prescribing process.  
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o Zero Tolerance Prescribing (n= 5): This intervention 
consists of multiple prescribing policies. Only PICU registrars 
or consultants are allowed to prescribe. There are 
exceptions for post-operative and oncology patients. 
Prescribers to write charts at a designated prescribing 
desk/room. They will be free of interruptions. Violations to 
this policy would be treated seriously and are not 
acceptable. 
o Designated Prescribing Desk (n= 6): A purposive desk 
in the PICU with resources to aid the prescriber. 
o Prescribing Guidelines (n= 3): PICU specific prescribing 
guidelines or protocol for prescribers to adhere to for the 
most commonly used medicines with information of 
indication and doses for different age groups. 
 
4. Quality Improvement Tools 
 These are tools used during the prescribing process. 
o Electronic Prescribing (n= 2): This tool is designed to 
remove handwritten drug charts from the PICU. Requires 
prescribers to order medicines electronically.  
o Drug Calculator (n= 3): Electronic drug calculator to 
support prescriber in pharmaceutical calculations of doses 
and infusion rate of medicines.  
o iPad Application (n= 1): Prescribers to order medications 
wirelessly. They will be able to determine the correct dose 
and infusion rates using the specific patient parameters such 
as weight or renal function.  
o Redesign of Drug Charts (n= 6): Development of new 
drug charts that make prescribers clearly provide all the 
instructions necessary for the safe administration of 
medicines and clinical checking.  
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5. Other Prescribing Error Interventions  
 These are interventions that are used to reduce prescribing errors 
in the PICU but cannot be categorised with into the above themes. 
o Pharmacist Presence (n= 2): PICU pharmacists on 
rounds and carrying out a daily clinical check, instant 
prescribing information and guidance.  
o Standardised Infusion concentration (n= 2): 
Prescribers to express concentration of infusions that are 
commonly used in standard expression. 
o Prescriber of the Week (n= 1): An approach that is 
using celebration of success for prescribers with the 
lowest number of errors on a weekly basis.              
 
Medication Administration Errors Interventions  
A total of 28 participants responded with an intervention for MAE. The 
responses were categorised into the following themes: 
1. Education and Training  
 This is a set of interventions that are used to educate and train 
practitioners to improve administration practice in PICU: 
o Nurse Training (n= 7): This is formal training of nurses 
in the practice of preparation and administration of 
medicines. 
o Information Labels (n= 1): Education method that is 
delivering quick guidance on the administration of 
commonly used medications. These labels are placed on 
key reference materials and on facilities that are used by 
nurses such as the preparation area or patient bedside. 
  
2. Error Reporting and Monitoring  
 These are interventions used to raise awareness and support the 
management of PICU to identify risk.  
o Error Incident Reporting (n= 4): System in place to 
report MAE in confidential manner.  
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o Error Incident Feedback (n= 4): Mechanism to 
provide feedback by risk management team to the 
reporter or person involved. This is to encourage learning 
from mistakes and avoid them happening again.  
 
 
3. Medicine Administration Policies 
 These are improvement policies that are used in PICU to reduce 
MAE:  
o No Unnecessary Night Administration of Medicines 
(n= 1): This policy restricts administration of medicines 
during daytime to prevent MAE due to night-time 
conditions and availability of resources and staff.  
o 5 Rights Rule (n= 1): This forms part of the standard 
operating procedure of medication administration that 
requires nurses to check before administration of 
medicines. Nurses to check that the right patient is given 
the right medicine with the right dose at the right time 
using the right route.  
o No Harm Policy (n= 2): Strict policy that requires 
nurses to be vigilant about what they are administering 
by ensuring that the dose is correct for that patient and 
ensures that they follow the appropriate procedure to 
prepare and administer medicine.  
o No Punitive Policy (n= 2): Open culture policy to 
support learning from errors and help foster 
improvements. This also assures nurses that MAEs that 
are not intentional will not be used against them.  
o No Interruptions (n= 2): Policy that imposes no 
tolerance to interruptions during medicine preparation 
and administration. This policy is part of the overall 
standard operating procedures of medication 
administration practice.  
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4. Quality Improvement Tools 
 These are tools used in the administration process: 
o iPad Application (n= 1): This is a tool for nurses to 
review medication prescribed wirelessly. Being able to 
calculate the dose and infusion rates using the specific 
patient parameters such as weight or renal function. 
They can also review other resources such as intravenous 
administration guidelines for advice on compatible 
diluents and infusion rate. 
o Pre-filled Syringes (n= 1): This is the use of pre-filled 
syringes only in the PICU. Standardising infusion 
concentrations and preventing MAEs relating to 
preparation and dose errors. Another example of this is 
the Centralised Intravenous Additive Service (CIVAS).  
o Dose Ready Reckoners (n= 1): This tool aims to ease 
pharmaceutical calculation of doses in the PICU. It 
provides a quick dose determination guide in accordance 
with the different weights of children for the commonly 
used medicines.  
o Smart Infusion Intravenous Pump (n= 1): This tool 
aims to alert the nurse when setting up intravenous 
infusions if the dose or rate entered is outside the 
therapeutic range of that medicine, using a built-in 
database of the approved policy within the PICU. This 
tool will require the nurse to enter data relating to the 
patient such as weight and select the medicine prescribed 
and dose or infusion rate, and then it will calculate if that 
is a correct dose by alerting the nurse before 
commencement of the therapy.  
o Standard Infusion Concentration (n= 2): This 
intervention restricts the way pharmaceutical agents are 
expressed and presented. It ensures that all injectable 
formulations are expressed in a simplified form to ease 
preparation and administration.  
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o Medicine Administration Guidelines (n= 5): PICU 
specific administration guidelines for nurses to adhere to 
when administering medications, with information about 
compatibility, diluents and infusion rates.  
o Red Aprons/Tabards (n= 7): This is a physical/visible 
tool to indicate that the nurse is engaged with medicine 
preparation and administration duties. To indicate that 
the nurse must not be interrupted.  
 
5. Medication Chart Clinical & Double Checking  
 These are interventions that are aimed at the process of clinical 
review of medication charts post-prescribing and prior to 
medicine administration to patients: 
o Handover Chart Review (n= 1): This is the inclusion 
of medication review as part of the handover process to 
ensure continuity of care and safe administration of 
medication. 
o Pharmacist Clinical Review (n= 1): Presence of PICU 
clinically trained pharmacist in the ward to review all 
medication charts to pick up MAEs and provide 
information on guidelines and recommend advice on 
compatibility of medications.  
o Silent Double Checking (n= 1): Intervention to 
ensure that the process of double checking by a second 
nurse before administrations is carried out in silence. This 
will prevent distraction and allow the second person to 
make an independent assessment of the prescribed and 
prepared dose.  
o Double Checking (n= 2): This intervention requires all 
medicines to be clinically checked by a second person 
before administration. 
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6.3.3 Impact of Interventions Post Implementation  
The participants were asked whether an audit had been carried out to 
evaluate the impact and effectiveness of the interventions. If so, they were 
asked to provide the main outcomes of the audit. A total of 23 participants 
provided a response to this part of the question. These responses were 
themed as represented in Table ‎6.2. For other interventions, either the impact 
is still under review or participants did not evaluate its use in practice. 
As can be seen in Table ‎6.2, participants stated that interventions were able 
to reduce medication errors in general. It was also noted that participants 
who used multiple interventions were able to reduce the severity of harm and 
increase number of error reports. Additionally, it is interesting to see that use 
of visible indicators such as the red apron had a mixed impact. Some 
participants were able to give numerical evidence to support their statements, 
for example:  
Response 01 “Significant reduction in prescription errors from 45 to 15 %”. 
Response 07 “Prescribing errors reduced from 1 per occupied bed day to 0.3 
per occupied bed day.” 
Response 41 “………no errors detected in 3 years post implementation. Only 2 
errors with miss-selection of infusions”. 
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Table ‎6.2: Impact of prescribing and administration errors interventions in PICU 
Impact Prescribing Error Interventions Administration Error Interventions 
Medication Errors 
Reduced  
Drug Calculator  
Error Incident Audit 
Error Instant Feedback  
New Doctor Induction  
No Bedside Prescribing 
Pharmacist Presence  
Prescriber of the Week  
Redesign of Drug Charts 
Zero Tolerance Policy 
5 Rights Rule  
Double Checking 
Error Incident Reporting  
Error Instant Feedback  
Handover Chart Review  
Information Labels 
Medicine Administration Guidelines  
No Harm Policy 
Red Aprons/Tabards  
Silent Double Checking 
Zero Tolerance Policy 
Reporting Increased  
Error Incident Reporting  
Error Instant Feedback  
No Blame Culture  
Zero Tolerance Policy 
Error Incident Reporting  
Interruption 
Continued  
Zero Tolerance Policy Red Aprons/Tabards  
Severity Reduced  Designated Prescribing Desk  
Specific Guidelines 
Needed  
Prescribing Guidelines  
Re-Education 
Required 
 Nurse Training 
 
6.3.4 Challenges and Barriers to Interventions  
Participants were also asked to describe any challenges or barriers they have 
faced while implementing interventions. Figure ‎6.2 illustrates the challenges 
and barriers identified from participants’ responses. Themes were 
characterised into personal, systemic and cultural factors.  
The personal factors relate to the individual healthcare professional's attitude 
towards the intervention. Whereas, systemic factors represent challenges due 
to the PICU setting of care. The cultural factor illustrates the challenges and 
barriers an intervention will encounter as a result of the interaction of a 
healthcare team within the PICU setting.  
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Figure ‎6.2: Challenges and barriers to success of prescribing and 
administration error interventions in PICU  
Participants highlighted that there were a number of personal factors that 
influenced the success of the interventions. This included personal and 
professional opinions about what constitutes an error and reluctance to 
change their practice. It also includes issues relating to adherence to the new 
intervention and commitment to the new procedures. This is worsened by the 
increased workload. As a result an issue of maintaining motivation on an 
individual level is noted. The following responses exemplify these factors: 
Response 02 “Nursing staff attitude towards checking the drug chart. Doctors 
unwilling to use the dedicated prescribing area, Nurses having 
their opinion on what is and is not an error“. 
Response 08 “Lack of motivation and momentum after initial push”. 
Response 12 “Reluctance from nursing staff to change the way things are 
done and doctors not taking med errors seriously”. 
Response 29 “Ensuring staff adherence to rules!” 
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Systemic factors that were raised by the participants were related to the 
difficulty in management of the intervention in relation to the PICU setting. 
This issue is illustrated with the following examples: 
Response 16 “Large workforce; difficulty in information distribution and 
reinforcement; time constraints; availability of space”. 
Response 25 “Errors on PICU are so multi-faceted that it is very difficult to 
identify whether the changes made have contributed to 
preventing further errors or not”. 
Response 46 “Nursing staff shortages, pharmacy staff shortages – I went on 
maternity leave and the work was not continued in my absence 
as there was no senior pharmacist cover”. 
Participants also revealed the effect of the overall team culture on the success 
of the interventions. This includes issues such as the need for consistent 
reinforcement of the intervention, management of the actual intervention and 
involving patient’s parents and visitors. Examples of these responses as 
follow: 
Response 03 “Poor “buy in” from members of the MDT. Additional support 
required from parents & visitors for the success of a change in 
practice. Disposable high visibility drug tabards alone are not 
enough to reduce / eradicate interruptions during the drug 
administration process”. 
Response 18 “Need nursing staff to be fully on-board. Good team of nurse 
educators here who led it”. 
Response 42 “People felt threatened at first now they help to develop the 
solution to prevent it happening again”. 
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6.4 Discussion 
The aim of this study was to characterise the existing interventions used in 
PICUs in practice nationally for prescribing and administration errors. A 
validated online short questionnaire was able to attract a large response. All 
were from healthcare professionals that have PICU clinical duties. A total of 
46 responses were received. This represents 23 hospitals (82%) from the 
potential 28 PICUs. This study was able to identify the nature of current 
national practice in tackling medication errors (specifically prescribing errors 
and medication administration errors) in PICU. It was also possible to explore 
the challenges and barriers in implementing these interventions. Additionally, 
key outcomes post interventions were found.  
A number of interventions were identified for both prescribing (n= 21) and 
administration errors (n= 22) in the PICU. Similar interventions were 
identified by the systematic literature review in chapter 3. Moreover, the 
findings of this survey are also in line with the COSMIC study by Wong et al. 
(2007). COSMIC characterised the interventions used to reduce calculation 
errors in children doses. The study was also in the form of a questionnaire 
that was distributed to professional networks across the UK and Europe. 
Wong and colleagues identified interventions into technological, healthcare 
professional practice and others. This study was able to find all interventions 
characterised in COSMIC.  
The characteristics of the interventions identified in this study were broadly 
themed into: 
 Education and Training. 
 Error Monitoring and Reporting. 
 Prescribing / Administration Policies. 
 Quality Improvement Tools. 
 Medication Chart Clinical and Double Checking. 
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The interventions identified illustrate the complex, multifaceted nature of 
prescribing and administration errors in PICU. This is important since it 
confirms that a single intervention is not enough to tackle the problem.  
Education and training is used for both prescribing and administration errors. 
These interventions aimed to reduce errors due to knowledge mishaps. This is 
carried out by a series of induction programmes for doctors and nurses and 
the use of specific medicine information in the form of cards and stickers. 
These interventions are useful in providing instant information on local 
prescribing and administration protocols. However, educational interventions 
require repeated cycles to have a long-term impact. Also the information 
cards and stickers will need regular updates to reflect changes in practice. 
Still yet, there was no mention of use of checklists or a trigger tool. Also, 
there is no mention of eLearning modules for administration or preparation of 
medicines. Especially as eLearning materials are becoming a major source of 
training for all healthcare professionals. Additionally, there was no mention of 
interventions targeting specifically high risk medicines or narrow therapeutic 
window medicines.  
Error reporting and monitoring interventions are useful in identifying trends of 
prescribing and administration errors. Additionally, these interventions can 
give feedback to individuals who are involved in errors and also provide areas 
where change is required in the system. However, these interventions are 
subject to factors such as transparency, openness and safety culture as 
highlighted by Wakefield et al. (2001). Therefore, underreporting and poor 
quality of reporting is possible. This type of intervention is considered a risk 
management strategy and not necessarily an intervention to reduce the 
opportunity of error at the point of care. However, no dashboards were 
identified that can monitor the medication safety culture.  
In contrast to interventions that are in the form of policies, these 
interventions are implemented as part of the standard operating procedures 
for the PICU when prescribing and administering medicines. Therefore, they 
are more likely to have a long lasting impact. For example specifying where 
prescribing should take place. Not allowing prescribing at the bedside would 
be ideal so that the prescriber is isolated from the busy clinical area. This will 
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enable prescribers to carefully check clinical resources and protocols. Also 
having a designated prescribing desk is useful to reduce interruptions and to 
move prescribing away from the busy nursing station. This is to enable better 
access to specific guidelines. An alternative approach is prescribing at bedside 
only. This will ensure no mixing up of patients and avoid the need for moving 
drug charts around the PICU. These interventions are often paired with a zero 
tolerance prescribing policy. This policy requires only senior staff to carry out 
prescribing in the PICU. This will minimise errors relating to knowledge such 
as choosing the right treatment with the right dose. This intervention was 
evaluated by the Booth, Sturgess, Taberner-Stokes, and Peters (2012) study 
which found a reduction of 44.5% of prescribing errors in PICU. These 
interventions can ensure safe prescribing in the PICU. In turn this can have 
an impact on administration errors.  
Similarly, policies for medicine administration were identified in this study. It 
is interesting to find a policy that restricts when to administer medicines. 
Reducing administration of medicines at night when possible can reduce 
errors relating to factors such as night-time PICU condition, staffing level and 
availability of medicines. Also, this policy allows night-time nursing staff to 
focus on clinical duties. However, there must be careful consideration given to 
which medicines should not be administered at night. For example, antibiotics 
must not be omitted or delayed since a patient could develop sepsis. Other 
policies aimed to develop a culture of no harm by ensuring that the right 
patient is receiving the right medicine at the right time using the right dose 
and route. This is often supported by the no interruption policy which 
mandates that nurses must not be interrupted when preparing and 
administering medicines. In addition, a no punitive policy to enhance error 
reporting and learning from errors. However, this policy is questionable since 
it is not clear if reckless behaviour will be tolerated. If so, this may put 
patients at an increased risk of harm.  
Other interventions that were found in this study are quality improvement 
tools. The Health Foundation (2013) explained that quality improvement is a 
tool that leads to change. Quality was defined in six dimensions: safe, 
effective, person-centred, timely, efficient, and equitable. Therefore, tools 
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were identified that introduced additional barriers in the system to ensure 
safe medicine practice. For instance, electronic prescribing was introduced in 
PICUs and the use of iPad based applications. These tools have the potential 
to reduce errors due to ambiguous handwritten prescriptions and dose 
instructions. It will also speed up the process of prescribing and allow a 
clinical pharmacist to check these prescriptions remotely. There have also 
been interventions that used electronic drug calculators for adjusting patient 
specific doses. These will reduce potential errors relating to pharmaceutical 
calculations. There is also a simpler intervention that redesigned the drug 
charts used. This intervention aimed to improve the presentation of the drug 
chart to make sure it provides clear instructions. Thus, allowing better clinical 
checking by both nurse and pharmacist.   
Parallel quality improvement tools where used can make administration of 
medicine safer. This includes the use of an iPad-based application that 
provides electronically presented prescriptions. It can also allow the nurse to 
use a built-in drug calculator to aid pharmaceutical calculations. An alternative 
way to do this was by use of ready reckoners that can guide a dose 
depending on patient’s weight. These tools can help in reducing dose errors. 
Another technological tool found is the use of smart infusion intravenous 
pumps. These are pumps with an integrated library of medicines programmed 
in compliance with the PICU prescribing protocols. This tool will alert the 
nurse if dose or rate entered falls out of the recommended limits. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that it is possible new type of errors 
could emerge from these technologies. Also no bar code medicine 
administration intervention was identified. This could be due to the high cost 
associated with this type of technology. 
A different approach to reduce administration errors is by the use of pre-filled 
syringes and use of standard infusion concentrations. Pre-filled syringes will 
ensure correct preparation of the medicine in an area away from distractions. 
Whereas the latter approach, involves changing the expression of medicine 
concentrations, hence making pharmaceutical calculations and preparation 
easier.  
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A frequent issue that is often associated with hindering the quality of 
medicine administration is interruptions. Therefore, red aprons or tabards 
were used to provide a visible indication for prescribers not to be interrupted. 
However, this approach lacked supporting evidence of its impact (Raban & 
Westbrook, 2013). 
Additional interventions were also found to be supplementary to the 
medication administration process. This includes the need to review drug 
charts during handover. This could reduce communication errors that lead to 
administration errors and ensure continuity of care. Another intervention to 
ensure correct medicine is given is by means of a double check. A second 
nurse checks the prepared dose before administration by the first nurse. The 
first nurse usually talks through what has been done to the second nurse. 
However, this manner is prone to errors and it is likely that the decision 
making process by the second checker is influenced by the first. Hence, there 
was another intervention, which proposed that nurses must conduct this 
process of double-checking in silence. Additionally, to ensure that 
prescriptions were clinically suitable for the patient, a clinical pharmacist was 
introduced to the PICU. The presence of a specially trained PICU pharmacist 
can reduce prescribing errors and be a source of prompt guidance for 
medicine administration. Additionally, a pharmacist will act as a further barrier 
for unsafe practices. 
The study also queried the impact of the interventions identified. The 
response was that most of the interventions were able to reduce medication 
errors in general such as by use of drug calculator, zero tolerance policy or 
handover drug chart review. Some helped to increase reporting as intended. 
It was interesting to find out that interventions to reduce interruptions were 
judged as not having much effect, this is a very similar finding as that by the 
systematic review of Raban and Westbrook (2013). Other interventions were 
either still under review or in an early stage of implementation. However, 
many of the responses were subjective and did not provide numerical 
supporting evidence. Therefore, responses may not be taken as a strong 
evidence of intervention impact but as a potential benefit indicator that needs 
to be studied thoroughly in the future research.  
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Additionally, participants were asked to identify challenges and barriers to the 
success of implementing these interventions. Reason's (1990) model of 
human errors was used to characterise these factors. They were classified 
into personal, systemic and cultural factors. The key highlight of these factors 
is that for an intervention to be success it is important to build a culture of 
safety. This can be achieved by developing a collaborative approach to learn 
from errors without pointing fingers and assigning blame to individuals. In 
return, there will be an increased openness and transparency and improved 
awareness of the seriousness of medication errors for patients and hospital 
care. 
It is important to consider the findings of this study in light of its limitations. 
Firstly, the recruitment process was carried out through pharmacist and 
doctor-led groups but not nursing-led group. This may have led to under 
representation of nurse perspectives and input. Secondly, only one PICU took 
part from Scotland and none represented Northern Ireland. Thirdly, the 
content of the questionnaire did not collect data such as: if the interventions 
were delivered through research-focused programmes, the duration of 
intervention, or cost implications of the interventions. Fourthly, neither a 
patient’s representative point of view nor the opinions of the intervention 
users were explored. This additional data could have provided more useful 
consideration for developing future interventions. Fifthly, the method did not 
address issues relating to intellectual property rights of interventions. This 
issue may have prevented some from sharing information.  
Nonetheless, a future recommendation is to observe the various interventions 
in practice. This will lead to a better appraisal of use and impact. Moreover, 
seek users' opinions on these interventions. Additionally it would be of 
interest to explore medication administration error interventions used across 
Europe. This can lead to the development of evidence-based protocols for all 
the interventions for management of medication administration errors in 
PICU.  
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6.4.1 Conclusion 
This study was able to identify 42 interventions used to reduce prescribing 
and administration errors in PICU across the UK. It was also able to identify 
challenges and barriers that hinder implementation of the interventions in 
practice. The study shed light on the importance of developing good 
medication safety practices that support a 'no blame culture' and enable 
learning from errors.   
 
6.5 Study Contribution to Knowledge 
1. Many of the interventions for administration errors are similar in 
nature to those used in prescribing errors. This includes: education 
and training, error reporting and monitoring, and no interruption 
policies. 
2. Various interventions used nationally to reduce MAE in PICU practice 
that were not found in published literature such as: use of iPad based 
applications, information labels and cards, reducing night time 
medicine administration, pre-filled syringes, dose ready reckoners, 
handover chart review, and silent double checking. However, 
supporting evidence of intervention impact is limited. 
3. The study identified factors that will influence the success of 
interventions in practice that were not known in literature. This 
includes: resistance from individuals to change, difficulties in adapting 
to the system, and blame culture.  
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Chapter 7:  Safety Measures for Medicine 
Administration in Paediatric Intensive 
Care Unit 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
It is evident now that the scale of MAE in PICU is large and complex. This was 
acknowledged following the series of studies that were carried out. Hospital 
MAE in children found in literature accounted for a mean of 50% of all 
reported medication error reports (n= 12552). It was also identified in a 
mean of 29% of all doses observed (n= 8894). This is consistent with the 
findings of the retrospective analysis of medication error incidents in PICU in 
this thesis as MAEs were found in 43% of all medication incidents (n= 412). 
Additionally, a total of 269 MAEs were observed in PICU medicine 
administration practice. This is represented as 32% per dose observed (n= 
832) over 28 shifts. MAEs were mostly related to wrong dose, wrong infusion 
rate, preparation errors and time errors. 
The findings suggest that multifaceted safety measures are required to tackle 
this problem since, there was a weak indication from the published literature 
that a single intervention would be enough. Additionally, the national survey 
of PICUs has demonstrated that multiple strategies and interventions to 
reduce MAE in practice are already being used.  
This illustrates that MAEs are spread over a number of subtypes and 
processes. It is also affected by factors relating to the human factor (e.g. 
level of experience and interruptions) as well as the system (e.g. lighting 
during nightshifts and unfriendly pharmaceutical formulations). This was 
recognised following the retrospective review of patient safety incidents 
related to medication use. Additionally, prospective observation of the 
medication administration practice reached the same conclusion. Therefore, it 
is important to correlate the trends of MAE identified with the interventions 
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found in the literature and through the national survey of PICUs. This will lead 
to a recommendation of safety measures to reduce MAE.  
The safety measures will aim to reduce MAE prevalence by 50% in 
accordance with the Secretary of State for Health’s Sign Up to Safety 
Campaign (NHS England, 2014a). The campaign’s target is to halve avoidable 
harm over three years. It is highly supported by the leadership and 
stakeholders of various health agencies. Additionally, this will also contribute 
to fulfilment of CQC and MSO responsibilities. Hence the aim of this study is 
to propose safety measures for MAE in PICUs based on the data found in this 
thesis and PICU practitioners’ recommendations. The study objectives are as 
follows: 
1. To characterise MAE contributory factors based on the opinions of 
PICU healthcare professionals.  
2. To identify the nature of MAE intervention based on PICU healthcare 
professionals' recommendations.  
3. To measure the level of usefulness of a preliminary set of safety 
measures. 
4. To propose safety measures to reduce MAE in PICUs based on the 
overall findings of the thesis. 
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7.2 Method 
7.2.1 Participants Recruitment  
The participants were recruited to take part in this study by email. The PICU 
healthcare professionals at GOSH were contacted via the Lead Nurse and 
Clinical Lead Consultant independently. An email was sent to all the doctors 
and nurses containing a study invitation letter from the researcher (Appendix 
13). The email also had a recommendation from both Leads to take part in 
the study. Moreover, the researcher sent out an email with an invitation letter 
(Appendix 14) to participants of the national survey study (Chapter 6) that 
wished to take part in related research.  
The invitation letters introduced the purpose of this study, explaining the 
overall aims and objectives. It contained a URL link to the questionnaire to be 
self-completed on SurveyMonkey website. Participants were also informed 
that responses would be anonymised and that ethical approval was obtained 
for this questionnaire. Additionally, contact details for the researcher were 
given in case participants had any enquires or were not sure about a 
question. 
 
7.2.2 Sample Size  
The number of PICU healthcare professionals at GOSH is large and changes 
frequently. Thus, an opportunistic sampling method is chosen and response 
rate will not be calculated. However, the study in chapter 4 identified 23 
participants willing to take part in related research. Therefore, the response 
rate for this cohort study is calculated by equation 7.1.  
               
                    
                         
        Equation 7.1 
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7.2.3 Preliminary Proposal of MAE Safety Measures 
The researcher proposed preliminary safety measures in Table ‎7.1. This was 
in agreement with the findings of the other studies in this thesis. It also builds 
upon the findings of the systematic literature review. It may be noted that the 
six safety measures are focused on reducing dose, infusion rate and 
preparation errors during medicine administration. This is to reflect the trends 
identified in the retrospective and prospective studies.  
These preliminary safety measures were included in a self-completed online 
questionnaire. This was to assess the perception, acceptability and usefulness 
by the end users. Additionally, opinions of other practitioners nationally in 
different PICUs were sought. 
 
Table ‎7.1: Preliminary safety measures to reduce MAE in PICU 
Preliminary Safety Measure Target MAE 
Centralised Intravenous Additive Service (CIVAS) for high 
risk drugs and drugs with difficult concentrations 
Dose and Preparation 
Errors 
Barcode medication administration technology combined 
with smart infusion pumps 
Infusion Rate, Dose and 
Patient Mismatch Errors 
Zero Tolerance Policy towards interruptions during 
administration 
Dose, Preparation, Time 
and Omission Errors  
Use of electronic calculator to help with preparation of 
dose e.g. calculate the actual volume needed to 
withdrawal, the amount of diluent and work out the rate 
of infusion 
Dose, Infusion Rate and 
Preparation Errors 
Extensive eLearning modules on medication administration 
process with demonstration videos 
Dose, Infusion Rate and 
Preparation Errors 
Step by Step flow chart easily accessible describing 
medication administration process and tips with 
pharmaceutical dose calculations for Intravenous 
medications  
Dose, Infusion Rate and 
Preparation Errors 
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7.2.4 Questionnaire Development 
The actual wording of the questions was developed in accordance with the 
objectives of this study. It was decided to have a short concise questionnaire. 
The participants were asked to describe the contributory factors of MAE, 
suggest methods to reduce MAE and give an assessment of the usefulness of 
the preliminary safety measures. The researcher developed a questionnaire 
consisting of a mix of open and closed questions in order to collect the 
following data: 
1. Profession  
 Format: closed question  
 Response: objective single response tick box 
 Purpose: to identify if the respondent is a doctor, nurse or 
pharmacist.  
2. Number of post registration experience in years  
 Format: open question  
 Response: objective single line free textbox 
 Purpose: to correlate responses with experience and 
profession. 
3. Hospital Name (only for the external participants) 
 Format: open question  
 Response: objective single line free textbox 
 Purpose: to identify which PICU this response is from in 
order to calculate the response rate and follow up non-
respondent PICUs. 
4. Description of factors that lead to MAE in current practice 
 Format: open question  
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 Response: subjective multiple line free textbox 
 Purpose: to collect the contributory factors of MAE perceived 
by the PICU healthcare professionals.  
5. Description of method to reduce MAE in current practice 
 Format: open question 
 Response: subjective multiple line free textbox 
 Purpose: to identify safety measures of MAE perceived by 
the PICU healthcare professionals.  
6. Rating the usefulness of the preliminary proposed safety 
interventions in section ‎7.2.3 
 Format: closed question 
 Response: subjective Likert scale 
 Purpose: This is a subjective rating in 6 point Likert scale 
(extremely useful, very useful, somewhat useful, not very 
useful, not useful at all and don’t know). Responses will 
direct the final proposed safety measures. 
The questionnaire also collected whether participants were interested in being 
informed of the overall study findings or taking part in related research. It 
also asked if they had any other comments regarding this study in order to 
allow them to express their thoughts.  
 
7.2.5 Validity and Transferability 
In order to measure whether the questionnaire is measuring what it supposed 
to be measuring, a construct validation was first carried out. A content 
validation process followed this. Two clinical pharmacy practice lecturers 
carried out a construct validation. They both have extensive experience in 
conducting this type of research. They were asked by the researcher to 
validate the questionnaire by checking that: 
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1. Questions asked reflect the aims and objectives of the study. 
2. Questions are not ambiguous or have the potential to be 
misunderstood/misleading. 
3. Questions are not double barrelled. 
4. The overall structure of the questionnaire and wording of the 
questions is concise. 
5. No problem of access to the questionnaire and navigation 
through the different sections of the questionnaire.  
The research team assessed the extent to which the data collected addressed 
the aims and the objectives of this study. This content validation found that 
all the responses were relevant and suitable for the purpose of this study. The 
responses reflected that the questions asked were correct. The validated 
questionnaire is presented in appendix 15.  
7.2.6 Credibility  
There is no method available to check that the participant answers to the 
questions are truthful. However, this questionnaire was distributed to doctors, 
nurses and pharmacists that have PICU duties through a Clinical and Nursing 
Leads. Moreover, it was also sent to participants of a previous study that 
wished to take part in other research. Therefore, all the responses were 
judged to be truthful.  
 
7.2.7 Reliability and Dependability   
Reliability and dependability relates to the extent to which the findings of this 
study are reproducible and replicable. There is no measure to estimate that, 
but all tools used to carry out this study have been provided. This includes 
the codes used to analyse the data. However, the findings might be different 
depending on when the study is replicated as new development in medication 
administration practice is inevitable. 
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7.2.8 Pilot Study 
It was decided not to carry out a pilot study for this survey since the sample 
size of the participants is small and if a pilot study were to be carried out, the 
responses would be excluded from the main findings. Thus, there is a risk of 
losing valuable data. Another concern of a pilot study is that it may introduce 
data contamination due to the fact that pilot participants will be included in 
the actual study, leading to participants providing different data when 
responding to the main study.  
 
7.2.9 Data Analysis  
Responses from each participant were collected on a web-based portal 
(SurveyMonkey). All responses were extracted into a Microsoft Excel 2010 
(Microsoft, Redmond, Washington, US) worksheet to manage the data 
analysis process. Each question was analysed independently. Basic descriptive 
analysis was carried out. However, due to the nature of this questionnaire, 
complex inferential statistical analysis (e.g. Chi-Square or T-Test) was not 
performed. Moreover, the questionnaire did not have specific factors that 
could be used to test internal reliability and stability over time nor testing for 
generalisability. Since participants will always be changing and will not be 
traceable. A mixed analysis of themes and contents was conducted using 
Grounded Theory approach. 
Grounded Theory concept by Glaser and Strauss (1967) was used to analyse 
the data in this study. Grounded Theory is an inductive approach used to 
reach phenomena from the data. This is the concept that is the most suitable 
approach for this study since there is a lack of a theoretical framework and 
this approach will act as a measure of conformability to ensure that the 
researcher's personal values or theories do not interfere in the conduct of this 
study and its findings (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). However, it is important not 
to ignore current literature to help with coding of the responses since 
Grounded Theory is not a presentation of raw data but a method of 
systematically analysing the data thematically. Another consideration is that 
this concept is not a method of content analysis that presents the findings in 
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a quantitative manner. However, content analysis was carried out to quantify 
the number of code repetitions to highlight the frequency of intervention used 
in practice across the UK.    
The data was analysed by the researcher using Bryman (2012, p. 576) stages 
of qualitative analysis: 
1. Responses for each question were read as a whole and highlight codes 
emerging.  
2. Re-read of responses to label codes and emerging themes.  
3. Systematic coding of responses. 
4. Synthesis of major themes by connecting different codes together to 
help interpretation of the findings in relation to study objectives. 
During thematic analysis, the researcher utilised Strauss’s version of 
Grounded Theory that emphasises that analysis should be consistent with the 
current knowledge or literature (Charmaz, 2005, p. 509). This is approach 
that was taken since it is in line with the pragmatic thinking of the researcher. 
It also enables use of the terminologies found in the systematic literature 
review in chapter 3 of this thesis.  
Moreover, Reason's (2000) model for error causation was used to map out 
the contributory factors of MAE. The model uses four domains for errors: 
organisational, error provoking conditions, supervision and unsafe acts. These 
domains are either as a result of an active failure or latent conditions. An 
active failure is a direct action taken that result in an error. Whereas, latent 
conditions are dormant factors in the system that when triggered will result in 
an error. Using this model to identify MAE causation as perceived by 
healthcare care professionals will lead to a better proposal of safety measures 
for MAE.  
 
Chapter  7 :  Safe ty  Measures  for  Medic ine  Admin is t rat ion  
 179 
7.2.10 Proposal of Safety Measures for MAE 
Triangulation of findings from the previous studies was carried out to propose 
safety measures. Moreover, the interventions identified by the systematic 
literature review and the national survey of PICUs were also used. 
Additionally, the outcomes of the questionnaire were taken into account to 
finalise the proposal. 
 
7.2.11 Ethical Consideration 
The questionnaire used in this study gathered information regarding the 
current practice around medication administration. This information is 
sensitive and can be misused. Therefore it was decided to anonymise all the 
findings. This will ensure that responses of specific PICUs cannot be 
recognised and extracted. The identity of the participants or other related 
information that could be used to identify them were not collected to 
encourage questionnaire uptake. However, only the names of the hospitals 
were used for the purpose of calculating response rate and demonstrating the 
participation spread nationally. Ethical approval was obtained from NHS REC 
to conduct this study as discussed in chapter 2.  
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7.3 Results 
7.3.1 Demographics  
The questionnaire was sent electronically for completion via SurveyMonkey ad 
attracted a good response rate. A total of 108 participants from GOSH 
completed the questionnaire. On average the participants had 8.7 years of 
experience (range 0.5–38 years). Participants who provided a description of 
contributory factors for MAE accounted for 61% (n= 66) of the respondents. 
Suggestions for MAE interventions were completed by 44% (n= 47) of the 
participants. Nurses provided the most responses. All participants rated the 
usefulness of the preliminary proposed safety measures. Table ‎7.2 presents 
the breakdown of the overall participants’ demographics and rate of response.  
Table ‎7.2 also illustrates the response rate by PICU healthcare professionals 
nationally. A total of 23 potential participants were identified. The participants 
who responded to the invitation accounted for 74% (n= 17). They 
represented 14 PICUs (50%) nationally. Amongst the participants they had a 
mean of 20.6 years of experience (10–38 years). The majority of the 
participants were PICU pharmacists (n= 12). All the participants provided 
descriptions of contributory factors for MAEs and possible MAE interventions. 
In addition, all the participants rated the usefulness of the preliminary 
proposed safety measures.  
Overall, the questionnaire was completed by a total of 125 healthcare 
professionals (doctors= 45, nurses= 68, and pharmacists= 12). They have a 
mean of 10.3 years of post-registration experience (0.5 to 38 years). There 
were also a total of 83 responses of MAE contributory factors and 64 
suggestions for MAE interventions. Moreover, all 125 PICU healthcare 
professionals rated the usefulness of the preliminary proposed MAE safety 
measures.  
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Table ‎7.2: Demographics data of MAE safety measures questionnaire 
Characteristics GOSH’s PICU 
National 
PICUs 
Total 
Number of responses  108 17 125 
Doctor 42 3 45 
Nurse 66 2 68 
Pharmacist  0 12 12 
Mean number of years post 
registration experience (range) 
8.7 (0.5-38) 20.6 (10-38) 10.3 (0.5-38) 
Doctor (range) 8.9 (1–24) 22 (20-24) 9.7 (1-24) 
Nurse (range) 8.5 (0.5-38) 19 (14-24) 8.8 (0.5-24) 
Pharmacist (range) --- 20.5 (11-38) 20.5 (11-38) 
Number of responses to MAE 
contributory factors question  
66 17 83 
Doctor 22 3 25 
Nurse 44 2 46 
Pharmacist  --- 12 12 
Number of responses to MAE 
Interventions question  
47 17 64 
Doctor 19 3 22 
Nurse 28 2 30 
Pharmacist  --- 12 12 
Number of responses to 
preliminary safety measures 
question 
108 17 125 
Doctor 42 3 45 
Nurse 66 2 68 
Pharmacist  --- 12 12 
7.3.2 Contributory Factors for MAE 
The questionnaire asked participants to describe contributory factors for MAE. 
Eighty-three (66%) participants completed this question. A thematic and 
content analysis using grounded theory approach was carried out on the 
responses. Table ‎7.3 presents the themes identified and their frequency of 
citation by the participants. A total of 28 themes were identified. The most 
frequent theme is distractions/distributions/interruptions (n= 35), followed by 
workload/pressure (n=20) and issues relating to pharmaceutical calculations 
(n= 10). The themes illustrate contributory factors relating to both systemic 
and human factors. Generally, the local and national responses are 
correlating. Table ‎7.4 presents the contributory factors against Reason’s 
model of error management.  
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Table ‎7.3: Contributory factors for MAEs by PICU healthcare professionals 
Contributory Factors 
GOSH’s PICU National PICUs Grand 
Total Doctor Nurse Total Doctor Nurse Pharmacist Total 
Distractions/ disturbance / 
Interruptions 
10 18 28 1 3 3 7 35 
Workload/Pressure 5 10 15 1 1 3 5 20 
Pharmaceutical calculations 3 3 6 1 1 2 4 10 
Availability of information/ 
resources 
2 1 3   6 6 9 
Fatigue/tiredness 1 7 8 1   1 9 
Difficult doses/dilutions/ 
concentrations 
1 4 5 1 1 2 4 9 
Prescribing error 1 5 6   2 2 8 
Time constraints  3 3 6 1  1 2 8 
Access to 
information/resources 
2  2 1 1 2 4 6 
Patient’s clinical condition 3 1 4   1 1 5 
Lighting conditions 1 4 5     5 
Staffing level 2 2 4   1 1 5 
New staff members 2 2 4     4 
Poor handwriting/style  2 2 2   2 4 
Familiarity with PICU 
environment/drug/practice 
2  2   1 1 3 
Seniority/Authority  3  3     3 
Carelessness/Personality  2 1 3     3 
Double checking effectiveness  2  2   1 1 3 
Knowledge deficits 2  2  1  1 3 
Protocols/Resources 
complexity 
2  2 1   1 3 
Lack of paediatric experience   1 1  1  1 2 
Lack of electronic calculations  2  2     2 
Infusion pump set up errors  1 1   1 1 2 
Multiple drug charts  1 1 1   1 2 
Supporting other staff/ 
communication 
 1 1   1 1 2 
No pre-prepared medications 1  1     1 
Unauthorised administration 1  1     1 
Lack of innovative solutions 1  1     1 
Total  54 67 121 11 9 27 47 168 
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Table ‎7.4: Reason's model of error causation map against MAE contributory 
factors 
Failure 
Pathway 
Domain MAE Contributory Factors 
Active 
Failure 
Unsafe Acts 
Pharmaceutical calculations 
Prescribing error 
Poor handwriting/style 
Knowledge deficits 
Unauthorised administration 
Infusion pump set up errors 
Latent 
Conditions 
 
Organisational 
Availability of information/resources 
Lack of electronic calculations  
Lack of innovative solutions 
Lighting conditions 
No pre-prepared medications 
Time constraints  
Seniority/Authority  
Protocols/Resources complexity 
Access to information/resources 
Multiple drug charts 
Error 
Provoking 
Conditions 
Carelessness/Personality  
Difficult doses/dilutions/concentrations 
Distractions/ disturbance/Interruptions 
Familiarity with PICU environment/drug/practice 
Lack of paediatric experience  
New staff members 
Patient’s clinical condition 
Staffing level 
Workload/Pressure 
Supervision 
Double checking effectiveness  
Fatigue/tiredness 
Supporting other staff/communication 
 
 
Reason’s model in Table ‎7.4 illustrates that the majority of the contributory 
factors are of latent conditions (n= 22). However, it demonstrates that the 
contributory factors relating to human fallibility that is in the form of active 
failures or unsafe acts is minimum (n= 6).  
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7.3.3 Suggestions of MAE interventions by PICU healthcare 
professionals  
Participants were also asked to describe interventions to reduce MAE in their 
practice. Sixty-four (51%) of the participants responded. Table ‎7.5 provides 
the themes of the interventions found in their responses. As can be seen, 
most of responses were relating to pre-prepared or standardised infusions 
(n= 16), following a method of reducing distraction, distribution and 
interruption (n= 15) and improving guidelines (n= 10). The responses also 
illustrate the need for implementing computer solutions to help to reduce 
MAEs (e.g. computer decision making support / electronic prescribing (n= 9)).  
Table ‎7.5: Suggestions of MAE interventions by PICU healthcare professionals 
MAE Interventions 
GOSH’s PICU National PICUs Grand 
Total Doctor Nurse Total Doctor Nurse Pharmacist Total 
Pre-prepared/ standardised 
infusions (1mg/mL) 
4 2 6 2 1 7 10 16 
Reduce distraction/ 
disturbance / interruption 
2 8 10 2 2 1 5 15 
Clearer/standardisation of 
guideline/monograph/ practice  
3 1 4   6 6 10 
Electronic access to 
information/resource  
2 1 3  2 4 6 9 
Improve double-checking  2 5 7  1 1 2 9 
Computer decision making 
support /electronic prescribing  
3  3 3  3 6 9 
Age/weight banded 
doses/infusions  
1 1 2    4 8 
Better training/ simulation 3 2 5   3 3 8 
More nursing staff   3 3   3 3 6 
Increase pharmacy role/ 
support 
1 1 2  1 1 2 4 
Improve nurse’s authority  1 2 3   1 1 4 
Physical barrier/quiet area for 
preparation  
1 1 2   2 2 4 
Prescribe measureable doses  1 1 1  1 2 3 
Error feedback 1  1  1  1 2 
Doses with volume expression 
(i.e. mLs) on drug chart 
1 1 2     2 
Drug calculator aid  1  1   1 1 2 
Reduce prescribing errors 1  1   1 1 2 
Improve night time working  2 2     2 
Reduce workload 1  1     1 
Smart infusion pumps      1 1 1 
Total 28 31 59 8 8 36 56 115 
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7.3.4 Usefulness of the preliminary proposed MAE safety measures 
All the participants rated the usefulness of the six preliminary proposed safety 
measures for MAE. The findings of each safety measure are presented 
independently. 
Centralised Intravenous Additive Service (CIVAS) for high risk drugs 
and drugs with difficult concentrations 
This safety measure is aimed to help reduce dose and preparation errors. The 
responses in Figure ‎7.1 illustrate the usefulness of CIVAS for high-risk drugs 
and those with difficult concentrations as perceived by the participants. It is 
interesting to see that the majority of participants rated this either very useful 
(n= 53, 42%) or extremely useful (n= 62, 49%). This is also in line with the 
findings in the previous question. Moreover, none of the participants rated 
this safety measure as not useful at all.   
 
Figure ‎7.1: Usefulness of CIVAS as an MAE safety measure 
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Barcode medication administration technology combined with smart 
infusion pumps 
This intervention is based on the implementation of barcode medicine 
administration with smart infusion pumps. This will ensure that the right 
patient is receiving the appropriate dose. A number of participants (n= 24, 
19%) did not know if this would reduce MAE as presented in Figure ‎7.2. This 
is possibly due to not having had experience with this technology before. Only 
a small proportion of the participants perceived that this would be extremely 
useful n= 11, 8%). The mean response to this safety measure is that it would 
be somewhat useful (n= 34, 27%).  
  
 
Figure ‎7.2: Usefulness of barcode medication administration and smart pumps 
as an MAE safety measure 
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Zero Tolerance Policy towards interruptions during administration 
This safety measure involves implementing a zero tolerance policy towards 
interruptions. The responses to this safety measure by the participants were 
mostly extremely useful (n= 47, 37%) or very useful (n= 53, 42%). However, 
there were also uncertainties about its usefulness (n= 6, 4%). Nevertheless, 
the responses correlate with the findings of the previous question.  
 
Figure ‎7.3: Usefulness of zero tolerance policy for interruptions as an MAE 
safety measure 
Use of electronic calculator to help with preparation of dose e.g. 
calculate the actual volume needed to withdraw, the amount of 
diluent and work out the rate of infusion 
Most of the participants found this type of safety measure for MAE as very 
useful (n= 57, 45%) as demonstrated in Figure ‎7.4. However, 8% (n= 11) 
finds this safety measure not very useful. It is interesting to note that the 
majority (n= 52, 76%) of the nurses who participated in this study found this 
safety measure to be either extremely useful or very useful in their practice.  
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Figure ‎7.4: Usefulness of electronic calculators as an MAE safety measure 
Extensive eLearning modules on the medication administration 
process with demonstration videos 
The usefulness of this educational material to reduce MAE is weak. Since this 
is the only safety measure with a considerable response by participants 
(n=31, 24%) that it would either be not very useful or not useful at all in 
practice. However, 41% (n= 52) found it to be of some use. 
 
Figure ‎7.5: Usefulness of eLearning as an MAE safety measure 
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Step by Step flow chart easily accessible describing the medication 
administration process and tips with pharmaceutical dose 
calculations for intravenous medications  
This safety measure is an attempt to standardise the practice of medicine 
administration. Most participants found this to be very useful (n= 53, 43%). 
This finding is in agreement with the previous question where participants 
expressed need for better standardisation of practice to reduce MAEs.  
 
 
Figure ‎7.6: Usefulness of detailed flow chart as an MAE safety measure 
Overall, the safety measure most rated to be extremely useful for reducing 
MAEs in practice was the use of CIVAS (n= 62) as presented in Figure ‎7.7. 
This was followed by a zero tolerance policy (ZTP) for interruption (n= 47) 
and use of computerised calculator to aid dose adjusting and infusion rate 
(n= 32). 
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Figure ‎7.7: Participants rating of the preliminary proposed safety measures as 
extremely useful in practice in reducing MAE 
 
7.3.5 Safety Measures for MAE 
The following are the proposed safety measures based on the cumulative 
findings in this thesis: 
1. Better lighting on preparation trolley and administration area. 
2. Decision support tool with calculation aid, provide direct access to 
updated guidelines and learning materials.  
3. Medicine administration checklist.  
4. Pre-prepared infusions.  
5. Standardise doses to age and weight bands.  
6. Structured open dialogue double checking process.  
7. Zero tolerance to interruption policy. 
n= 62 
n= 47 
n= 32 
n= 29 n= 28 
n= 11 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
CIVAS ZTP 
Interruptions 
eCalculator eLearning Flowchart Smart 
Barcode 
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
s
 
Chapter  7 :  Safe ty  Measures  for  Medic ine  Admin is t rat ion  
 191 
7.4 Discussion 
The aim of this study was to propose safety measures to reduce MAEs in 
PICUs. A self-completed online questionnaire was developed to achieve this 
aim. The questionnaire collected the contributory factors for MAE as 
perceived by PICU healthcare professionals. The questionnaire also gathered 
suggestions for MAE interventions. Moreover, the participants were asked to 
rate the usefulness of preliminary safety measures proposed by the 
researcher. The participants were recruited through clinical and nursing Leads 
for a London-based PICU. Furthermore, the national survey in chapter 4 of 
this thesis identified a number of PICU healthcare professionals willing to 
participate in related research. They were invited to take part in this study 
too.  
A good response rate was achieved by this questionnaire. In total, 125 PICU 
healthcare professionals took part in this study representing various PICUs 
across the UK. Cumulatively, 83 participants responded with contributory 
factors for MAE and 64 participants provided suggestions for MAE 
interventions. Moreover, the mean years of post-qualification experience was 
10.3 years. This represents a good mixture of participants who are highly 
experienced as well as those with lower levels of experience. Therefore, this 
questionnaire has a good level of representation and generalisability.  
Reason’s model of error causation was applied to trace contributory factors of 
MAE. Reason’s model argues that most errors are a result of latent conditions 
in the system. These latent conditions lead to errors triggered by an unsafe 
action. Meaning the system has pre-existing accidents waiting to happen. The 
findings of this suggest is in agreement with this argument since the 
contributory factors described by the participants mostly relate to latent 
conditions. Healthcare professionals identified factors that they feel are 
putting their practice at risk. Many of these latent conditions are opportunities 
for error remission. Moreover, the contributory factors causing MAE found in 
this study are in line with a recent system literature review by Keers et al. 
(2013a). The review examined all the MAE studies in hospital settings. Keers 
et al. (2013a) found that local working conditions profoundly affected the 
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prevalence of MAE. Therefore, an added strength of the findings is the 
consistency with current knowledge.   
Contributory factors relating to active failures were viewed as a direct 
consequence of an unsafe act. This includes failure to perform pharmaceutical 
calculations to adjust suitable child doses or infusion rates and failure to 
intervene in a prescribing error before administration. These factors are 
considered to be slips and lapses since it is believed that the individuals 
administering are competent to carry out these duties. However, due to latent 
conditions they have failed to do so correctly. Other unsafe acts relate to 
violations of rules such as administration of unauthorised medicines and 
prescribers failing to order medicine clearly. It is difficult to determine if this is 
due to reckless behaviour or latent conditions. An additional unsafe act is 
knowledge based, this is the act of conducting a task without prior 
knowledge. Furthermore, unsafe acts can relate to failing to set up specific 
equipment correctly. Nevertheless, this can be attributed to a latent condition 
where the actual equipment is faulty and not the person setting it up. Little 
information is known regarding this new emerging type of MAE caused by 
equipment failure.  
On the opposing failure pathway are the latent conditions that are 
contributing to MAE. As described earlier, these are conditions within the 
system or culture of the PICU that can lead to MAE. Healthcare professionals 
have identified a vast number of these worrying conditions. Many are relating 
to the organisational level. This includes failure to have adequate information 
or resources for healthcare professionals to consult or poor clarity and access 
to these resources. Additionally, lighting conditions during night shifts is a 
major risk factor. Especially as it is known that many of the labels/markings 
on vials are extremely small and can go down as low as font size 6 (e.g. 
Ranitidine). Poor lighting can also have an effect on performance and 
concentration. Moreover, lack of innovative solutions such as the introduction 
of iPad-based resources or computer-based drug calculators is also an 
organisational matter. Other examples include not using pre-prepared 
medicines or infusions. Another important matter is relating to seniority and 
authority of individuals, this is where a junior or less experienced individual is 
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afraid to question or raise a concern about the prescribed treatment. Also the 
time constraints placed by the organisation on individuals does introduce the 
risk of carelessness and rushing through tasks.  
Latent conditions are also related to error provoking situations. These relate 
to the local culture of practice. The constant distractions, disturbances and 
interruptions are a common contributory factor. This is in the form of 
interruptions from other staff, patients' families and visitors and noise from 
bedside equipment. Also, the increased workload and pressure from peers is 
putting patients at risk. This is worsened by the understaffing level for this 
high risk area. Moreover, the experience level of staff and knowledge of local 
PICU practice is a key factor since medicine administration is a skill that 
requires both knowledge and practice. Also, prescribers are not taking into 
consideration the difficulty associated with small child doses. This results in 
problems during the administration process in adjusting the various 
concentrations to reach small doses. Furthermore, if these latent conditions 
are not tackled, carelessness among certain individuals will develop. It will 
become the norm to take risks unnoticed.  
Another latent condition is the effectiveness of the double-checking process. 
It is now a must practice in every PICU to have a double-checking policy. 
However, it is not known how effectively that process is carried out. This was 
raised by a number of healthcare professionals. Also the level of support 
received by other staff was mentioned. Since, it is likely for patient’s acuity to 
be severe in this setting, support will be needed. However, workload and 
understaffing may hinder this. Hence, this will lead to staff fatigue and stress. 
All contribute to making a MAE. 
The participants were also asked to describe what interventions they required 
to reduce MAE in their practice. A total of 64 (51%) participants responded 
with suggestions. This question was asked in order to propose safety 
measures based on the needs of the end users as well as on empirical 
evidence from this research. Most of the interventions described by the 
healthcare professionals were characterised previously in chapter 4 of this 
thesis. However, a key highlight is the need for standardisation of dosing in 
bands of age and weight. This will result in safer practice in terms of 
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preparation and administration since less pharmaceutical calculations will be 
needed. Also, standardisation of dosing will result in a more efficient 
administration practice since the same doses will be repeated among different 
patients hence improving their skill. Another suggestion that was not picked 
up previously is the improvement of night time working conditions. Lighting 
was a common issue, followed by fatigue and break allowance. Moreover, a 
strategy to improve the double checking process was identified. A more 
complicated suggestion is to increase staffing level in the PICU. As far as the 
researcher is aware, this is the first study that has identified improvement 
strategies to reduce MAEs based upon suggestions from front-line care 
providers. 
The researcher also asked the participants to rate the usefulness of the 
preliminary proposed safety measures. These safety measures were 
developed upon examining the evidence of MAE found in this thesis. The first 
safety measure was to increase the use of pre-prepared infusions/CIVAS for 
high-risk medicines and for those with difficult concentration ratios. This was 
most rated as extremely useful (n= 62). This is not a surprising finding since 
it correlates with that fact that it will reduce workload, ease pressure and is 
the most commonly suggested intervention by the healthcare professionals 
themselves. The second safety measure that was found to be extremely 
useful is the introduction of a zero tolerance policy to interruptions (n= 47). 
This would be embedded into the standard practice procedures of the PICU. 
Breach of the policy should not be tolerated and actions should be taken 
against re-offenders. Once again this was expected since interruptions were 
identified as a major contributory factor to MAEs.  
Other proposed preliminary safety measures related to adapting an electronic 
calculator, extensive eLearning material and a standardised flow-chart for the 
medication administration process. The participants found these to be mid to 
extremely useful safety measures. Additionally, once again these safety 
measures were correlating with the findings of the contributory factors and 
suggestions of MAE interventions. However, the least favourite safety 
measure was the use of the smart infusion pump combined with barcode 
medicine administration technology. A possible justification for this dislike is 
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that many professionals have no experience in using such methods of 
administration. Therefore, this explains the low rating of usefulness for this 
safety measure. Nevertheless, the overall findings of the preliminary proposed 
safety measures were positively correlating with the rest of the findings of 
this study and other chapters. This has strengthened the aim of proposing a 
set of safety measures to decrease prevalence of MAEs in PICUs.      
 As a result of the above findings and other evidence from: the systematic 
literature review, national survey of PICU interventions, retrospective review 
of patient safety incidents, and the prospective observation of the medication 
administration process. The following safety measures based on the evidence 
gathered are proposed to reduce MAE in PICU:     
Better lighting on preparation trolley and in administration area 
This is a basic safety measure to ensure that there is sufficient lighting for 
safe preparation and administration process. It applies to both day and night 
shifts. It was observed that during the night shift most of the lights in the 
PICU were dimmed. Whereas, during the day shift light is restricted due to 
bedside curtains blocking light. This will result in poor visibility for the safe 
preparation and administration of medicines. The advantage of this measure 
is that it is a relatively cheap method to reduce latent conditions for MAE. 
Especially, there is already a table lamp at each bedside that is not being 
used for this purpose.  
However, there might be resistance from some individuals to taking up this 
safety measure. This simple method can also be adapted across other 
hospital settings since this extra light can improve the concentration of the 
person administering the medicine. No study has explored the effect of 
lighting on MAEs. Nevertheless, Buchanan, Barker, Gibson, Jiang, and 
Pearson (1991) presented the early findings of reducing dispensing errors in a 
pharmacy by having better lighting. The same principle should apply with 
MAE.   
Decision support tool with calculation aid, provide direct access to 
updated guidelines and learning materials  
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This is becoming an increasingly required safety measure in medicine 
administration practice. It is common in practice that doctors, nurses and 
pharmacists use their personal smart phones to carry out calculations or to 
consult a clinical application. Examples include use of BNF and BMJ Best 
Practice mobile applications. Therefore, it is possible to have one application 
that puts together all the tools needed for safe administration. This 
application can include drug dose and infusion calculator, dilution help, access 
to guidelines and protocols and learning materials for help in the 
administration process. The advantage of this application is that it will ensure 
fast access to information at the point of care. It is reasonably simple to 
develop since many NHS hospitals now have access to platforms to develop 
these applications. This safety measure addresses the challenges faced by 
new healthcare professionals that are becoming more and more dependent 
on this type of technology. Also, this safety measure is adaptable to other 
hospital areas. An additional benefit of this safety measure is that it reduces 
the need for paper-based guidelines that are poorly designed. However, there 
are no studies that have evaluated the impact of such safety measures on the 
prevalence of MAE.  
Medicine administration checklist  
This is another simple safety measure that provides a step-by-step quick 
checklist for the preparation and administration processes. This would be in 
the form of a checklist. It will also include a calculation aid for dose 
adjustment and dilutions. The checklist would be placed on the preparation 
trolley and in the medicines room/cabinet. The checklist will need to be 
concise, clear and agreed by senior healthcare professionals. This is in order 
to ensure validity and accuracy. Moreover, the checklist can be printed into a 
material that illuminate in the dark. Additionally, this safety measure will 
provide a form of practice standardisation when preparing and administering 
medicines. It can also be adapted in other settings of hospital care. However, 
it would be difficult to measure if it is being used. Although, its impact is to be 
evaluated using direct observation or structured interviews/questionnaires 
methods. 
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Pre-prepared infusions  
This is a more complicated safety measure to reduce MAEs. It requires wider 
adaption of CIVAS to cover all the mostly used therapeutic agents. This is 
challenging since it needs the development of an agreed business plan within 
the hospital pharmacy. However, it is easily implemented once the financial 
implications are cleared. Also, it can be evaluated using direct observation 
and retrospective analysis of incidents. If this safety measure proves effective 
for safety, it can be applied to other clinical areas.   
Standardise doses to age and weight bands  
This is a safety measure that is effecting prescribing as well the 
administration process. As is known, many therapeutic agents are prescribed 
using patient specific parameters such as weight. However, it is possible to 
band or group a range of such parameter into one dose. This is commonly 
used with some antibiotics. The advantage of this strategy is that it provides 
standardised doses for all healthcare professionals. This will lead to an easier 
clinical checking process for pharmacists and nurses. But it will also ensure 
that nurses are more familiar with dose adjustments across a wide range of 
patients. Hence, they would be building on knowledge and experience in 
medicine administration. Therefore, ensuring safety and lowering the chances 
of calculation errors across different medication processes. This safety 
measure already exists, but it requires adaption of a wider range of 
medicines. The development of this safety measure can be challenging since 
a consensus of dose bands between healthcare professionals is necessary. 
They would assess the therapeutic benefit against different indications. A 
classic example is that severe infections require double the usual dose. 
However, these challenges can be minimised by developing clear, well 
designed and accessible prescribing protocols and guidelines.      
Structured open dialogue double checking process  
Many of the errors identified in this thesis could have been prevented by 
using an effective double checking process before administration. It is now 
common practice to have a second person to double check. However, the 
effectiveness of that process is not clear. During the observation, it was 
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noticed that this process was not adequately utilised. It tends to be 
unstructured, quick and not focused on the actual process but was used for 
conversations outside the patient’s care. This results in putting patients at risk 
due to ineffective double checking. In order to make use of this vital safety 
process, an open dialogue combined with a clear structure to maintain focus 
and ensure intervening in MAEs before these reach the patient. An open 
dialogue is chosen instead of silent double checking in order to maintain 
communication between the two individuals. Also it is evident that they will 
be communicating and a great resistance from staff is foreseen to the idea of 
silent double checking. This structured double checking can be implemented 
through a series of workshops during the monthly allocated times for learning 
and team briefing. It will require a long time and repeated cycles of education 
to ensure the effective implementation of this safety measure.      
Zero tolerance to interruption policy  
This is the most challenging safety measure to reduce the most claimed 
contributory factor of MAE as the systematic literature review found that 
there is a lack of evidence that supports the use of a visible indication for a 
healthcare professional not to be interrupted during administration. However, 
a culture change requires more than just a visible measure. Therefore, in 
order to enforce a culture that does not interrupt the administration process it 
is vitally important to reflect this in the standard operating procedures of the 
unit. It should be relayed that it would be unacceptable to interrupt anyone in 
the process of administering medicines. It would apply to all doctors, nurses, 
pharmacists and patient's visitors. It is important to have a strong nursing led 
no interruption stewardship in order to make this a success. Also, breaching 
of this no interruption rule should be treated seriously. This policy was 
successfully used for the prescribing process. Therefore, it is possible to adapt 
the same attitude for the administration process. This will also empower the 
nurse's authority and ensure less time is wasted on dealing with non-urgent 
requests.  
In summary, a set of safety measures is proposed to tackle the multifaceted 
nature of MAE. To ensure safe administration practices in PICUs, age and 
weight based prescribing bands are recommended. This ensures that doses 
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and infusion rates are standardised and that there is less chance of 
calculation errors occurring before the administration process. Supported by a 
well-lit environment for both day and night shifts. Additionally, enable quick 
access to an electronic resource that aids calculations and contains guidelines. 
Increase the uptake of pre-prepared infusion medicines and a standardised 
approach to the double checking process. A medicine administration checklist 
and culture of interruption intolerance is needed.                   
Regardless of this study's fulfilment of the aims and objectives, a number of 
issues could have limited the data reached. First, the responses received by 
participants for the open-ended questions were mostly key terms and not 
detailed descriptions. Second, due to the first limitation the analysis was 
restricted to a characterisation of the responses rather than an exploration. 
Both could have been avoided by a better structuring of the questions. 
Thirdly, recruitment was opportunistic via email. The data synthesised would 
have been more generalisable if responses were collected directly from the 
healthcare professionals in person. This could have been done by the 
researcher being present in the PICUs and collected responses on an iPad. It 
would also have improved the response rate and the level of detail given in 
each response. Future research recommendation is to assess the feasibility of 
the proposed safety measures. This can be carried out by: 1) assessing 
suitability by medication safety experts, 2) implement in practice to evaluate 
impact on prevalence of MAE, 3) collect opinions of healthcare professionals 
subjected to these safety measures, and 4) explore the patient’s family's and 
visitor's perceptions of the implemented medicine administration safety 
measures.    
7.4.1 Conclusion 
This study was able to interest a large number of experienced PICU 
healthcare professionals locally and nationally. Many have provided MAE 
contributory factors and suggested methods to reduce it. It was found that 
interruptions, workload and pharmaceutical calculations are the most 
regularly identified MAE contributory factors. Also the majority of the 
contributory factors were of latent conditions that could lead to MAE. The 
participants mostly suggested that pre-prepared infusions, reduction of 
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interruptions and clear guidelines would lower MAE in their practice. The 
following safety measures were proposed: standardise dose by bands, 
improve lighting conditions, develop an electronic tool with a calculation aid 
and access to clinical resources, scale up the use of pre-prepared infusions, 
enhance the double checking process, adapt a medicine administration 
checklist, and enforce a culture intolerant to interruption. Future research 
includes the need to assess the feasibility of the proposed safety measures 
and implement them in practice.    
7.5 Study Contribution to Knowledge  
1. First study to explore contributing factors of MAE in PICU led by 
practitioners nationally regardless of making an error. MAE 
contributing factors were mostly related to: interruptions, workload 
and pharmaceutical calculations.  
2. Reason’s model for error causation used to characterise MAE 
contributing factors in PICU. It was found that most of the factors are 
latent conditions due to organisational level matters and error 
provoking conditions.  
3. First study to identify the recommendation of PICU practitioners 
nationally for interventions to reduce MAE. Practitioners mostly 
suggested that: use of pre-prepared infusions, reduction of 
interruption and improving guidelines would lower MAE in their 
practice. 
4. The following MAE safety measures are proposed in light of this study 
and the findings of the overall thesis: standardise dose by bands, 
improve lighting conditions, develop an electronic tool with a 
calculation aid and access to clinical resources, scale up the use of 
pre-prepared infusions, enhance the double checking process, adapt a 
medicine administration checklist, and enforce a culture intolerant to 
interruption.  
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Chapter 8:  Overall Discussion 
 
8.1 Introduction 
Fortunately the majority of children grow healthily into adulthood without the 
need for serious medical attention. However, many require help and hospital 
support. It is estimated that 2.4 million children were hospitalised in 
2012/2013 across England (Health & Social Care Information Centre, 2013). 
The vast majority of these admissions are believed to be cared for with the 
highest standards of quality. Moreover, some children require more intensive 
care under round the clock supervision of healthcare professionals. The 
PICANet reports a total of 60343 paediatric intensive care admissions (up to 
16 years old) for the period between 2011 and 2013 across the UK. This 
represents a 4% increase in admissions (PICANet, 2014). The mortality rate 
in PICUs is very low since 96% of children were discharged alive for 2011 and 
2013.  
However, children that are in critical clinical areas are at a higher risk of being 
subjected to medication administration errors. This is due to the fact these 
children are bound to be receiving more frequent administrations of 
medications compared to other acute wards. They are more likely to require 
narrow therapeutic window medicines and intravenous infusions (Campino et 
al., 2009; Suresh et al., 2004).  
Moreover, medicine administration in the PICU is not allocated to specific time 
slots. Hence, administration will be frequent at various times. This is an 
important issue, since there is the potential for administering medicines 
without clinical checks by a pharmacist. Also, due to the compromised health 
status of this cohort, they will be more prone to harm and deterioration in 
event of an error. This will also affect the rate of drug metabolism and 
excretion (Wilson et al., 1998). Additionally, PICUs are increasingly employing 
agency and bank staff to address the issue of shortages and it has been 
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highlighted that only 15% (n= 5) of PICUs met the national standard for level 
of nursing (7.01 whole time equivalent per critical care bed) in 2013. This is a 
huge risk since agency and bank staff will not necessary have the knowledge 
or skills needed for critical care. Furthermore, there is a risk of bringing in 
uncommon practices that are not routinely performed in certain PICUs or not 
part of the local procedures and protocols. Additionally, in the PICU it is a 
1.5:1 nursing ratio therefore errors must be limited. Since children are in 
PICUs with life-threating conditions and require constant, close monitoring 
and support an error can lead to devastating consequences. 
The thought of potentially harming children during their care in a hospital 
environmental is unacceptable and highly sensitive, especially taking into 
account the fact that the vast majority of potential harm is preventable. Of 
course this will cause great distress for the patient and their family, but it will 
also affect the confidence and trust in the healthcare system. Additionally, we 
cannot ignore the financial implications since patients have the right for 
compensation through the NHS Litigation Authority for acts of negligence. In 
turn this will lead to added pressures on healthcare providers. Therefore, it is 
important to make sure that this process is secured and physical as well as 
non-physical measures are in place to avoid errors in this process.  
This area of research has been extensively studied across the globe. 
However, the direction of current research has been widely focused on 
measuring the incidence of MAE in children’s hospitals. A limited number of 
interventional studies was carried out. The majority of these interventional 
studies tended to be developed and evaluated over a short period of time by 
the researchers. Therefore, they are not addressing the problem of MAEs 
realistically from a practice point of view but the research is rushed without 
taking into consideration the validity, creditability, feasibility and usefulness of 
these interventions. Hence, the impact of these interventions is questionable 
and also most of the research is intervening in MAE using a single method. 
Thus, the primary question for this research is what safety measures are 
needed to reduce MAEs in PICUs. In order to reach the answer to this 
research question, the following objectives were developed: 1) to review 
literature on MAEs in children’s hospitals, 2) to characterise existing MAE 
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interventions used nationally in PICUs, 3) to investigate the nature of MAE in 
PICUs, and 4) to propose safety measures to reduce MAEs in PICUs.  
A pragmatic research method was developed to measure the objectives 
above. The method was composed of five studies: 1) systematic literature 
review of MAE in children’s hospitals, 2) retrospective analysis of patient 
safety incidents relating to medication use in PICUs, 3) prospective 
observation of medication administration practice in PICUs, 4) national survey 
of MAE interventions used in PICUs, and 5) survey of PICU healthcare 
professional’s thoughts on causes and preventions of MAEs in PICUs.  
8.2 Key Research Findings 
The systematic literature review of MAE in children’s hospitals illustrated the 
scale of the issue internationally. Although there are basic terminological 
differences between the definitions used for MAE, the main component of 
these definitions is the same. This shared component is describing that MAE 
is related to administration of a medicine deviating from the prescribed 
instructions or the standard procedures for administration. However, none of 
the studies recognised errors that related to other medicine processes such as 
prescribing and that were not intervened in before reaching the patient.    
Additionally, the review study found retrospective and prospective methods to 
investigate hospital MAEs in children. Despite the heterogeneity, the review 
found cumulatively 12552 reported hospital medication error incidents, MAEs 
accounted for 50% (n= 6246). Whereas using a prospective method a total of 
2537 MAEs (29%) were detected in 8894 dose observations. These findings 
demonstrate the scale of the problem when providing medicine to children in 
hospital. Yet data is lacking regarding the level of harm this is causing or the 
potential for harm. Furthermore, the interventions that were found did not 
provide enough evidence to support a full-scale impact on MAE. The review 
identified that MAE is of a multifaceted nature unlike the interventions.  
However, the review identified a key gap in literature and that is the limited 
number of interventions in PICUs, although there have been a number of 
studies carried out in PICUs to quantify the scale of the problem. Additionally, 
no study was found that investigated the opinions of PICU healthcare 
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professionals into the causes of MAE or took their recommendations to 
improve their administration practice. As far as the researcher is aware, there 
are only two studies that were carried out in the UK that tried to reduce MAEs 
(Stewart et al., 2010; Warrick et al., 2011). Both studies did not actually 
address MAE in the PICU context. Stewart et al. (2010) investigated the use 
of education and simulation of the administration process with undergraduate 
nurse students. The study is of less application in real practice since it was 
carried out over a very short period of time. Also they did not follow up the 
students’ performance in real time clinical situations. On the other hand, 
Warrick et al. (2011) utilised a clinical information system to provide support 
for doctors and nurses mainly. However, they only measured MAEs in terms 
of omitted doses. This is by no means a reflection of the true level of the 
problem in practice. Especially as they carried out the study in an emergency 
department where patients are likely to stay for a very short period of time. 
Hence many of the scheduled doses will have been missed because the 
patient would either have been discharged to another ward or sent back 
home. Therefore, there is a serious need for evidence based MAE safety 
measures in PICUs.  
The second study in this research analysed the reported patient safety 
incidents in the PICU of a London based children hospital. A total of 1686 
patient safety incident reports were analysed. Incidents relating to 
medications accounted for the most (35%). After further exclusion of reports, 
412 incidents were specifically associated with the use of medicines. 
Medication administration incidents were the most reported (n= 176, 43%), 
followed by prescribing errors that were not intercepted (n= 141, 34%) and 
near miss incidents (n= 95, 23%). There were 12 incidents classified as 
severe harm. 
The findings of the retrospective analysis were broadly in line with published 
literature found in the systematic literature review. However, as far the 
researcher is aware, this is the first study that has identified incidents due to 
failure in multiple medication processes. It also highlighted the role played by 
the PICU clinical pharmacist in identifying these incidents. More importantly, it 
further illustrates the complexity of MAEs and identifies areas for 
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improvement despite the low reporting rate. Therefore, this led to carrying 
out a prospective observation study to assess the overall practice of medicine 
administration.  
Hence the third study observed 42 nurses administering 832 doses to 46 
patients aged over 1 and under 16 during 28 shifts. It was possible to identify 
269 MAEs. Therefore the incidence of MAE in this study is 32.3% of the doses 
observed which is consistent with the published literature. It was also found 
that increase in number of interruptions during medicine preparation and 
administration does correlate positively with increased risk of MAE (r = 0.7; p 
< 0.5).  
The MAEs categorised into: wrong dose (n= 152, 56.5%), preparation (n= 
50, 18.6%), wrong infusion rate (n= 26, 9.7%), wrong time (n= 25, 9.3%), 
omission (n= 11, 4.1%), and wrong formulation (n= 5, 1.9%). There were 
also six high-risk medicines that were associated with 56 MAEs cumulatively. 
In combination with the retrospective analysis study, it was clear that MAEs in 
PICUs require an intervention. However, both studies highlighted that MAEs 
are diverse in practice and need multiple interventions in order to reduce 
them fully. The interventions identified in the systematic literature review 
were limited and none were focused on the PICU context. Therefore, it was 
important to identify interventions used nationally in current PICU practices in 
order to find an evidence-based solution.   
Thus, the fourth study aimed to characterise the interventions used in PICUs 
nationally to reduce medication errors and in particular administration errors. 
The survey attracted wide interest from 82% of the hospitals that offer PICU 
services in the UK. As a result, a number of interventions were identified for 
both prescribing (n= 21) and administration errors (n= 22). The 
characteristics of the interventions were broadly themed into: 
 Education and Training 
 Error Monitoring and Reporting  
 Prescribing / Administration Policies 
 Quality Improvement Tools 
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 Medication Chart Clinical and Double Checking 
The key highlight of this survey is that it illustrates the complexity of dealing 
with MAEs in practice. It also strengthens the view that  a single intervention 
would not be enough to minimise MAEs in PICU care. Moreover, the 
participants were asked to identify challenges and barriers for MAE 
interventions. Their responses were classified into personal, systemic and 
cultural factors. In summary, for an intervention to be a success it is 
fundamental to build a culture of safety and a supportive system. This can be 
achieved by developing a collaborative approach to learn from errors without 
pointing fingers and assigning blame. This leads to individuals being more 
open and transparent and improves awareness of the seriousness of 
medication errors in hospital care. But also the system needs to make the 
practice of medicine administration easier. This information was not available 
in the literature. This basic risk management strategy is not always practiced 
as the observation study found unsafe practices in the system such as: 
workload, use of child unfriendly formulations, and a constant culture of 
interruptions and distractions.   
Furthermore, it was identified in the systematic literature review that there is 
a gap in knowledge relating to exploring MAE from PICU frontline staff's 
perspective. Consequently, a survey was developed to explore MAE 
contributory factors and reduction methods from their perspective. A total of 
125 PICU healthcare professionals took part in this fifth study. Cumulatively, 
the mean years of post-qualification experience was 10.3 years. Reason’s 
model of error causation was applied to trace contributory factors of MAE. 
The contributory factors described by the participants were mostly related to 
latent conditions. This includes failure to have adequate information or 
resources for healthcare professionals to consult or poor clarity and access to 
these resources. Additionally, lighting conditions during night shifts is a major 
risk factor. Other examples include not using pre-prepared medicines and 
infusions. 
Other latent conditions that are error provoking were also found. The 
constant distractions, disturbances and interruptions are a common 
contributory factor. Also, increased workloads, low staffing levels and 
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pressure from peers is putting patients at risk. The effectiveness of double-
checking was also questioned.  
Contributory factors relating to active failures were also identified. This 
includes failure to perform pharmaceutical calculations to adjust suitable child 
doses or infusion rates. Other unsafe acts relate to violations of rules such as 
administration of unauthorised medicines and prescribers failing to order 
medicine clearly.  
The participants were also asked to describe what interventions they required 
to reduce MAEs in their practice. A key highlight was the need for 
standardisation of dosing in bands of age and weight. Another suggestion 
was the improvement of night-time working conditions. Moreover, a strategy 
to improve the double-checking process was identified.  
Overall, the findings of this survey justify the increasingly high rate of MAEs in 
PICUs as demonstrated by the retrospective and prospective studies. It 
further illustrates the need for changes to the system. Some changes are very 
challenging such as increasing the workforce. This is a national issue as it was 
mentioned earlier that only 15% of UK PICUs were able to achieve the 
standard of 7.01 whole time equivalent per critical care bed in 2013. 
However, there are other factors that can be feasibly changed. As a result of 
this study, the following safety measures are proposed to reduce MAEs in 
PICUs:     
1. Better lighting on preparation trolley and administration area. 
2. Decision support tool with calculation aid, provide direct access to 
updated guidelines and learning materials. 
3. Medicine administration checklist. 
4. Pre-prepared infusions.  
5. Standardise doses to age and weight bands.  
6. Structured open dialogue double checking process.  
7. Zero tolerance to interruption policy.  
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The summary of the key findings of this research represent that the aims and 
objectives were fulfilled. Therefore, the above list of safety measures provides 
the answer to the research question based on evidence that was gathered 
from international, national and local perspectives using a valid research 
method that included healthcare professionals.  
8.3 Research Contribution to Knowledge 
Specific research contribution to knowledge was mentioned for each study 
chapter. However, the key contribution is that it was able to address the gap 
in literature in relation to PICU specific safety measures to reduce MAE. The 
research also assessed the potential for harm caused by these errors. It also 
involved PICU frontline staff in exploring the contributory factors of MAE and 
reduction strategies.  
A major contribution to knowledge also includes evidence of errors that were 
not picked up before the administration process. This was not explored in any 
study that investigated MAEs in children’s hospitals. The study argued that 
errors from other medication process such as prescribing not intervened 
during the administration processes should also be counted as MAE. Since 
hospital procedures require staff to conduct adequate clinical checks and not 
blindly administer medicine. This is also an interpretation of MAE definition 
that generally counts deviation from hospital procedures as MAE. This 
concept will add a new theoretical dimension to future research.  
Furthermore, the method used for the prospective observation study was 
unique. It builds upon an existing approach developed by Ghaleb (2006). The 
method used utilised an MAE definition that was validated in a two-round 
Delphi expert consensus. However, the impact of this research is that it 
developed a strong methodological approach to identify MAE in practice. This 
research modified the method of observation practice and the data collection 
tool. The main modification to the method was that the researcher clinically 
reviews medication charts before observing the administration process. As far 
as the researcher is aware, this is the first study that takes this approach. The 
advantage of this approach is that it allows the observer to anticipate the 
administration process before it actually takes place. It provides the 
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opportunity to flag up any potential errors and to be able to be ready to 
intervene when needed. The second major modification is that the researcher 
developed an iPad data collection tool rather than the traditional paper-based 
form. There are many advantages to this, but mainly it can help to maximise 
the validity of the data since there will be no need for transcription. But it also 
helps to increase the sensitivity of the observation since less time will be 
wasted in documentation and therefore this increases the observer’s focus.  
The contribution of these modifications is that a valid and reliable method for 
MAE observations is developed. This is becoming increasingly vital since 
currently it is essential to have valid measurement tools for these types of 
errors as highlighted by the national patient safety priorities set by NHS 
England (2014d). This is also required for Quality Improvement programmes 
funded by the Health Foundation and the Department of Health. Researchers 
and practitioners can use this method along with the data collection tool. 
Therefore, providing a new data matrix that can be combined with the 
reported medication incidents to improve practice.  
Another contribution to knowledge is that this research carried out the first 
national survey of interventions used in PICU to reduce medication errors. 
Many of these interventions were not known in literature. The results of the 
survey identified a number of good practices that are in place to reduce 
avoidable errors. The data generated is now part of a multimillion pounds 
Quality Improvement programme led by the Royal College for Paediatrics and 
Child Health. This programme is aiming to develop a one-stop resource for 
healthcare professionals. This initiative is called Paediatric Care Online. It 
involves a collaborative component for sharing good practices to improve 
delivery of medication care. Therefore, this research was able to have a 
practical input into a national level programme. Finally, a really important 
contribution to knowledge is that PICU healthcare professionals expressed 
their view on MAE contributing factors and reduction methods. The key point 
of this part of the research is that it did not focus on particular staff. Opinions 
were gathered from everyone and not just the ones that made an error. This 
adds strength to the study since it presents generalisable findings. Overall, 
this research was able to propose safety measures to reduce MAE from 
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different perspectives. The safety measures are also based on evidence 
gathered from numerous sources that are challenging. 
8.4 Research Output 
The research findings were presented at the following events:  
1. Department of Pharmacy Research Seminar UH. Methodology 
development for medication administration error research: 
understanding the problem. March 2012 
2. Department of Pharmacy Research Seminar UH. Medication 
administration in paediatric intensive care unit: Risky practice and 
solutions. April 2013 
3. Health Services Research and Pharmacy Practice Conference. 
Systematic review: epidemiology, nature and interventions of hospital 
medication administration errors in paediatrics. May 2013 
4. Child Health Research Conference. Interventions and tools used for 
Used for reduction of Prescribing and Administration Errors in UK & 
Ireland Paediatric Intensive Care Units. May 2013 
5. European Society of Paediatric and Neonatal Intensive Care Annual 
Meeting. Retrospective analysis of medicine related critical incident 
reports in paediatric intensive care unit. June 2013 
6. Department of Pharmacy Research Seminar UH. Observation of 
medication administration practice. January 2014 
7. School of Life and Medical Sciences Research Conference. 
Retrospective analysis of medicine related critical incident reports in 
paediatric intensive care unit. April 2014 
8. School of Life and Medical Sciences Research Conference. 
Interventions and tools used for Used for reduction of Prescribing and 
Administration Errors in UK & Ireland Paediatric Intensive Care Units. 
April 2014 
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9. Department of Pharmacy Research Showcase UH. Medication 
administration errors in children’s hospital: problem that needs solving. 
June 2014 
8.5 Research Limitations 
It is important to consider the findings of this research in light of its 
limitations; the following are the key limitations of the research:  
1. The systematic literature review of evidence was restricted to original 
research presented in English only. It would have been useful to 
explore non-English written data to identify other perspectives to the 
problem. 
2. The national survey of interventions in PICUs for MAE did not seek to 
evaluate the true impact of these interventions. Neither did it explore 
the views of the actual users nor examine the cost effectiveness of the 
interventions.  
3. It was not possible to explore the contributory factors or causes of the 
MAEs identified retrospectively from the patient safety incidents.  
4. It was not possible to find out if a patient suffered any harm or 
discomfort as a result of the MAE identified during the prospective 
observation study. Additionally, it is unknown if the nurses observed 
were aware that they had made an MAE and if they learnt from that 
error. 
5. The final survey of PICU healthcare professionals' questionnaire could 
have been structured better. The responses received were mostly in 
the form of key words rather than complete sentences.  
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8.6 Future Research 
 
The following are the key recommendations for future research in this field: 
 
1. Development of a validated guide based on expert consensus on 
investigational methods of MAE. This will help to reduce 
heterogeneity of findings and act as a resource for agreed definition, 
subtypes of MAE, and numerators/denominators used to represent 
prevalence of MAE. 
2. Evaluation of the impact of the currently used interventions in 
practice that were identified by the national survey study. This will 
lead to a better appraisal of effectiveness. Moreover, seek users' 
opinions on these interventions. Additionally it would be of interest to 
explore MAE interventions used across Europe PICUs.  
3. Carry out a thorough root cause analysis of specific MAEs such as 
wrong dose or wrong infusion rate. This will lead to a better 
understanding of the contributory factors and actual causes. 
4. Assessment of medicine administration practice in children’s hospitals 
by failure effect mode analysis. This will help to identify risky 
practices and potential consequences of errors.  
5. Implementation of the proposed safety measures in practice. This 
should include an assessment process of impact and suitability. The 
findings of this study would provide evidence relating to the impact of 
multifaceted MAE safety measures.   
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8.7 Conclusion 
Medicine administration in children’s hospitals is a complex and risky process. 
Errors in this process can lead to serious consequences for healthcare 
providers and more importantly to the patient. Therefore, any mishap is 
unacceptable and measures should be in place to prevent it. Hence, a series 
of studies were carried out to propose safety measures for these errors.   
A number of interventions were identified that can reduce administration error 
in practice. This was achieved by a thorough review of published literature 
and national survey of PICUs. Additionally, the challenges and barriers that 
hinder the success of these interventions were characterised. This was 
followed by a retrospective analysis of patient safety incidents and 
prospective observation of the administration practice.  
It was found that a considerable number of patient safety incidents are 
occurring due to medication use in PICU. Reports relating to failures in 
administration process are the highest. Medicines that are high risk and those 
with narrow therapeutic windows are correlated with an increased risk of 
administration errors. Moreover, the observational study of medication 
administration practice found a high rate of errors in PICU. The overall 
findings of the observation study are comparable with the reported errors. 
Healthcare professionals identified interruptions, workload and calculations as 
the main contributory factors for administration errors.  
Based on the overall findings of the various studies, the following safety 
measures are proposed to reduce administration errors: standardise dose by 
bands, improve lighting conditions, develop an electronic tool with calculation 
aid and access to clinical resources, scale up the use of pre-prepared 
infusions, enhance the double checking process, adapt a medicine 
administration checklist, and enforce a culture intolerant to interruption. 
Future research includes the need to assess the feasibility of the proposed 
safety measures and implement them in practice. So far, this is the first study 
of its kind to explore medication administration errors in PICU from different 
perspectives. It also included practitioners’ points of view for improving the 
safety of medicine delivery in PICU.    
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Appendix 2: NHS R&D GOSH Approval  
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Appendix 4: Invitation Letter for National 
Survey of PICU Interventions 
 
University	of	Hertfordshire		
School	of	Life	and	Medical	Sciences	
Department	of	Pharmacy	
College	Lane	
Hatfield	
AL10	9AB,	UK		
Tel:	+44	(0)1707284248	
Fax:	+44	(0)1707284506	
herts.ac.uk		
A Charity Exempt from Registration under the 
Second Schedule of the Charities Act 1993   
 
6	November	2012	
	
Dear	Healthcare	Professional	
	
My	name	is	Ahmed	Ameer,	I	am	a	doctoral	candidate	at	the	Department	of	Pharmacy,	University	of	
Hertfordshire.	I	am	investigating	interventions	and	tools	used	in	practice	to	reduce	medication	errors	in	
paediatric	intensive	care	units.	I	would	like	to	invite	you	to	participate	in	my	research	and	complete	an	
online	survey	in	order	to	indentify	the	nature	of	the	interventions	used	in	the	UK.	
If	you	decide	to	participate	please	complete	a	short	online	survey	at:	tinyurl.com/surveypicu,	the	survey	
should	not	take	you	more	than	10	minutes	to	complete.	Participation	is	entirely	voluntary	and	data	
obtained	will	be	kept	confidential.	NHS	ethical	approval	has	been	obtained	from	NRES	 London	
Bloomsbury	committee	to	carry	out	this	research.	
The	results	of	the	study	will	be	published	or	presented	at	meetings,	but	data	will	be	kept	anonymous.	I	will	
be	grateful	if	you	can	also	nominate	any	other	individuals	that	you	feel	have	been	involved	in	putting	the	
intervention	at	your	practice.	They	can	follow	the	same	link	above	to	complete	the	survey.		
Thank	you	very	much	for	your	co-operation	and	participating	in	this	study.	If	you	have	any	query,	you	can	
contact	me	at	01707284248	or	email	A.1.Ameer@herts.ac.uk.				
	
With	kind	regards				
	
AhmedAmeer 
	
Ahmed	Ameer	MRPharmS	
PhD	Candidate					
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Appendix 5: PICU Medication Error 
Interventions Survey  
Welcome to PICU Medication Error Interventions Survey. The purpose of this 
survey is to identify interventions and/or tools used to reduce medication 
errors in PICU.  
 
All data collected in this survey will be anonymised and held securely. The 
Survey should take 5–10 minutes to complete. 
 
Survey results and feedback will be reviewed within the University of 
Hertfordshire, Department of Pharmacy. Aggregate data may be retained to 
benchmark future surveys. This research has been approved by NRES London 
– Bloomsbury Committee (reference number is 12/LO/0621, Protocol V1).  
 
If you have any questions, please contact Ahmed Ameer on 
A.1.Ameer@herts.ac.uk.  
 
Thank you very much for completing this survey.  
 
1. Please provide the name of hospital you are representing  
Hospital Name 
 
 
2. Have you carried out an intervention to reduce any of the following at your 
PICU?  
Prescribing Errors Yes No 
Administration Errors Yes No 
 
3. If yes, please describe the nature of intervention used? 
Prescribing Errors 
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Administration Errors 
  
 
4. Have you carried out an audit before and after implementing the 
intervention? 
 Yes  No 
 
5. If yes, what are the main outcomes of the audit, was the intervention able 
to reduce errors? 
 
 
6. Can you please describe the challenges/barriers you have faced in 
implementing the intervention? 
 
 
7. Would you like to participate in future research aiming to develop an 
intervention to reduce medication errors in PICU or be informed of this 
research outcome? If yes, please provide the following 
 Title 
 
Name 
 
Profession 
 
E-mail 
Address  
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Hospital 
Name  
Job Title 
 
 
8. Do you have any other comments in regards to this survey? 
 
 
Thank you very much for taking time to complete this survey. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix  
 239 
Appendix 6: Raw Data of National Survey 
Responses to Key Questions 
 
 Response 
ID  
Nature of intervention used for prescribing errors? 
01 Zero tolerance policy – 2 years 
02 Zero tolerance prescribing in place 
03 ZTP – commenced in 2009 &on-going 
04 Staff training, incident reviews: On-going 
06 
Doctors provided with pocket cards with all the drug infusion guidelines/doses on to help with 
prescribing 
07 
Zero tolerance prescribing desks – dedicated and interruptions not allowed for medical staff; no 
prescribing at end of bed 
08 
Pharmacist on rounds, feedback daily on errors, prescriber of the week, prescribing desk, no 
harm policy, induction teaching 
09 Junior doctor induction tutorial, daily feedback from PICU pharmacist, Feedback at M&M 
10 
Redesigned medication chart, instituted distraction management techniques ("Zero Tolerance") 
12 Regular feedback to prescribers 
13 Induction training for junior doctors on the pitfalls of medical prescribing. 
14 
Development of an electronic, prescription form for resus drugs. Also implemented use of new 
drug chart that is aimed at reducing prescription errors. 
15 Drug infusion calculator and zero tolerance policy 
16 
Increased reporting and development of rapid feedback to the prescriber; no blame culture; 
openness. Improve safety clauses on high risk prescribing in ICU – e.g. K check and K dose limits 
17 
Prescribing areas– approx 1yr (currently being specifically designed to ensure fit for purpose). 
Specifically designed questionnaires asking for specific detail of the incident (4yrs to current) 
20 
Production of labels with prescribing and administration information for a wide range of drugs. 
Production of a dose calculator for critical drugs 
22 Time and motion study over a 3 month period 
23 
Day to day: on when required – MAX daily dose, antibiotic duration & indication (often), renal 
dose adjustments 
24 Introductory talks to registrars as part of their rotational training 
25 
Many interventions including introduction of new prescriptions, training and education, 
standard infusion concentrations, ready-reckoners, emergency drug dose calculators etc 
28 Dosing Errors 
29 Prescribing at bedside & non-interruption whilst prescribing 
30 GOSH Tool  
Appendix  
 240 
 Response 
ID  
Nature of intervention used for prescribing errors? 
31 New drug charts 
32 PICU safety group have been overseeing RCAs and action plans on drug errors for 5 years 
33 Zero tolerance regime, where all errors are documented and chase up. 
34 
iPad compatible prescribing programme being developed and introduced which produces 
prescribing stickers 
35 Introduced electronic prescribing system 
36 Dedicated prescribing area 
37 
Prescribing training pre job. Pharmacy reviews each prescription chart. Specific PICU training. 
Feedback tool and discussion post error 
38 
Prescribing trolleys to reduce interruptions. Incident reporting system. Review of prescribing 
errors regularly to learn through reflective practice. Prescribers may be required to write a 
reflective account regarding lessons learnt from prescribing errors. 
39 Drug chart redesign; induction training session; on-going "power" sessions; twice yearly audit 
40 Continuous intervention 
41 Use of standard concentrations of infusions–Prescribing with standard labels 
42 Training, human factors (prescribing area), tracking and reviewing with feedback all errors 
43 
Assisted in the implementation for prescribing areas, and been involved in discussions prior to 
this for effective actions to take 
44 
Feedback to the prescriber from Pharmacist and safety team usually as an email if there are any 
errors. 
45 
More guidelines writing, particularly unlicensed drugs where no information is provided in BNF. 
Reviewing procedures for outpatient prescribing. 
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Response 
ID  
Nature of intervention used for medication administration errors? 
3 
Reduction of interruptions utilising high visibility disposable red tabards during the 
preparation & administration process of medications – audit of intervention three 
months – end 2010 – beginning 2011. 
4 staff training, incident reviews: Ongoing 
6 
Smart IV pumps introduced to help reduce incidents relating to drug infusion 
administration 
7 Silent double checking for nurses 
8 redaprons, double check, no harm 
9 Daily chart review by pharmacist, non-interruption policy 
12 IV infusion rounds &no unnecessary drugs given overnight 
14 
Double-checking for all drugs. Planning to implement use of 'high-vis' tabards for nurses 
drawing up drugs, to reduce interruptions. 
15 Zero tolerance policy 
16 
increased reporting and development of rapid feedback to the administrator; standardise 
algorithms for checking glucose (when on insulin) or K when on repeat dosing; red 
apron to prevent disturbances; reinforce 5 rights mentality/process; handover drug chart 
reviews 
17 
Using a red apron to identify nurses preparing & administering medications (approx 1yr 
to current). Specifically designed questionnaires asking for specific details of the incident 
(4yrs to current) 
18 send out info for nurses to read then observe administration, ask questions etc 
20 Labels as above + IV guidelines to help with information 
22 time and motion study over a 3 month period 
25 
Many interventions including development of IV drug guidelines file, training. pre-filled 
syringes, ready-reckoners, rationalisation of drugs/formulations stocked etc 
29 Red aprons & non interruption policy whilst administering 
31 Avoiding handover times  
32 
PICU safety group have been overseeing RCAs and action plans on drug errors for 5 
years 
34 
As above (iPAD compatible prescribing programme being developed and introduced 
which produces prescribing stickers), for many drugs, 'mls' of drug are calculated on 
prescribing. Also many administration drug guides 
37 
Critical incident forms with feedback. Non punitive approach. Drug rounds. CIVAS ivs 
where possible 
38 
All new nurses/staff returning from long term leave: basic and complex drug 
calculations, infusion devices competency assessments, 12 x administration of 
medication assessments. All staff: annual medications management update, complex 
drug calculations, IV update. Medication errors policy. Incident reporting system. Action 
plans and educational support for staff as required: decision made by Modern Matron 
39 multiple training sessions; iv monographs; twice yearly audit; ongoing sessions 
41 Use of standard concentrations of infusions 
42 Training, human factors, tracking and reviewing with feedback all errors 
43 Implemented the use of red aprons for all clinical staff drawing up/administrating 
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Response 
ID  
Nature of intervention used for medication administration errors? 
medicines 
44 Support and retraining. 
45 
More protocols stating usual practice for nurses to follow. Reviewing stock levels and 
trying to keep to just one strength. 
46 
Monthly documents on drug groups, aimed at nursing staff including info on dosing, 
administration and compatibility 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix  
 243 
Response 
ID 
Main outcomes of the audit 
1 Significant reduction in prescription errors from 45 to 15 % 
2 
Implementation in its infancy, initial data would suggest more errors are spotted and 
corrected before reaching the patient. 
3 
Interruptions continued irrespective of a change in practice during the three month audit 
process. 100% compliance, demonstrated “buy in” by nursing staff. 
4 Not specifically, again Audit is ongoing and continuous 
7 Prescribing errors reduced from 1 per occupied bed day to 0.3 per occupied bed day. 
8 Interventions reduced errors 
15 
Audited use of drug calculator (excel program) 2006–7 before and after implementation. 
Showed reduction in actual errors and near miss events 
16 
Ongoing reporting. Severity of incidents falling, reporting of incidents increasing – 
interpreted as a better culture 
17 
Continuous audit of medication incidents – causes, contributing factors etc. There has 
been a downward trend in severity of incident reported 
18 
Showed good knowledge but currently working on change in attitude as to why 
sometimes cut corners and don't follow policy properly. Improvement initially but now 
need to re-educate as problems again 
20 
Errors were reduced following the intervention although not all the improvement was 
maintained on re-audit. 
22 Medication errors reduced 
23 
Antibiotic audits are carried out monthly in respect to indication and duration ... still not 
100% Could install a trigger on electronic prescribing system Change of incident 
reporting NOW online and daily check possible, therefore also immediate follow-up In 
respect to administration: Need to write more specific guidance – in respect of too big 
patients – tube / routes NJ, OG, PEG. 
25 
Not with all the administration interventions but we undertake monthly audits of 
prescribing errors 
29 Pre audit, post not completed 
32 Errors reduced.  
34 Waiting to re-audit following introduction of prescribing programme 
35 
Intervention (e-prescribing) only live very recently – data to be collected and then 
audited 
36 in progress 
37 
All results not available, pharmacy keep an eye on all errors, plus we use our own critical 
incident forms to look at such incidents. 
38 Planning audit in 2013 
39 
being rushed and busy leads to errors – take your time and step back – training includes 
increase self and situational awareness – take that step back 
41 
Yes, no errors detected in 3 years post implementation. Only 2 errors with miss-selection 
of infusions 
42 Yes 
45 
We have only done an initial audit, we need to re-audit in one year, but interventions 
look to be making a difference. 
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Response 
ID 
Can you please describe the challenges/barriers you have faced in 
implementing the intervention? 
2 
Nursing staff attitude towards checking the drug chart. Doctors unwilling to use the 
dedicated prescribing area, Nurses having their opinion on what is and is not an error 
(i.e. abbreviations NaCl) 
3 
Poor “buy in” from members of the MDT. Additional support required from parents & 
visitors for the success of a change in practice. Disposable high visibility drug tabards 
alone are not enough to reduce / eradicate interruptions during the drug administration 
process. 
4 Getting staff to participate in the training. Avoiding the 'blame culture' 
6 
Pocket dose cards very favorably received. Smart pumps received well by nursing staff 
but has highlighted the need for a 2nd check regarding the information entered into the 
pumps as some errors have occurred due to human error in data entry into the pump. 
7 
Sticking to the guidelines and strictly no prescribing at end of bed on ward round and no 
speaking to prescribers policy all took getting used to 
8 lack of motivation and momentum after initial push 
10 Unit culture and acuity 
12 
reluctance from nursing staff to change the way things are done and doctors not taking 
med errors seriously 
15 
Cultural – implementing same calculator on three different PICU wards at the time all 
with different practices. Zero tolerance policy – easier to implement but have not audited 
to show effect 
16 
large workforce; difficulty in information distribution and reinforcement; time constraints; 
availability of space 
17 take of staff – poor if it is not easy for them to do the right thing. 
18 need nursing staff to be fully on-board. Good team of nurse educators here who led it. 
20 
Initial resistance to using labels but the greater problem is maintaining the system and 
ensuring there is administrative staff to print as needed 
21 lack of time and staff 
23 – time – limitations of the software 
24 
Challenge: getting registrars to note that as they will now do the majority of the 
prescribing it is important to acknowledge common mistakes. 
25 
Errors on PICU are so multi-faceted that it is very difficult to identify whether the 
changes made have contributed to preventing further errors or not 
29 Ensuring staff adherence to rules! 
32 Large intensive care unit–communications 
33 
Upsetting staff as all errors and near misses are recorded. Problems with feedback to the 
staff on the ground floor. 
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Response 
ID 
Can you please describe the challenges/barriers you have faced in 
implementing the intervention? 
35 
Huge project! not designed (other than in minor ways) for paediatrics so huge amount of 
labor intensive customisation of system required. Major lack of resources for 
implementation of system, in particular the drug file. 
36 people not adhering to non interruption rule 
39 
acceptance that there is a problem; that they can fall into the traps; drive for more 
"efficiency" and that being interpreted as speed 
41 
Many, manufacturing of infusions, design of labels of syringes, prescribing protocols and 
labels, training of nurses programming of pumps, storage of products and labelling of 
syringes 
42 
people felt threatened at first now they help to develop the solution to prevent it 
happening again 
43 
Large amount of work force to implement the action, Resistance for change, 
Communication, Lack of time/patient workload 
45 
The amount of nurses working on PICU and their shift patterns. The MDT nature of 
some errors and trying to close all the loop holes in the process (swiss cheese model). 
46 
Nursing staff shortages, pharmacy staff shortages – I went on maternity leave and the 
work was not continued in my absence as there was no senior pharmacist cover. 
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Appendix 7: Observation Study 
Introductory Presentation  
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Appendix 8: Observation Study Information 
Sheet 
  
!
!
!
Study!Information!Leaflet!–!Version!3!–!24th!July!2012!
!
!
!
Study!Information!Leaflet:!A!Study!to!Identify!Errors!in!Medication!Administration!!!
!
!
The!aim!of!the!study!
The!aim!of!this!study!is!to!identify!potential!medication!administration!errors!that!occur!in!
children!and!to!identify!their!causes,!so!we!can!learn!how!to!avoid!them.!We!are!not!
interested!in!who!makes!the!mistake,!just!what!they!are,!why!they!happened,!and!how!we!
can!stop!them!from!happening!again.!!
!
Why!is!the!study!being!done?!
Limited!literature!has!suggested!that!medication!administration!errors!may!be!common!in!
paediatrics!and!may!cause!severe!harm.!We!want!to!understand!the!nature!and!the!causes!
of!medication!administration!errors!in!children.!We!look!beyond!blaming!individuals!for!the!
occurrences!of!these!errors.!This!will!aid!in!the!development!of!strategies!that!will!help!and!
reduce!medication!administration!errors!in!this!patient!group.!!
!
Why!have!you!been!chosen?!
We!are!asking!all!healthcare!professionals!who!prepare!and!administer!medicines!to!help!in!
conducting!this!study.!This!study!has!been!approved!by!NHS!Research!Ethics!and!GOSH!R&D!
committees.!An!approval!has!also!been!taken!from!the!ward!risk!management!team.!
!
How!is!the!study!being!done?!
The!study!will!be!carried!out!during!your!routine!work!of!preparing!and!administering!
medicines.!The!researcher!would!like!to!observe!this!process!and!will!record!information!
about!how!the!drugs!are!prepared!and!administered.!Our!research!group!has!used!this!
method!to!observe!drug!rounds!in!other!adult!hospitals.!!
!
The!observer!will!approach!you!to!take!permission!prior!to!each!observation!in!order!to!
check!that!the!observation!will!be!carried!out!at!a!suitable!time!for!you!and!your!patient.!If!
you!agree,!the!observer!will!inform!you!of!what!would!be!carried!out!during!the!observation!
and!what!information!will!be!recorded.!Observation!will!be!carried!out!routinely!during!both!
day!and!night!shifts.!The!observation!schedule!will!be!given!to!the!Nurse!in!charge.!!
!
The!observation!will!be!unobtrusive!and!the!researcher!will!not!interfere!with!patient!care!
or!your!usual!ward!routine!in!any!way.!The!observations!will!be!done!during!most!drug!
administration!rounds.!The!observation!will!be!documented!into!a!standardised!form,!the!
form!will!record!details!of!medication!prescribed,!prepared!and!administered!to!the!patient,!
also!patient’s!hospital!number,!age,!sex!and!weight.!!
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!
!
The!observer!will!review!patient!medication!chart!before!administration.!Observer!will!only!
review!patient’s!medication!charts!if!you!have!consented!for!the!observation.!
!
Due!to!the!fact!that!at!the!PICU!medication!administration!time!slot!is!patient!specific!unlike!
other!wards!where!there!are!specific!time!slots!for!administrations,!the!observation!will!be!
carried!out!in!an!opportunistic!manner,!meaning!the!researcher!will!be!present!on!PICU!at!
most!medicine!administration!rounds!and!observe!medication!administration!only!if!you!
have!agreed!and!consented!for!the!observation.!
!
If!a!mistake!has!occurred,!a!doctor!might!have!to!be!contacted!if!an!action!is!required!but!it!
will!remain!anonymous.!We!will,!of!course,!intervene!to!stop!any!patient!harm,!in!the!
unlikely!event!that!this!is!necessary.!Any!such!interventions!will!be!made!in!an!unobtrusive!
manner.!!
!
The!researcher!will!deliver!a!study!presentation!in!order!to!clarify!any!queries!you!may!have!
and!an!informed!consent!will!be!taken!if!you!wish!to!participate,!prior!to!observation!the!
researcher!will!also!take!a!verbal!consent!from!you.!If!you!have!missed!the!presentation!the!
researcher!can!explain!the!study!to!you!personally!before!taking!an!informed!consent.!!!
!
What!are!the!potential!benefits?!
Currently!little!is!known!about!medication!administration!in!paediatric!in!intensive!care!unit!
currently.!This!study!will!allow!the!detection!of!possible!risk!factors!and!good!practices!in!
medication!administration!to!children,!therefore!making!medication!administration!safer.!!!
!
Who!will!have!access!to!the!research!records?!
Only!the!study!team!will!have!access!to!the!records!kept!in!this!study.!The!use!of!some!types!
of!personal!data!is!safeguarded!by!the!Data!Protection!Act!1998!(DPA).!The!DPA!places!an!
obligation!on!those!who!record!or!use!personal!information,!but!also!gives!rights!to!people!
about!whom!information!is!held.!If!you!have!questions!about!data!protection,!contact!the!
Data!Protection!Officer!via!the!switchboard!on!0207!405!9200!extension!5217.!!!
!
Do!I!have!to!take!part!in!this!study?!
No.!your!participation!in!the!study!is!entirely!voluntary!and!it!is!your!right!to!decide!whether!or!
not!to!take!part.!The!researcher!will!ask!you!at!the!beginning!of!each!drug!round!whether!you!
are!happy!to!be!observed!as!part!of!the!study.!If!you!would!prefer!not!to!be!included!in!the!
study,!please!let!him!know.!!
!
Who!do!I!speak!to!if!I!have!further!question!or!worries?!!
Please!contact!Mr!Ahmed!Ameer,!who!is!responsible!for!this!study.!You!can!contact!him!
either!by!phone!0170!728!4248!or!by!email!on!A.1.Ameer@herts.ac.uk.!Alternatively,!you!
can!contact!Dr!Mark!Peters!on!Mark.Peters@gosh.nhs.uk.!!
!
Mr!Ahmed!Ameer! ! Dr!Maisoon!Ghaleb!!! ! Professor!Soraya!Dhillon!
!University!of!Hertfordshire,!School!of!Pharmacy,!Hillside!House,!College!Lane,!AL10!9AB!
! !
Dr!Mark!Peters!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!Ms!Rachelle!Booth!!!!!!!!!!!! Ms!Alison!TabernerQStokes!
PICU!4th!Floor,!GOSH,!Great!Ormond!Street,!London,!WC1N!3JH!
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Appendix 9: Observation Study Consent 
Form 
  
Consent	Form	–	Version	2	–		1st	June	2012	
	
	
Consent	Form	
	
Study	Number:	
Participant	Identification	Number:	
Title	of	project:	Medication	Administration	Errors	in	Paediatric	Intensive	Care	Unit			
Name	of	Researcher:----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	
	
	
	
Please	tick	if	you	agree:	
	
1. I	confirm	that	I	have	read	and	understood	the	information	sheet	dated....................	
(version............)	 for	 the	 above	 study.	 I	 have	 had	 the	 opportunity	 to	 consider	 the	
information,	ask	questions	and	have	had	these	answered	satisfactorily.		
	
2. I	understand	that	my	participation	is	voluntary	and	that	I	am	free	to	withdraw	at	any	time	
without	giving	any	reason,	without	my	medical	care	or	legal	rights	being	affected	
	
3. I	agree	to	take	part	in	this	study	
	
Print	Name:----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	
Date:													/																	/	
	
Signature:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	
(By	participant)	
	
Print	Name:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	
(Person	taking	consent)	
	
When	completed:	1	for	participant;	1	for	researcher;	1	(original)	for	researcher	site	file	
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Appendix 10: Observation Study Posters  
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Appendix 11: Observation Study Pilot Data 
Collection Form 
 
Observation Form – Version 3 – 20th March 2013  
 
Date 
 
Patient Age 
 
 
MAE Detected 
Time 
 
Patient Weight 
 
 
Yes  No, If Yes specify type 
Preparation  
Wrong Medicine 
Wrong Patient 
Wrong Route 
Wrong formulation 
Admin. Technique 
Dosage Administered 
Dosage Prescribed & 
Administered  
Extra Dose    IV Rate  
Time            Omission 
Unauthorised Med. 
Other  
Obsv. 
Ref. 
 Patient 
Reference 
 
 
Detailed Account of Observation: 
 
Chart Review 
Error  Identified,  if Yes 
  Dose               Diluent      
 Formulation   Medicine    
 Route              Frequency   
  Illegal              IV Rate        
 Other  
Error Intercepted 
 Yes  No 
No .Interruption  
No. Doses  
 
Professional 
Ref. 
 Nurse                              Bank Staff       
 Sister                              NHS Staff       
 Trainee 
 Other --------------                         
Experience  
 0 to 6 months                   2 to 4 years 
 7 to 12 months                 5 to 10 years 
 1 to 2 years                       more than 10 years 
 
MAE Harm  No Harm       Low       Moderate        Severe              Death 
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Appendix 12: Case Vignettes for assessment 
of observed MAE 
Dose Errors Case Vignette 
 
Dose Error is the administration of the correct medicine by the correct route but in a quantity that was 
not that prescribed. This includes administration of the incorrect number of dose units and the 
measurement of an incorrect volume of an oral liquid. 
 
Using that definition, please circle/choose if you agree that following scenario is indeed containing an 
error in the dose given or not.   
 
Please rate severity of harm for the following scenarios in terms of potential clinical significance by 
choosing a number between zero to ten, where zero should be given to a case which will have no 
effects on the patient, and ten should be given to a case that would result in death. Please assess 
the cases based on the information available, but feel free to look up any information you need in the 
BNF or elsewhere. Please state any comments you have in the space provided. 
MAE Ref 
Patien
t 
Prescribed 
Medicine 
Administered Medicine Error Occurred 
4, 10, 15 
14 y/o 
(35kg) 
Aciclovir 350mg 
IV Q8hr  
Aciclovir 500mg/20mL solution for 
injection, 15mL (375mg) with NS 
100mL @ 100mL/hr 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
19, 22 
14 y/o 
(35kg) 
Alimenazine 
35mg PO QDS 
PRN 
Alimenazine 30mg/5mL oral solution, 
6mL (42mg) 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
25 
1 y/o 
(9.2kg
) 
Cefotaxime 
450mg IV Q6hr 
Cefotaxime 500mg powder for 
injection, WFI 2mL, 2mL (500mg) 
given 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments 
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44 
3 m/o 
(4kg) 
Cefotaxime 
200mg IV Q6hr 
Cefotaxime 500mg powder for 
injection, WFI 2mL, 1mL (250mg) 
given 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
47 
10 y/o 
(34kg) 
Clarithromycin 
255mg IV BD 
Clarithromycin 500mg powder for 
injection, WFI 9.6mL, 4.5mL (225mg) 
with NS 100mL @ 2mL/min 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
54, 55 
2 y/o 
(12kg) 
Dexamethasone 
1.2mg IV QDS 
Dexamethasone 4mg/mL solution for 
injection, 0.25mL (1mg) given Neat 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
56, 57, 62, 
65, 71, 72, 
75 
3 m/o 
(4kg) 
Dexamethasone 
0.6mg IV QDS 
Dexamethasone 4mg/mL solution for 
injection, 0.1mL (0.4mg) given Neat 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
76 
11 
m/o 
(9kg) 
Dexamethasone 
1.35mg IV QDS 
Dexamethasone 4mg/mL solution for 
injection, 0.3mL (1.2mg) given Neat 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments 
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78 
1 y/o 
(9.2kg
) 
Flucloxacillin 
22mg IV Q6hr 
Flucloxacillin 250mg powder for 
injection, WFI 4.8mL, 5mL (250mg) 
given over 5min 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
82, 84 
1 y/o 
(10kg) 
Furosemide 5mg 
IV QDS 
Furosemide 20mg/5mL Oral solution, 
1.2mL (4.8mg) given NGI 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
86 
10 y/o 
(33kg) 
Ibuprofen 440mg 
PO TDS 
Ibuprofen 100mg/5mL oral solution, 
20mL (400mg) given NGI 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
87, 90 
1 y/o 
(7.5kg
) 
Ibuprofen 75mg 
PO QDS 
Ibuprofen 100mg/5mL oral solution, 
3.8mL (76mg) given NGI 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
91, 92 
1 y/o 
(10kg) 
Lansoprazole 
10mg NGI OD 
Lansoprazole 15mg Dispersable 
Table in 50mL water, 50mL (15mg) 
given 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments 
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93 
4 y/o 
(17kg) 
Metronidazole 
130mg PO Q6hr 
Metronidazole 200mg/5mL oral 
solution, 3.2mL(128mg) 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
100, 102, 
103, 111, 
115, 120 
2 m/o 
(1.6kg
) 
Morphine 
0.33mg PO Q6hr 
Morphine 10mg/5mL oral solution, 
0.1mL (0.2mg) given 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
121, 122, 
123, 126 
4 y/o 
(20kg) 
Paracetamol 
400mg NGI QDS 
Paracetamol 250mg/5mL oral 
solution, 5mL (500mg)  
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
129 
1 y/o 
(7kg) 
Paracetamol 
110mg PO QDS 
Paracetamol 120mg/5mL oral 
solution, 4mL (96mg)  
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
130, 131, 
132 
4 y/o 
(17kg) 
Paracetamol 
265mg PO Q6hr 
Paracetamol 250mg/5mL oral 
solution, 6mL (300m) 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
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133, 134 
8 y/o 
(27kg) 
Phenyotin 
125mg NGI BD 
Phenyotin 30mg/5mL oral solution, 
18mL (108mg) 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
135 
1 y/o 
(9.2kg
) 
Phenyotin 45mg 
IV BD 
Phenyotin 250mg/5mL solution for 
injection, 0.8mL (40mg) given Neat  
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
136, 137, 
138, 139, 
140 
2 m/o 
(3.3kg
) 
Ranitidine 3mg 
IV TDS 
Ranitidine 50mg/2mL solution for 
injection, 0.2mL (5mg) given Neat  
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
142, 143, 
146 
4 y/o 
(20kg) 
Ranitidine 20mg 
IV TDS 
Ranitidine 50mg/2mL solution for 
injection, 0.6mL (15mg) given Neat  
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
147 
2 y/o 
(12kg) 
Ranitidine 12mg 
IV TDS 
Ranitidine 50mg/2mL solution for 
injection, 0.6mL (15mg) given Neat 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
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148, 151, 
152, 154, 
155, 157 
1 y/o 
(9.6kg
) 
Ranitidine 9.5mg 
IV Q8hr  
Ranitidine 50mg/2mL solution for 
injection, 0.5mL (12.5mg) given Neat 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
158, 159 
4 y/o 
(16kg) 
Ranitidine 16mg 
IV TDS 
Ranitidine 50mg/2mL solution for 
injection, 0.8mL (20mg) given Neat 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
161, 162, 
163 
1 m/o 
(3kg) 
Ranitidine 3mg 
IV TDS 
Ranitidine 50mg/2mL solution for 
injection, 0.2mL (5mg) given Neat  
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
164, 165, 
166, 169 
1 y/o 
(9.4kg
) 
Ranitidine 9mg 
IV Q8hr  
Ranitidine 50mg/2mL solution for 
injection, 0.3mL (7.5mg) given Neat 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
170, 171, 
175, 176, 
177, 179, 
182 
1 y/o 
(7.5kg
) 
Salbutamol 1 
puff inhalation 
QDS PRN 
Salbutamol 100mcg mouth inhaler, 2 
puffs administered  
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
183, 184 
4 y/o 
(26kg) 
Sodium 
Valporate 360mg 
Sodium Valporate 200mg/5mL oral 
solution, 8mL (320mg)  
Yes / No 
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PO BD 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
 
 
  
Formulation Errors Case Vignette 
 
Formulation error is the administration of the correct medicine by the correct route but in a formulation 
that was not the prescribed.  
 
Please rate severity of harm for the following scenarios in terms of potential clinical significance by 
choosing a number between zero to ten, where zero should be given to a case which will have no 
effects on the patient, and ten should be given to a case that would result in death. Please assess 
the cases based on the information available, but feel free to look up any information you need in the 
BNF or elsewhere. Please state any comments you have in the space provided. 
MAE Ref 
Patien
t 
Prescribed 
Medicine 
Administered Medicine 
Error 
Occurred 
125 
7 y/o 
(19kg) 
Co-Trimoxazol 
480mg PO 
Q12hr 
Co-Trimoxazol 480mg/5mL solution for 
injection, 5mL (480mg) in NS 125mL @ 
120mL/hr administered,  
Yes / No 
Severity of Harm  0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9     10    
Comments  
80, 82, 84, 
153 
1 y/o 
(10kg) 
Furosemide 5mg 
IV QDS 
Furosemide 20mg/5mL oral solution, 1.2mL 
(4.8mg) given. 
Yes / No 
Severity of Harm  0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9     10    
Comments  
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Infusion Rate Errors Case Vignette 
 
Infusion rate error is the administration of the correct medicine and correct dose by the correct route 
but infused at a rate that falls out side the recommended infusion rate of the medicine per guidelines. 
Using this definition, please circle/choose if you agree that following scenario is indeed containing an 
infusion rate error or not.   
 
Please rate severity of harm for the following scenarios in terms of potential clinical significance by 
choosing a number between zero to ten, where zero should be given to a case which will have no 
effects on the patient, and ten should be given to a case that would result in death. Please assess 
the cases based on the information available, but feel free to look up any information you need in the 
BNF or elsewhere. Please state any comments you have in the space provided. 
MAE 
Ref 
Patient Prescribed Medicine Administered Medicine 
Error 
Occurred 
2 
2 y/o 
(12kg) 
Cefotaxime 600mg IV QDS 
Cefotaxime 1g powder for injection, WFI 
3.5mL, 2.4mL (600mg) given over 2min 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
16, 20, 
21 
10 y/o 
(30kg) 
Clarithromycin 255mg IV BD 
Clarithromycin 500mg powder for 
injection, WFI 9.6mL, 5mL (250mg) in 
100mL NS @ 2mL/min 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
28 
2 y/o 
(12kg) 
Clarithromycin 90mg IV 
QDS 
Clarithromycin 500mg powder for 
injection, WFI 9.6mL, 1.8mL (90mg) in 
50mL NS @ 100mL/hr  
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
33, 34 
8 y/o 
(26kg) 
Furosemide 5mg IV BD 
Furosemide 10mg/mL solution for 
injection, 0.5mL (5mg) given Neat Bolus  
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
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36, 40 
4 y/o 
(20kg) 
Furosemide 10mg IV Q6hr 
Furosemide 10mg/mL solution for 
injection, 1mL (10mg) given Neat Bolus 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
41, 42 
1 y/o 
(10kg) 
Metronidazole 75mg IV 
Q8hr  
Metronidazole 500mg/100mL solution 
for injection, 15mL (75mg) in G5W 
85mL @ 400mL/hr 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
47 
1 y/o 
(9.6kg) 
Midazolam 50mg (0-4 mcg/ 
kg/min) Continuous IV @ 0 - 
2mL/hr, 50mL G5S 
Midazolam 50mg/10mL solution for 
injection, 10mL in G5S 40mL @ 1mL/hr 
as 2mcg/kg/hr 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
53, 60, 
64, 70, 
77, 79 
14 y/o 
(41kg) 
Ranitidine 40mg IV Q8hr 
Ranitidine 50mg/2mL Solution for 
injection, 1.6mL (40mg) given in less 
than 2min 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
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108 
3 y/o 
(14kg) 
Ranitidine 14mg IV Q8hr 
Ranitidine 50mg/2mL solution for 
injection, 0.6mL (14mg) Neat Bolus 
Yes / No 
110, 
112 
15 y/o 
(50kg) 
Ranitidine 50mg IV TDS 
Ranitidine 50mg/2mL solution for 
injection, 2mL (50mg) Neat Bolus 
Yes / No 
145, 
149 
1 y/o 
(10kg) 
Ranitidine 10mg IV QDS 
Ranitidine 50mg/2mL solution for 
injection, 0.4mL (10mg) Neat Bolus 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
150 
11 m/o 
(9kg) 
Vancomycin 150mg IV TDS 
Vancomycin 500mg powder for 
injection, WFI 9.7mL, 3mL (150mg) @ 
1mL/hr 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
178 
1 y/o 
(10kg) 
Vecuronium 30mg (0-
4mcg/kg /min) Continuous 
IV @ 0-2mL/hr in 25mL 
NaCl 0.9%  
Vecuronium 10mg powder for Injection, 
WFI 5mL x3 (30mg), NaCl 0.9% (10mL), 
infused @ 1mL/hr as 2mcg/kg/hr 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
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Omission Errors Case Vignette 
 
Omission error is a dose of medication that had not been administered by the time of the next 
scheduled‎ dose.‎ Doses‎ omitted‎ according‎ to‎ doctors’‎ instructions,‎ according‎ to‎ a‎ nurse’s‎ clinical‎
judgement or because the patient was not on the ward were not considered opportunities for error. If a 
dose omitted was documented in medication chart, it would not be considered as an omission error. 
 
Please rate severity of harm for the following scenarios in terms of potential clinical significance by 
choosing a number between zero to ten, where zero should be given to a case which will have no 
effects on the patient, and ten should be given to a case that would result in death. Please assess 
the cases based on the information available, but feel free to look up any information you need in the 
BNF or elsewhere. Please state any comments you have in the space provided. 
MAE 
Ref 
Patient Prescribed Medicine Administered Medicine 
Error 
Occurred 
5 
4 y/o 
(20kg) 
Furosemide 10mg IV Q6hr  
Dose not given, omission not 
documented  
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
9 
10 m/o 
(9.5kg) 
Furosemide 9mg IV BD 
Dose not given, omission not 
documented 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
12 
10 m/o 
(9.5kg) 
Ranitidine 10mg IV TDS 
Dose not given, omission not 
documented 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
17, 35, 
39 
1 y/o 
(10kg) 
Paracetamol 150mg IV Q6hr 
Dose not given, omission not 
documented 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
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98 
1 y/o 
(9.2kg) 
Ranitidine 9mg IV TDS 
Dose not given, omission not 
documented 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
117 
1 y/o 
(7.5kg) 
Chloral 225mg PO Q6hr 
Dose not given, omission not 
documented 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
118 
1 y/o 
(7.5kg) 
Morphine 1.5mg PO Q6hr 
Dose not given, omission not 
documented 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
144 
2 m/o 
(1.6kg) 
Furosemide 1mg IV TDS 
Dose not given, omission not 
documented 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
160 
11 m/o 
(9kg) 
Disopyramide 20mg PO Q6hr 
Dose not given, omission not 
documented 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
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Preparation Errors Case Vignette 
 
Preparation error is an incorrect preparation of the medication dose, an example incorrect dilution or 
reconstitution, not shaking a suspension, not keeping a light-sensitive drug protected from light, and 
mixing drugs that are physically or chemically incompatible. Not following aseptic preparation 
technique is also considered a preparation error. Also not administering a medicine without double 
checking is a preparation error or use of wrong diluent than that prescribed or recommended in 
guidelines.  
 
Please rate severity of harm for the following scenarios in terms of potential clinical significance by 
choosing a number between zero to ten, where zero should be given to a case which will have no 
effects on the patient, and ten should be given to a case that would result in death. Please assess 
the cases based on the information available, but feel free to look up any information you need in the 
BNF or elsewhere. Please state any comments you have in the space provided. 
MAE 
Ref 
Patient Prescribed Medicine Administered Medicine 
Error 
Occurred 
11 
7 y/o 
(26kg) 
Aciclovir 475mg IV Q8hr 
Aciclovir 500mg/20mL solution for 
injection, 19mL (475mg) in 100mL NS @ 
100mL/hr, Dose spillage occurred when 
withdrawing the 19mL into 100mL of NS 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
3 
2 y/o 
(12 kg) 
Aciclovir 280mg  IV TDS 
Aciclovir 500mg/20mL solution for 
injection. 11.2mL (280mg) in NS 56mL 
@1.2mL/min administered but no aseptic 
preparation followed. 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
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23 
1 y/o 
(10kg) 
Benzylpencillin 500mg 
IV Q8hr 
Benzylpencilin 600mg powder for injection, 
NS 5.6mL, 5mL (500mg) to NS 15mL @ 
30mL/hr, Dose spillage occurred when 
withdrawing from syringe containing drug. 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
46 
1 y/o 
(10kg) 
Benzylpencillin 500mg 
IV Q8hr 
Benzylpencilin 600mg powder for injection, 
NS 5.6mL, 5mL (500mg) to NS 15mL @ 
30mL/hr, Dose spillage occurred and not 
following aseptic technique 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
27, 52, 
49,  
1 y/o 
(10kg) 
Cefotaxime 500mg IV 
Q6hr 
Cefotaxime 500mg powder for injection, 
NS 2mL, 2mL (500mg) over 5min. Powder 
not fully dissolved. 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
174 
1 y/o 
(9kg) 
Cefotaxime 450mg IV 
Q6hr 
Cefotaxime 500mg powder for injection, 
NS 2mL, 1.8mL (450mg) over 5min. No 
double check. 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
30, 31  
5 y/o 
(18kg) 
Ceftazidime 2g IV TDS 
Ceftazidime 2g powder for injection, WFI 
10mL, 10mL (2g) Neat Bolus given. 
Powder not fully dissolved. 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
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37  
5 y/o 
(18kg) 
Co-Amoxiclav 125/31mg 
PO TDS 
Co-Amoxiclav 125/31mg/5mL oral solution, 
5mL given using oral syringe, dose spillage 
noticed.  
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
180 
15 y/o 
(60kg) 
Co-Amoxiclav 1.2g IV 
Q8hr 
Co-Amoxiclav 600mg powder for injection, 
WFI 10mL x2. 20mL(1.2g) neat given 
without double check. 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
43 
1 y/o 
(9.2kg) 
Flucloxacillin 225mg IV 
Q6hr 
Flucloxacillin 250mg powder for injection, 
WFI 4.8mL, 4.5mL(225mg) neat over 5min 
given. Dose spillage 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
48 
10 y/o 
(33kg) 
Ibuprofen 440mg PO 
TDS 
Ibuprofen 100mg/5mL oral solution, 
20mL(400mg) given. Not shaken. 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
51 
1 y/o 
(7.5kg) 
Ibuprofen 75mg PO 
QDS 
Ibuprofen 100mg/5mL oral solution, 
3.8mL(76mg) given. Not shaken. 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
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93 
4 y/o 
(17kg) 
Metronidazole 130mg 
PO Q6hr 
Metronidazole 200mg/5mL oral solution, 
3.2mL (128mg) given but not double 
checked 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
6, 45, 
63 
8 y/o 
(27 kg) 
Midazolam 0 – 4 
mcg/kg/min continuous 
IV @ 0 – 2mL/hr 
Midazolam 50mg/10mL solution for 
injection, 32.4mL in NS 17.6mL @ 
20mcg/kg/min (1mL/hr). Dose spillage 
noticed and wrong diluent used, G5W 
prescribed. 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
172 
1 y/o 
(12kg) 
Midazolam 0 – 4 
mcg/kg/min continuous 
IV @ 0 – 2mL/hr 
Midazolam 50mg/10mL solution for 
injection, 14.4mL in NS 35.6mL @ 
20mcg/kg/min (1mL/hr). Wrong diluent 
used, G5W prescribed.  
Yes/No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
66, 68 
1 y/o 
(10kg) 
Morphine 0 – 4 
mcg/kg/hr continuous IV 
@ 0 – 2mL/hr 
Morphine 10mg/mL solution for injection, 
1mL in NS 49mL @ 20mcg/kg/min 
(1mL/hr). Dose spillage noticed. 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
173 
1 y/o 
(12kg) 
Morphine 0 – 4 
mcg/kg/hr continuous IV 
@ 0 – 2mL/hr 
Morphine 10mg/mL solution for injection, 
1.2mL in NS 48.8mL @ 20mcg/kg/min 
(1mL/hr). No aseptic technique followed. 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments 
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7 
8 y/o 
(27kg) 
Morphine 0 – 4 
mcg/kg/hr continuous IV 
@ 0 – 2mL/hr 
Morphine 10mg/mL solution for injection, 
2.7mL in NS 47.3mL @ 20mcg/kg/min 
(1mL/hr). Wrong diluent used, G5W 
prescribed. 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
69, 73, 
67 
4 y/o 
(26kg) 
Oramorph 2.5mL PO 
QDS  
Oramorph 10mg/5mL oral solution, 2.5mL 
(5mg) given but not shaken. Poor aseptic 
technique  
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
74, 81 
14 y/o 
(41kg) 
Paracetamol 500mg PO 
QDS PRN 
Paracetamol 250mg/5mL oral solution, 
10mL(500mg) given but not shaken using 
oral syringe. 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
85 
8 y/o 
(27kg) 
Paracetamol 500mg 
NGI QDS 
Paracetamol 250mg/5mL oral solution, 
10mL(500mg) given but not shaken using 
oral syringe. 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
86 
1 y/o 
(7.5kg) 
Paracetamol 120mg PO 
QDS 
Paracetamol 120mg/5mL oral solution, 
5mL (120mg) given but not shaken & 
spillage using oral syringe. 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
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90, 94 
1 y/o 
(10kg) 
Paracetamol 150mg IV 
Q6hr 
Paracetamol 500mg/50mL solution for 
injection, 15mL (150mg) @ 1mL/min Neat. 
Dose spillage 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
95, 
104 
2 m/o 
(3.3kg) 
Paracetamol 60mg IV 
QDS 
Paracetamol 500mg/50mL solution for 
injection, 6mL (60mg) in NS 54mL @ 
1mL/min. Dose spillage 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
119 
4 y/o 
(20kg) 
Paracetamol 400mg 
NGI QDS 
Paracetamol 250mg/5mL oral solution, 
8mL(400mg) given but not shaken 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments 
 
 
 
 
 
124 
4 y/o 
(17kg) 
Paracetamol 265mg PO 
Q6hr 
Paracetamol 250mg/5mL oral solution, 
6mL (300mg) given but not shaken 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
127, 
128 
4 y/o 
(26kg) 
Phenytoin 150mg NGI 
BD 
Phenytoin 30mg/5mL oral solution, 25mL 
(150mg) given but not shaken 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments 
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132 
8 y/o 
(27kg) 
Piperacillin/Tazobactam 
2475mg IV Q6hr 
Piperacillin/Tazobactam 4/0.5g powder for 
injection, NS 16.6mL, 11mL (2475mg) 
neat, dose spillage & no aseptic technique 
followed  
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
141 
11 m/o 
(9kg) 
Propranolol 9mg PO 
TDS 
Propranolol 10mg/5mL oral solution, 4.5mL 
(9mg) given but not shaken 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
32 
15 y/o 
(47kg) 
Rifampicin/Isoniazid 
450/300mg PO OD 
Rifampicin/Isoniazid 150/100mg tablets 
crushed and dissolved in water x3. 50mL 
(450/300mg) given but poor aseptic 
technique followed.   
Yes/No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
156, 
167, 
168 
14 y/o 
(41kg) 
Salbutamol 100mcg 
2puffs QDS PRN 
Salbutamol 100mcg Inhaler, 2 puffs 
administered but inhaler not shaken 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments 
 
 
 
 
 
181 
14 y/o 
(35kg) 
Vancomycin 2g IV TDS 
Vancomycin 1g powder for injection, WFI 
20mL x2. 40mL (2g) in NS 400mL @ 
200mL/hr. Powder not fully dissolved in 
vial. 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
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Time Errors Case Vignette 
 
Time error is the administration of a medication ± 1 hour of the prescribed dosage regime. 
 
Please rate severity of harm for the following scenarios in terms of potential clinical significance 
by choosing a number between zero to ten, where zero should be given to a case which will have 
no effects on the patient, and ten should be given to a case that would result in death. Please 
assess the cases based on the information available, but feel free to look up any information you 
need in the BNF or elsewhere. Please state any comments you have in the space provided. 
MAE 
Ref 
Patient Prescribed Medicine Administered Medicine 
Error 
Occurred 
101 
14 y/o 
(35kg) 
Aciclovir 350mg IV Q8hr 
Aciclovir 500mg/20mL solution for 
injection, 14mL (350mg) in NS 100mL @ 
100m/hr given 1hr:45min late 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
61 
1 y/o 
(10kg) 
Aciclovir 245mg IV TDS 
Aciclovir 500mg/20mL solution for 
injection, 9.8mL (245mg) in NS100mL @ 
100mL/hr given 1hr:30min late 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
18 
1 y/o 
(10kg) 
Benzylpencillin 500mg IV 
Q8hr 
Benzylpencillin 600mg powder for 
injection, NS5.6mL, 5mL(500mg) in NS 
15mL @ 30mL/hr given 1hr:50min late 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
13 
2 y/o 
(12kg) 
Cefotaxime 600mg IV 
QDS 
Cefotaxime 1g powder for injection WFI 
3.5mL, 2.4mL (600mg) given 1hr:15min 
late   
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
Appendix  
 275 
59 
1 y/o 
(10kg) 
Cefotaxime 500mg IV 
Q6hr 
Cefotaxime 500mg powder for injection, 
WFI 2mL, 2mL (500mg) given 1hr:20min 
late 
Yes / No 
113 
1 y/o 
(9.1kg) 
Cefotaxime 450mg IV 
Q6hr 
Cefotaxime 500mg powder for injection, 
WFI 2mL, 1.8mL (450mg) given 
1hr:30min late 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
114 
11 m/o 
(9kg) 
Ciprofloxacin 90mg IV 
Q8hr  
Ciprofloxacin 250mg/5mL oral solution, 
1.8mL (90mg) was given orally 1hr:10min 
late 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
58 
1 y/o 
(10kg) 
Clarithromycin 75mg IV 
BD 
Clarithromycin 500mg powder for 
injection, WFI 9.6mL, 1.5mL (75mg) in 
NS 50mL @ 50mL/hr given 2hrs late 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
76 
11 m/o 
(9kg) 
Dexamethasone 1.35mg 
IV QDS 
Dexamethasone 4mg/mL solution for 
injection, 0.3mL (1.2mg) given neat 
2hr:10min late 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
99 
1 y/o 
(9.2kg) 
Flucloxacillin 225mg IV 
Q6hr 
Flucloxacillin 250mg powder for injection, 
WFI 4.8mL, 4.5mL (225mg) neat given 
2hr late 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
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87 
1 y/o 
(7.5kg) 
Ibuprofen 75mg IV QDS 
Ibuprofen 100mg/5mL oral solution, 
3.8mL (76mL) given 1hr:45min late  
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
89 
4 y/o 
(17kg) 
Meropenem 340mg IV 
Q8hr 
Meropenem 0.5g powder for injection, 
WFI 9.5mL, 6.8mL(340mg) in NS 17mL 
given 1hr:15min late 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
1, 38 
1 y/o 
(10kg) 
Metronidazole 75mg IV 
Q8hr 
Metronidazole 500mg/100mL solution for 
injection, 15mL (75mg) in G5W 85mL @ 
5mL/min given 1hr late 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
83, 88, 
109 
4 y/o 
(26kg) 
Oramorph 2.5mL PO 
QDS 
Oramorph 10mg/5mL oral solution, 
2.5mL(5mL) given 1hr:50 late 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
97 
14 y/o 
(41kg) 
Paracetamol 1g NGI 
QDS 
Paracetamol 250mg/5mL oral 
solution,20mL(1g) given 1hr:30min late 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
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105 
1 y/o 
(9.2kg) 
Piperacillin/Tazobactam 
810mg IV Q6hr 
Piperacillin/Tazobactam 2g/0.25g powder 
for injection, WFI 8.3mL, 3.5mL (810mg) 
given 2hr:15min late 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
8, 26, 
29 
8 y/o 
(27kg) 
Piperacillin/Tazobactam 
2475mg IV Q6hr 
Piperacillin/Tazobactam 4g/0.5g powder 
for injection, NS 16.6mL, 11mL (2475mg) 
given 1hr:50min late 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
116 
11 m/o 
(9kg) 
Propranolol 9mg PO TDS 
Propranolol 10mg/5mL oral solution, 
4.5mL(9mg) given 2hrs:30min late 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
106 
3 y/o 
(14kg) 
Ranitidine 14mg IV Q8hr 
Ranitidine 50mg/2mL solution for 
injection, 0.6mL (14mg) given 1hr:10min 
late 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
24 
1 y/o 
(10kg) 
Ranitidine 10mg IV QDS 
Ranitidine 50mg/2mL solution for 
injection, 0.4mL (10mg) given 1hr:30min 
late 
Yes / No 
Severity of 
Harm 
 0      1       2       3       4       5       6       7     8       9       10    
Comments  
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Appendix 13: MAE Safety Measures Survey 
Invitation Letter for  GOSH PICU Staff 
 
University	of	Hertfordshire		
School	of	Life	and	Medical	Sciences	
Department	of	Pharmacy	
College	Lane	
Hatfield	
AL10	9AB,	UK		
Tel:	+44	(0)1707284248	
Fax:	+44	(0)1707284506	
herts.ac.uk		
A Charity Exempt from Registration under the 
Second Schedule of the Charities Act 1993   
 
16	July	2014	
	
Dear	Healthcare	Professional	
	
My	name	is	Ahmed	Ameer,	I	am	a	doctoral	candidate	at	the	Department	of	Pharmacy,	University	of	
Hertfordshire.	I	would	like	to	invite	you	to	participate	in	an	online	survey	to	identify	an	intervention	to	
reduce	the	possibility	of	medication	administration	errors	in	paediatric	intensive	care	unit.		
If	you	decide	to	participate	please	complete	a	short	online	survey	at:	
http://tinyurl.com/interventiondesign	,	the	survey	should	not	take	you	more	than	10	minutes	to	
complete.	Participation	is	entirely	voluntary	and	data	obtained	will	be	kept	confidential.		
The	results	of	the	study	will	be	published	or	presented	at	meetings,	but	data	will	be	kept	anonymous.	I	will	
be	grateful	if	you	can	also	nominate	any	other	individuals	that	you	feel	have	been	involved	in	putting	the	
intervention	at	your	practice.	They	can	follow	the	same	link	above	to	complete	the	survey.		
Thank	you	very	much	for	your	co-operation	and	participating	in	this	study.	If	you	have	any	query,	you	can	
contact	me	at	01707284248	or	email	A.1.Ameer@herts.ac.uk.				
	
With	kind	regards				
	
AhmedAmeer 
	
Ahmed	Ameer	MRPharmS	
PhD	Candidate					
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Appendix 14: MAE Safety Measures Survey 
Invitation Letter for PICU Staff Nationally  
 
University	of	Hertfordshire		
School	of	Life	and	Medical	Sciences	
Department	of	Pharmacy	
College	Lane	
Hatfield	
AL10	9AB,	UK		
Tel:	+44	(0)1707284248	
Fax:	+44	(0)1707284506	
herts.ac.uk		
A Charity Exempt from Registration under the 
Second Schedule of the Charities Act 1993   
 
16	July	2014	
	
Dear	Healthcare	Professional	
	
My	name	is	Ahmed	Ameer,	I	am	a	doctoral	candidate	at	the	Department	of	Pharmacy,	University	of	
Hertfordshire.	I	would	like	to	invite	you	to	participate	in	an	online	survey	to	identify	an	intervention	to	
reduce	the	possibility	of	medication	administration	errors	in	paediatric	intensive	care	unit.		
If	you	decide	to	participate	please	complete	a	short	online	survey	at:	
https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/CFHGNF3	,	the	survey	should	not	take	you	more	than	10	minutes	to	
complete.	Participation	is	entirely	voluntary	and	data	obtained	will	be	kept	confidential.		
The	results	of	the	study	will	be	published	or	presented	at	meetings,	but	data	will	be	kept	anonymous.	I	will	
be	grateful	if	you	can	also	nominate	any	other	individuals	that	you	feel	have	been	involved	in	putting	the	
intervention	at	your	practice.	They	can	follow	the	same	link	above	to	complete	the	survey.		
Thank	you	very	much	for	your	co-operation	and	participating	in	this	study.	If	you	have	any	query,	you	can	
contact	me	at	01707284248	or	email	A.1.Ameer@herts.ac.uk.				
	
With	kind	regards				
	
AhmedAmeer 
	
Ahmed	Ameer	MRPharmS	
PhD	Candidate					
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Appendix 15: MAE Safety Measures Survey  
 
Survey to Design Medication Administration Error Intervention in PICU 
 
Thank you for taking part in in this medication administration error intervention 
design survey. The purpose of this survey is to identify interventions and/or 
tools that can help to reduce the possibility of medication administration errors 
in your practice.  
 
All data collected in this survey will be anonymised and held securely. The 
survey should take 5–10 minutes to complete. 
 
Survey results and feedback will be reviewed within the University of 
Hertfordshire, Department of Pharmacy.  
 
If you have any questions, please contact Ahmed Ameer on 
A.1.Ameer@herts.ac.uk.  
 
Thank you very much for completing this survey.  
 
1. Can you please choose one of the following that best describe you: 
 Doctor 
 Nurse 
 Pharmacist 
 
2. How many years of post registration experience do you have?  
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3. What factors do you believe could lead to making a mistake during 
medication administration in your current practice?   
 
4. In your opinion, what would reduce the possibility of medication 
administration errors in current practice?  
 
5. Please rate the usefulness of the following interventions/tools in 
reducing medication administration errors in your current practice?  
Intervention/Tool 
Scale 
Don’t‎
Know 
Not Useful 
At All 
Not Very 
Useful 
Somewhat 
Useful 
Very 
Useful 
Extremely 
Useful  
Centralised Intravenous 
Additive Service (CIVAS) for 
high risk drugs and drugs 
with difficult concentrations   
      
Barcode medication 
administration technology 
combined with smart infusion 
pumps  
      
Zero Tolerance Policy 
towards interruptions during 
administration 
      
Use of electronic calculator 
to help with preparation of 
dose e.g. calculate the actual 
volume needed to 
withdrawal, the amount of 
diluent and work out the rate 
of infusion  
      
Extensive eLearning 
modules on medication 
administration process with 
demonstration videos  
      
Step by Step flow chart 
easily accessible describing 
medication administration 
process and tips with 
pharmaceutical dose 
calculations for Intravenous 
medications  
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6. Would you like to participate in future research aiming to develop an 
intervention to reduce medication errors in PICU or be informed of this 
research outcome? If yes, please provide the following 
 
Name 
 
Job Title 
 
E-mail 
Address 
 
  
7. Do you have any other comments? 
 
 
 
Thank you very much for taking time to complete this survey. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
